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Preface 
This report documents the findings and analysis of a 60-day agency-wide Lunar Robotic Architecture 
Study (LRAS) conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  Work on this 
study began in January 2006.  Its purpose was to: 
• Define a lunar robotics architecture by addressing the following issues: 
o Do we need robotic missions at all?  If so, why and under what conditions? 
o How would they be accomplished and at what cost?  Are they within budget? 
o What are the minimum requirements?  What is the minimum mission set? 
• Integrate these elements together to show a viable robotic architecture. 
• Establish a strategic framework for a lunar robotics program. 
The LRAS Final Report presents analysis and recommendations concerning potential approaches related 
to NASA’s implementation of the President’s Vision for Space Exploration.  Project and contract 
requirements will likely be derived in part from the LRAS analysis and recommendations contained 
herein, but these do not represent a set of project or contract requirements and are not binding on the U.S. 
Government unless and until they are formally and expressly adopted as such. 
Details of any recommendations offered by the LRAS Final Report will be translated into implementation 
requirements.  Moreover, the report represents the assessments and projects of the report’s authors at the 
time it was prepared; it is anticipated that the concepts in this report will be analyzed further and refined. 
By the time some of the activities addressed in this report are implemented, certain assumptions on which 
the report’s conclusions are based will likely evolve as a result of this analysis. Accordingly, NASA, and 
any entity under contract with NASA, should not use the information in this report for final project 
direction. 
Since the conclusion of this study, there have been various changes to the Agency’s current portfolio of 
lunar robotic precursor activities.  First, the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP) has been 
renamed the Lunar Precursor and Robotic Program (LPRP).  On May 17, 2006, the Lunar Reconnaissance 
Orbiter (LRO) was confirmed to enter its implementation phase.  Last, a new low-cost secondary payload 
known as the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was co-manifested to launch 
with LRO in 2008.  These changes are consistent with the conclusions and recommendations of this 
study, but came too late to be specifically reflected in this report. 
 
 
 
 
 
The cover image of the Copernicus crater on the moon is seen from the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft, an Apollo 
lunar robotic precursor mission.  Copernicus is 93 km wide and is located within the Mare Imbrium Basin, 
northern nearside of the moon (10 degrees N., 20 degrees W.). Image shows crater floor, floor mounds, 
rim, and rayed ejecta.  Rays from the ejecta are superposed on all other surrounding terrains which places 
the crater in its namesake age group: the Copernican system, established as the youngest assemblage of 
rocks on the moon.  Source: Shoemaker and Hackman, The Moon  (London: Academic Press, 1962), pp. 
289-300. 
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1. Executive Summary 
 
This report of the Lunar Robotic Architecture Study (LRAS) responds to a charter from the NASA 
Headquarters Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) on behalf of the NASA Administrator 
to recommend an architecture for lunar robotic precursors.  PA&E chartered the Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study (ESAS) during the spring and summer of 2005 to provide an overall architecture for 
NASA’s exploration mission.  It then chartered LRAS to provide a flexible architecture for the robotic 
spacecraft that would be required on or near the Moon as precursors to each of the architectural elements 
that ESAS recommended. 
The LRAS team was asked to address a basic set of questions: 
• Do we need robotic missions at all?  If so, why and under what conditions? 
• How would they be accomplished and at what cost?  Are they within budget? 
• What are the minimum requirements?  What is the minimum mission set? 
 
The LRAS team concluded that there are compelling reasons to conduct robotic precursor missions. 
However, the extent of the requirements depends on the degree to which NASA will implement the ESAS 
architecture.  The Agency still has many known decisions ahead of it and many additional decisions will 
present themselves as exploration of the moon proceeds.  LRAS analyzed a set of scenarios, assembled a 
set of potential requirements. 
The LRAS team makes two recommendations: 
1. Adopt the set of requirements presented in Section 4 of this report.  
o Establish a linkage between the risk reduction of the Constellation Program and 
individual requirements.  As Constellation’s risk strategy evolves, so may the precursor 
requirements. 
2. Adopt the baseline architecture option through 2012 presented in Section 6 of this report. 
o The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) could be the first orbiter – it has passed 
confirmation review. 
o Decisions concerning ISRU and robotic missions starting beyond 2012 depend on results 
of earlier missions and therefore do not have to be made now. 
In addition, the team recommends NASA pursue the future work identified in the “Future Work” section 
of this document (Section 6.6).   
LRAS did not have a current set of robotic precursor requirements.  Instead, the team drew upon the 
ESAS report, the outdated and early set of requirements of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program 
(RLEP), and other recent analyses to lay out a linkage to Constellation needs.  These linkages connect 
Constellation risks to discrete precursor requirements, and are flexible to evolve as the elements of the 
Constellation architecture are refined.  Further, the robotic precursor missions support Constellation 
milestones and development.  Schedule linkages were used to phase the requirements in time. 
At first order, it appears the existing RLEP budget can accommodate all high-priority near-term (through 
2012) requirements.  Additional consideration was given to potential requirements, many of which might 
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still provide tremendous benefit.  Within each category, the LRAS team examined a wide range of 
activities and determined whether “we would still send humans if we didn’t do them.”  This provides a 
range of potential activities that scales with the available resources.  The requirements form a minimum 
set, but with additional resources significant additional risk can be “bought down,” or reduced.  
The requirements emphasize communication and navigation, high-fidelity mapping (visual, topographic, 
and resource), characterization of the environment (dust and radiation), preparation for in-situ resource 
utilization (ISRU) and the search for water.  The primary uses of the results of these missions would be 
risk reduction for Constellation development, sortie site selection, sortie operations, and outpost 
development and site selection.  The requirements are time-phased to match these needs.  This means, for 
instance, that communications, mapping, and dust mitigation must be addressed before attempts to 
characterize any deposits of water in permanently shadowed craters. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1.  LRAS identified, grouped, and time-phased lunar robotic precursor requirements. 
 
Opportunities exist for lunar science in conjunction with each element of the LRAS architecture.  LRAS 
documented the competitive process by which these opportunities could be realized. The team identified 
no lunar science requirements for robotic precursor missions. 
The LRAS baseline architecture is built upon a series of missions linked to their driving requirements:  
• 2008 - Orbiter to provide visual, topographic, and resource mapping.  
• 2011 - Fixed Lander to characterize the polar environment for Lunar Surface Access Module 
(LSAM) risk reduction. 
• 2011 - Long-life Communications Relay to support all other robotic precursors. 
• 2013 - Mobile Lander to investigate potential presence of water in cold-shadowed craters.  
• 2015 - ISRU Rover to demonstrate resource production.  
LRAS also analyzed a series of excursions from this baseline to evaluate de-scoped ESAS mission 
scenarios and other potential decisions.  The excursions examined: decision options on a lunar orbiter; 
extensible communications; the number of landers; lander mobility; and ISRU. In particular, the 
minimum architecture – and one that is within the budget profile – assumes a deferral of both the Mobile 
Lander and the ISRU Rover.  The decision on whether an outpost will need to take advantage of ISRU 
and if so, whether water is required, does not have to be made until the results of the initial orbiter 
mission have been analyzed.  During the course of this study, the LRO project passed its confirmation 
review.  The now-confirmed LRO meets all the requirements identified by LRAS for a lunar orbiter, 
exceeds some requirements, and accomplishes many of the highest value additional considerations.  
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Though LRO is not in the LRAS-recommended baseline, this report provides architecture excursions with 
LRO as the initial lunar obiter missions 
 
 
Figure 1-2.  The LRAS Baseline Architecture and Linkages to the Elements of the ESAS 
Architecture 
LRAS identified several promising opportunities that may increase efficiency and reduce budget 
demands; innovative low-cost missions, international partnerships, and selective NASA center 
assignments could all improve the LRAS baseline architecture and potentially reduce cost. 
Current work on innovative, low-cost missions may produce tremendous benefits using novel approaches 
to further lunar exploration objectives.  The recently announced secondary payload to accompany LRO is 
an early result of this promising work.  The LRAS baseline resources ensure that the risk reduction 
requirements of Constellation are accomplished, but additional savings may be realized through 
implementation of lower-cost missions. 
International partnerships may supplement the results of the baseline architecture.  The baseline focuses 
on those things required to “buy down,” or decrease, Constellation risks.  However, a number of activities  
– such as international lunar orbiter missions – were also identified that, while not absolutely required, 
would still produce tremendous benefit. 
NASA may realize additional long-term efficiencies by the choice of center assignment.  The LRAS 
baseline provides a number of opportunities for small- and mid-sized spacecraft development.  Skills 
required to develop these spacecraft vary from communications and navigation to landers and mobility 
systems to search for water-ice in lunar craters. Implementing the LRAS baseline using NASA research 
and spaceflight center capabilities could provide opportunities to strengthen NASA’s space systems 
development and operations workforce and enhance center technical skills and capabilities for future 
exploration missions. 
This report of the Lunar Robotic Architecture Study (LRAS) provides guidance and flexibility for 
decisions on lunar robotic precursor missions.  The recommendations link to the results of the ESAS 
architecture and the needs of the Constellation Program.  The analysis of various requirements and 
excursions is intended to provide the flexibility to evolve with the overall exploration architecture of the 
Agency.  This LRAS report should serve as a valuable resource for NASA and others as we build the 
systems for exploring the Moon, Mars, and beyond. 
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2. Introduction 
 
2.1. Background 
The Vision for Space Exploration specifies a series of campaigns to return humans to the Moon, use it as 
a testbed, and then conduct human expeditions to Mars.  Preparatory robotic exploration campaigns will 
precede the human campaigns to both the Moon and Mars.  
 
Undertake lunar exploration activities to enable sustained human and robotic 
exploration of Mars and more distant destinations in the solar system; 
Starting no later than 2008, initiate a series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare 
for and support future human exploration activities; 
Conduct the first extended human expedition to the lunar surface as early as 2015, but no 
later than the year 2020; and 
Use lunar exploration activities to further science, and to develop and test new 
approaches, technologies and systems, including use of lunar and other space resources, 
to support sustained human space exploration to Mars and other destinations. 
A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision 
for U.S. Space Exploration, January 14, 2004 
 
NASA established the Lunar Precursor and Robotic Program (LPRP) in mid-2004 to conduct the robotic 
lunar campaign, and established the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter as the first project within this program. 
 
       
Figure 2.1-1.  The three documents that guided the Lunar Robotic Architecture Study: A Renewed 
Spirit of Discovery, The Vision for Space Exploration, and NASA’s Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study. 
In the spring and summer of 2005, NASA conducted the Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
(ESAS). The ESAS study resulted in an overall candidate architecture for human lunar return: the launch 
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vehicles, propulsion elements, crew transport vehicles, and crew surface elements.  During the 
development and testing of these architecture elements, a campaign of lunar robotic vehicles will conduct 
precursor lunar missions, scouting out potential landing sites, and laying the communications and 
navigational infrastructure upon which the human lunar missions will rely.  ESAS framed the expected 
costs of such a robotic campaign based on the prior RLEP budget formulation work, but did not address 
the specifics of the robotics campaign architecture. 
To complete the set of exploration architectures, a lunar robotics exploration architecture needed to be 
defined that fits within the environment established by the derived requirements of the human lunar 
exploration architecture.  A robotics architecture should build on existing and planned communication 
and navigation assets that can be leveraged to support lunar missions, including the Deep Space Network 
and Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) System.  There are also existing and planned spacecraft 
from potential partners, including lunar missions by international space agencies.  Precursor lunar science 
should complement the existing International Space Station research on space environmental effects and 
space science research on the solar system’s evolution.  Finally, as the architecture is being deployed, it 
may be itself leveraged to conduct priority science. 
2.2. Study Charter and Scope 
The NASA Headquarters Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) sponsored a study to 
develop a lunar robotics exploration architecture.  The Lunar Robotics Architecture Study (LRAS) was 
chartered in January 2006 to provide recommendations and findings within 60 days and prepare a written 
report to document this analysis.  A Terms of Reference (TOR) document for the study was signed to 
delineate its scope and deliverables.  (See the appendices for the TOR.) 
The LRAS team was chartered to define a lunar robotics architecture by addressing the following top-
level issues: 
• Do we need robotic missions at all?  If so, why and under what conditions? 
• How would they be accomplished and at what cost?  Are they within budget? 
• What are the minimum requirements?  What is the minimum mission set? 
 
The LRAS team integrated these elements together to develop a viable strategic framework for a lunar 
robotics program.  The LRAS focused on robotic precursor missions having near-term benefit and 
requiring the most immediate decisions.  As a basis for the lunar robotic architecture, the following 
definitions were employed: 
• Lunar missions are activities that require or take advantage of the lunar environment, either on 
the lunar surface or in lunar orbit. 
• Robotic missions are any that do not have humans aboard, including precursor missions, 
technology demonstrations, full-system demonstrations (e.g., LSAM demo), robotic infrastructure 
(e.g., communications relay), and robotic companion systems. 
• An Architecture is the structure, relationships and principles governing the design and evolution 
of elements linked in accomplishing a purpose. 
• Architecting means to identify the elements and the relationships among the elements, and 
establish the guidelines that govern development and evolution of the elements and interfaces, of 
a given purpose. 
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The LRAS team reviewed other robotic missions such as space weather sentinels that orbit closer to the 
sun, but did not include these missions in the lunar robotics architecture.  
It is important to note that an architecture is not a robotics program, but merely a flexible framework on 
which a program could be devised.  Program development was not within the scope of the LRAS activity; 
but rather is a crucial element and interface for follow-on activities. 
2.3. Specific Questions 
The LRAS team was tasked with finding the minimum set of lunar robotics requirements to enable human 
lunar exploration.  The study assessed and compiled the top-level requirements derived from the Vision 
for Space Exploration, the ESAS human lunar return architecture and other sources, and then built 
architectures to satisfy the requirements within cost, schedule and risk constraints.  
This involved answering the following series of more detailed questions regarding the requirements and a 
second series of architecture questions: 
• What are the robotics architecture requirements for reducing the risks to human lunar return and 
how do these compare to other risks and mitigations? 
• When does the specific site of the lunar base need to be established?  How much surveying needs 
to be done, if any, to down-select to a site, and how much surveying needs to be done on the 
selected site? 
• What are the precision navigation requirements that must be met with a robotic lunar 
infrastructure, and what navigational technologies must be tested on the lunar surface prior to 
human lunar return? 
• What communication architecture needs to be deployed by the time of human lunar return and 
what benefits are there to deploying these elements earlier during the robotic campaign? 
• What priority lunar science must be addressed prior to human return, e.g., biological sensitivity to 
dust, and how would these results be important inputs to future architecture decisions, e.g., lunar 
base location or in-situ resource utilization? 
• What are the necessary precursors for demonstrating technologies for human surface activities, 
such as supplying power and conducting in-situ resource utilization demonstrations? 
• How are the robotics requirements to be allocated among the existing programs and projects and 
across the set of potential robotics architectures? 
The study provided a range of architectural options and a recommended option. For each option, the study 
answered the following:  
• What are the costs of the architecture elements, including leveraged assets?  Are these costs 
within the existing budgets or, if they go outside them, do they do no harm to higher priorities 
such as CEV acceleration? 
• By what dates or milestones do the robotic elements need to be deployed, technologies validated, 
or scientific questions investigated prior to human lunar return? 
• What technical requirements or critical needs does each element fulfill?  How do these 
requirements or needs vary across architectural options?  
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• What are the highest cost, schedule, and performance risks that might affect the success of an 
individual element and overall campaign success? 
The study further assessed the integration of the potential lunar science with NASA’s existing research 
strategy: 
• What priority lunar science of the Moon could be enabled by robotic precursor missions meeting 
exploration requirements?  
• What priority lunar science from the Moon is enabled by robotic precursor missions? 
2.4. Schedule 
The LRAS was chartered for a 60-day architecture study and analysis, with a mid-term and final review. 
After the final review, an additional 30 days was available to document the analysis in a written report. 
The study provided its midterm and final review as shown in the schedule below. 
 
 
Figure 2.4-1.  LRAS study schedule 
During the data-gathering phase, the team received inputs from a comprehensive array of sources.  (The 
full list of inputs is provided in Appendix C, “Inputs.”)  During the initial analysis phase, the team 
identified the driving assumptions, constraints, and ESAS mission scenarios and assembled its draft list of 
requirements and additional considerations.  After the mid-term briefing, the team finalized the list of 
requirements and additional considerations, and then used them to build architectural options.  Team 
members then evaluated the cost, schedule, performance, and risk of each option.  Finally, the team 
identified a recommended baseline and findings.  Team members briefed each Mission Directorate and 
relevant Headquarters Mission Support office on the study results. The team made final presentations to 
PA&E and the NASA Administrator on March 23, 2006. 
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3. Approach 
3.1. Assumptions and Constraints 
Guiding principles 
The LRAS team approached this study using the following guiding principles derived from the specific 
study questions listed in Section 2.3: 
• Fulfillment of a clear need for lunar knowledge, risk reduction, or mission support in support of 
future crewed lunar missions. 
• Identification of the requirements to enable successful crewed lunar missions. 
• Prioritization of the requirements, yielding required and additional consideration sets of 
knowledge or activities. 
• Provision of the maximum knowledge and risk reduction for minimum cost. 
• Required traceability of the lunar robotic mission requirements to the Constellation Systems 
needs and schedule. 
General Assumptions and Constraints  
The top-level assumptions and constraints employed in this study were driven by the Vision for Space 
Exploration and the Exploration Systems Architecture Study.  The top-level assumptions are as follows: 
• The series of robotic missions to the moon will start no later than 2008. 
• The lunar robotic architecture will fit within the context of the ESAS architecture, as modified by 
the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, and be consistent with its baseline set of design 
reference missions (DRMs). 
• Robotic architecture options include all uncrewed missions (across the Exploration Systems 
Mission Directorate, or ESMD) that support return to the moon.  
• In all options, “Equatorial” represents NASA’s return to sites near the Apollo landings only 
(unless specified as “backside equatorial”).  For any options to additional sites, refer to 
requirements for “Global.”  (See below.) 
Constraints derived from the ESAS are as follows: (see below) 
• Return to the moon by 2020, with the goal of living and working there for increasingly extended 
periods, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. 
• Sortie mission durations are up to 7 days in length and begin no earlier than 2018 and no later 
than 2020.  The lighting and thermal environments allow up to 14-day missions on most sites, 
with up to 30-day missions on continuously illuminated polar sites. 
• The outpost will be established by first doing a series of sortie missions to a given location. 
• Outpost mission durations are for 6 months, beginning no earlier than 2022 and no later than 
2025. 
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Costs must be within the existing budgets or, if they exceed them, must do no harm to higher priorities 
such as CEV acceleration. 
 
NASA FY07 Budget Estimates 
ESAS 
Element 
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
RLEP 134.3 272.7 366.9 411.3 421.0 414.5 
 
Table 3.1-1.  Budget for Elements of the Architecture (in millions of dollars) 
A portion of the Exploration Communications Navigation Systems (ECANS) budget may apply to certain 
precursor communications spacecraft, especially long-life spacecraft that will operate well past the 2018 
milestone for human lunar return. The amount of the Exploration Technology and LSAM budgets 
available for reducing the risks documented by LRAS is still to be determined. 
Regions of the Moon 
This study assumed that human sortie missions with a frequency of two per year would begin in 2018, 
with an outpost being established sometime after 2022.  Robotic missions to define the required precursor 
information necessary to assure safe human missions to any location on the Moon would begin in 2008.  
The LRAS set of mission scenarios included: (1) a campaign of only short-term sortie missions, 
nominally a few days to a week at equatorial sites and up to 30 days at a highly illuminated polar site, (2) 
sorties at multiple sites followed by a permanent lunar outpost, and (3) sorties to a potential outpost site, 
followed by a permanent outpost.  In addition, the study team considered two options for lunar in-situ 
resource utilization (ISRU): (1) a small-scale ISRU facility with a production capacity of about one to 
several metric tons/year, and alternately (2) a larger facility, nominally producing 50 to 100 metric tons/yr 
of O2 from regolith or possibly O2 and H2 from water in a permanently shadowed crater.  For the purposes 
of the study it was assumed that the second option would likely require a nuclear reactor power source, 
while the first option could likely be achieved with solar power.   
 
Figure 3.1-1.  The regions of the moon as used by the ESAS and LRAS studies.  Each region has 
its own challenges and benefits, such as thermal cycling, lighting, communication limitations, and 
available resources.  
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Mission scenarios were divided into three major landing site geographic groups: (1) front-side equatorial 
sites, including Apollo landing sites, (2) landing sites on the lunar limb including missions to either or 
both poles (global missions), and (3) back-side landing sites (global missions).   
Front-side equatorial landing sites are characterized by continuous communications availability direct to 
Earth (DTE), with generally better-understood surface features and topography.  A sortie mission to this 
region could be accomplished without any precursor robotic missions beyond that gathered during the 
Apollo missions.  Locations on the lunar limb are characterized by limited DTE communications 
possibilities and less well-understood surface features; some localized polar landing sites may have the 
advantage of nearly continuous solar illumination.  Back-side landing sites are characterized by poor to no 
knowledge of surface features and topography and no DTE communications, and require lunar relay 
satellites as the sole means of communications and tracking. 
Polar landing sites may include the special case of missions to high latitudes above the nominal equatorial 
region but below the highly illuminated polar region.  This special case is distinguished by the higher 
energy required to reach than the other two regions and not being close enough to a pole for near-
continuous solar illumination.  In all cases, the study assumed that for all human missions communication 
with earth would be assured either by direct line-of-sight or augmented by lunar orbiting relay satellites.  
A sortie mission to the backside equatorial region would be somewhat riskier due the limited fidelity of 
gravitational and topographic maps, which could result in a few hundred meters in landing error. 
The main attraction of a high polar region is the potential for a landing site with near-continuous solar 
illumination. This would eliminate the problems and risk imposed by a lunar night that, at the equator, is 
334 hours long and as cold as -150°C.  It would also provide continuous sunlight, enabling total 
dependence on photovoltaic power generation and relieving the potential requirement for a nuclear 
reactor power source.  In addition, there is the possibility of substantial amounts of ancient cometary 
water embedded in parts of the walls or floor of a crater, such as Shackleton, that is permanently 
shadowed from the sun – and as cold as 40K (-233°C).  This could potentially provide a practical source 
of lunar hydrogen, which when separated from oxygen enables lunar-produced rocket fuel.  The only 
other source of hydrogen is the scarce amount from the solar wind, embedded in the lunar soil at about 50 
parts per million (ppm).   However, even if water exists on the Moon, the ability to conduct extensive 
mining operations under such harsh conditions represents a considerable technical challenge and risk.  
The economic value of producing H2/O2 fuel on the Moon has yet to be determined. 
Nonetheless a permanently illuminated polar sight is the most attractive and the least risky for any 
mission lasting more than a few days, which includes all outpost missions.  Potentially, an “eternally” 
illuminated site could be thermally benign and rich in solar energy and in-situ resources from regolith or 
ice.  However, there is insufficient high-resolution data of the lunar surface to confidently identify a site 
of this type, though there is evidence that small islands of continuous illumination near a shadowed crater 
rim may exist.  For the purpose of the LRAS, the team assumed a continuously illuminated site and the 
existence of reasonably accessible water in suitable quantities and concentration for practical in-situ 
resource utilization (ISRU) to exist at least at one of the poles, though neither is yet proven.  
Elements of ESAS Architecture 
The ESAS architecture lays out the elements required to return humans to the Moon, the relationship 
between the elements, and a set of design reference missions (DRMs) that would employ those elements. 
The elements break down into launch vehicles, human exploration vehicles, and infrastructure.  The 
launch vehicles include a Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) derived from a shuttle solid rocket booster (SRB), 
a Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) derived from the shuttle SRBs and the external tank (ET), and an Earth 
Departure Stage (EDS) to carry a payload from Earth to the moon.  The human exploration vehicles 
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include a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and its associated service module, a Lunar Surface Access 
Module (LSAM) with derivatives, and various outpost elements for use on the lunar surface.  The 
architecture includes concepts for extending the capabilities of these elements to Mars exploration. 
The LRAS team identified four places in which the architectural elements of ESAS and robotic precursors 
interconnect:  
• LSAM design and landing site selection; 
• Communications and navigation support to the CEV and LSAM; 
• Outpost design and placement; and  
• In situ resource utilization (ISRU) design and affordability. 
 
ESAS defined the LSAM at a conceptual level, as shown in 
Table 3.1-2 at right.  The LSAM is the first major element 
of the architecture to operate on the lunar surface, followed 
by the elements of an outpost.  
ESAS defined a set of DRMs that included a series of 
human sortie missions to the lunar surface, followed by a 
slow buildup of an outpost.  The location of the sorties and 
the outpost was left undefined, but regions of high interest 
were identified. 
The DRMs include: 
• Crew to and from the lunar surface 
o 7 day missions to anywhere on the surface 
o Crew rotation to lunar outpost 
• Cargo to the lunar surface 
o One-way delivery of cargo to support 
longer duration missions 
• Crew to and from Mars 
o 500 days on the surface 
• International Space Station resupply capability – if 
commercial services are unavailable 
o Ferry crew up and down 
o Cargo up and down 
Table 3.1-2.  Lunar Surface Access Module 
Definition  
Lunar architecture capabilities are driven, in part, by the duration, location and centralization of lunar 
surface activities.  An initial strategy was chosen that begins with global-access, short-duration sortie 
missions, and transitions quickly to deployment of a permanent outpost.  These trades also drive the 
required exploration support (power, communication, habitation, mobility, resource utilization, science). 
Lunar Surface Access Module ( LSAM) 
Definition 
 
4 crew to and from the surface 
Seven days on the surface 
Lunar outpost crew rotation 
Global access capability 
Anytime return to Earth 
Capability to land 21 metric tons of dedicated 
cargo  
Airlock for surface activities 
Descent stage: Liquid oxygen / liquid 
hydrogen propulsion 
Ascent stage: Liquid oxygen / liquid methane 
propulsion 
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While the specific lunar surface activities were left undefined, ESAS did identify the following classes of 
activities.  The LRAS team used these items to infer the range of activities that would require precursor 
robotic missions: 
• Initial demonstration of human exploration beyond Earth orbit. 
• Learning how to operate away from Earth.  
• Conducting scientific investigations. 
• Using the Moon as a natural laboratory.  
• Planetary formation/differentiation, impact cratering, volcanism. 
• Understanding the integrated effects of gravity, radiation, and the planetary environment on the 
human body. 
• Conducting ISRU demonstrations. 
• Learning to “live off the land.” 
• Excavation, transportation and processing of lunar resources. 
• Beginning to establish an outpost – one mission at a time. 
• Enabling longer-term stays. 
• Testing of operational techniques and demonstration of technologies needed for Mars and 
beyond. 
To see the full ESAS report, go to 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/news/ESAS_report.html 
3.2. Analysis Process 
The LRAS team followed a traceable, unbiased, and open analysis process as follows: 
1. Identify lunar robotics requirements from as many sources as available. 
2. Categorize these requirements and determine applicability. 
3. Rank these requirements by assessing their impact to Constellation through the use of the figures 
of merit similar to those used in ESAS. 
4. Identify what type of platform would be needed to fulfill these requirements (i.e., lunar orbiter, 
surface penetrator, fixed lander, rover, hopper, etc.). 
5. Group requirements that are on the same platform into sets that can be fulfilled by the same 
instrument, using existing instruments as a baseline. 
6. Use the existing instrument mass and power levels to develop a baseline spacecraft mass, power 
level, and cost. 
1. Identify requirements 
The team gathered individual requirements from several documents:  
• ESAS appendix 4 – assumptions about the RLEP architecture 
• ESMD’s Cost Analysis Requirements Document (CARD) 
• RLEP requirements document (draft) 
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Along with these documents, the team received several presentations focused on lunar science 
opportunities, the robotic architectures of the first two RLEP missions, the Space Communications 
Architecture Working Group results, and others. 
2. Categorize requirements 
The team then gathered and ranked the requirements from these documents and presentations.  A structure 
for these requirements was created that sorted different requirements into possible future options for the 
lunar exploration program.  These categories were based on increasing complexity of possible future 
human missions. Initially, an additional categorization was made into requirement “type,” and then 
arranged into a matrix as follows: 
Four major categories for robotic requirements: 
1) Communication and Navigation Support  
• Communication for critical event coverage (Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) burn on far side 
of the Moon) 
• Communication for high data rate relay 
• Navigation/tracking aid to meet 100m precision landing requirement 
• Communication and tracking support for elements with limited or no DTE 
communication access 
2) Mapping and Environmental Measurements & Effects (including biological effects)  
• Lunar mapping 
• Landing site characterization such as soil density, debris, dust, radiation 
• Potential locations of water (only needed for polar landing) 
• Characterization of potential water sites (only needed for polar landing) 
• Illumination characterization 
3) Preparation for Establishing an Outpost  
• Site selection 
• Autonomous assembly, cable laying, etc. 
• Regolith reconfiguration such as radiation protection 
4)   ISRU  
• Site selection 
• ISRU demonstrations and trials 
Several mission scenarios for future exploration were considered that evolved from sortie-only missions 
to sorties leading to an outpost and finally sorties or outpost with various levels of ISRU: 
1) Sorties only 
a. Sorties to the equatorial region of the Moon 
b. Sorties with global access 
2) Sorties and an outpost (global access sorties) 
a. Outpost constructed in one of the polar regions of the Moon 
b. Outpost constructed in the mid-latitudes or near the equator 
3) Sorties and ISRU (global access sorties) 
a. ISRU plant constructed at one of the polar regions (extracting O2 and H2 from water if 
available and accessible or O2 through regolith processing)) 
b. ISRU plant constructed in the mid-latitudes or near the equator (extracting O2 only 
through regolith processing) 
4) Sorties and the outpost incorporates ISRU (global access sorties) 
a. Outpost and ISRU plant at polar region 
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b. Outpost and ISRU plant at equatorial or mid-latitude region 
 
This leads to the following matrix of possibilities and the robotic support that would be useful and 
applicable: 
 
Equatorial 
Only
Global 
Access
Polar 
Outpost
Equatorial 
Outpost
Polar  
Plant
Equatorial 
Plant
Polar 
Outpost
Equatorial 
Outpost
1) Comm & Nav 
Support x x x x x x x x
2) Recon for 
Landing sites x x x x x x x
3) Outpost Setup 
Assistance x x x x x x
4) ISRU x x x x
Sorties Only Sorties and Outpost Sorties and ISRU
Outpost Includes 
ISRU
 
Table 3.2-1.  Possible Configurations of Sorties and Robotic Requirements 
 
This framework was further expanded by listing all of the derived requirements and determining what 
missions would satisfy each requirement.  As can be seen from this matrix, missions with ISRU drive the 
largest number and most demanding Robotic Lunar Exploration Program requirements.  
The matrix demonstrates that the proposed requirements depend on what exploration missions are 
eventually selected.  The team determined that 17 requirements need to be satisfied in preparing for a 
polar outpost, primarily due to the unknown nature of the lunar polar regions and the unknown 
environmental effects for long-duration stays on the moon.  If ISRU is to be used, there are an additional 
4 requirements that need to be fulfilled. The remaining requirements, if fulfilled, would reduce risk to the 
human missions but are not strictly necessary. 
When this matrix was presented at the midterm review, the scope of the study was narrowed significantly. 
Most notably, large-scale ISRU dominated and greatly expanded robotics requirements to the point that it 
needed to be considered separately from other options. PA&E directed the team to look only at “sorties 
building to an outpost that would eventually use small-scale ISRU.”  The team therefore focused the next 
phase of its analysis on requirements related to this mission category. 
3. Assess the requirements and determine the platforms 
The team used a priority ranking process to assess how important these requirements are to the 
Constellation mission.  Without assuming a particular set of mission options, the team used a Quality 
Function Deployment ranking system to determine qualitatively the relative importance of each of these 
requirements. 
Each requirement was scored on five (5) different figures of merit (FOMs). These FOMs were derived 
from the ESAS FOMs in order to maintain as much consistency as possible. The FOMs were: 
1. Safety and Mission Success 
a. Reducing risk to crew 
b. Enhancing the probability of mission success 
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2. Effectiveness/Performance 
a. Increasing surface accessibility 
b. Increasing system availability 
c. Increasing system operability 
d. Increasing crew productivity 
 
3. Extensibility/Flexibility 
a. Increasing flexibility of the lunar mission 
b. Extensibility to other destinations, especially Mars 
c. Extensibility to commercial applications 
d. Extensibility to national security 
 
4. Programmatic risk 
a. Reducing system development risk 
b. Increasing architecture efficiency 
c. Decreasing cost risk 
d. Decreasing schedule risk 
e. Increasing political viability 
f.  
5. Cost/risk 
a. Reducing overall architecture cost 
b. Increasing performance 
c. Reducing overall architecture risk 
 
The FOM scores formed the basis for selection of high-priority requirements and candidate missions to 
satisfy the requirements. 
The team linked each requirement to specific exploration missions in Constellation’s timeline, including 
when the program would need the data..  For example, data gathered on lunar dust and long-term health 
hazards will be needed before extended-duration human missions to an outpost.  This information is 
required before design of an outpost (notionally ~2016-2020); however, the effects of dust on the seals of 
an airlock is required to inform the design of the LSAM’s airlock system, so this information is needed 
much sooner, approximately 2012. 
The full list of requirements, including the platform that can perform the necessary measurements and the 
applicable part of the Constellation mission, is presented in section 5.3.  
4. Determine how the requirements can be implemented 
Once the requirement prioritization information was gathered, the team determined what platforms would 
be needed to fulfill the requirement.  For instance, determining a safe landing site for a sortie may be done 
from an orbiting asset; however, characterizing the lunar dust requires a lunar lander.  
The team considered four major types of lunar robotic missions: 
• Orbiters 
• Fixed landers 
• Mobile landers, i.e., rovers or hoppers 
• Other (non-robotic or robotic test flights of human equipment, such as the LSAM) 
Some examples of requirements that can be fulfilled by orbiters are: 
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• High-resolution map of the surface of the Moon 
• Image selected sites at landform scales 
• Relay communications and tracking 
• Orbital measurements of the thermal & radiation environments 
• Characterization of lighting on the near-permanently lit areas of the poles 
• Mapping and characterization of volatiles 
 
Some examples of requirements that can be fulfilled by fixed landers are: 
• Measure ground properties, radiation, dust and environmental conditions 
• Demonstrate precision landing with hazard avoidance 
• Prototype systems for measuring or mitigating environmental effects 
• Characterize 1/6g fluid properties 
• Determine effect of lunar dust on mechanical and biological systems 
• Demonstrate small-scale ISRU 
 
Some examples of requirements that can be fulfilled with mobile landers are: 
• Search for water  
• Demonstrate excavation for ISRU activities 
• Demonstrate small-scale ISRU 
• Demonstrate site surface preparation 
• Demonstrate robotic habitat pre-emplacement and setup 
• Demonstrate new mobility techniques 
• Demonstrate of safe roving up to 30km 
 
Some examples of requirements that can be fulfilled with other systems, such as LSAM, are: 
• Over-the-horizon propagation of radio frequency (RF) – needed for the outpost extra-vehicular 
activities (EVAs) from base—this technology can be developed and tested on the first sortie 
missions 
• Validating in-space operation of the LSAM engine is not an appropriate test for an RLEP 
mission. This engine should be tested as part of the LSAM development program. 
 
5. Group requirements that can be met by classes of instruments 
Some of the requirements can be preformed by the same instrument.  For example, an orbiter in a low 
lunar polar orbit with a high-resolution camera could both map the moon’s surface and characterize the 
lighting on the near-permanently lit areas of the poles. 
By utilizing data gathered from previous missions and from the RLEP program office, the team identified 
requirements that could be satisfied by several existing instrument designs. The results are presented in 
section 5.3. 
6. Estimating mission mass and cost 
Cost analysis was based on historic and estimated data.  Data was mined from Integrated Cost and 
Schedule Analysis Tool (ICSAT), NASA / Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM), Resource Data Storage 
and Retrieval (REDSTAR) library , Dr. Joe Hamaker’s Quickcost Cost Model, and the Independent 
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Program Assessment Office (IPAO) database.  Additional data and engineering assistance was also 
provided by members from the JPL Advanced Design Team (Team X).  Table 3.2-2 provides an overview 
of the data collected for the analysis of each major element. 
 
 
Orbiter Lander Rover Instruments 
Lunar Orbiter MER Mars Pathfinder Clementine 
MRO Phoenix MSL Phoenix 
Cloudsat MPL MER Mars Polar Lander 
Grace MSL  Lunar Orbiter 
MGS   MRO 
Mars Odyssey   Cloudsat 
MCO   Grace 
   MGS 
   Mars Odyssey 
   MCO 
Table 3.2-2.  Historic Data Used for Each Element of the Architecture 
All cost estimating relationships (CERs) were based upon the selection of the most analogous historic and 
estimated data points.  Generally, at least one specific independent variable (i.e. mass or power) must be 
selected to create a viable CER.  The LRAS team used payload element mass as the basis for estimating 
cost.  This was due to a lack of technical definition available for the cost team.  Each element had a suite 
of instruments assigned to it to fulfill the requirements generated by the LRAS team.  This information, 
along with the data set in Table 3.2-2, was utilized by the cost team to generate mass estimating 
relationships between instrument mass, element dry mass, and element wet mass.  Mass derived from 
Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) was used as the independent variable for LRAS CERs.   
3.3. Architecture Development and Integration 
Establishing Precursor Baseline 
The ESAS architecture was designed to provide flexible elements that can conduct a variety of human 
exploration mission scenarios.  The architecture includes a number of design reference missions (DRMs) 
to illustrate the range of missions.  It allows NASA to commit to elements incrementally through a series 
of demonstrations and future decisions.  For example, the architecture provides the vehicle capability to 
land a crew anywhere on the lunar surface.  Eventually, a specific series of landing sites will be selected 
based on information obtained from robotic precursor missions and each subsequent human sortie.  As 
another example, NASA could develop an outpost but choose not to pursue in-situ resource utilization at 
that outpost. 
This wide range of initial human exploration mission options resulted in an equally wide range of 
precursor robotic mission requirements.  Subsequently, the study focused primarily on a human mission 
set based on several lunar sortie missions followed by a lunar outpost at a lunar pole with small-scale 
ISRU.  The LRAS team developed a decision tree as shown below in Figure 3.3-1 that illustrates the 
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different mission scenarios that could result from different decision branches.  For each mission scenario, 
there are a string of activities that would be needed ahead of time, possibly including precursor robotic 
activities.  For example, to conduct ISRU operations, there are a series of ISRU developments and 
demonstrations that are needed, extending back prior to the first sortie mission.  The total set of robotic 
precursor requirements is the combination of all the requirements for all mission scenarios.  
 
Figure 3.3-1. The LRAS  focused on precursor requirements to support development of human polar outpost(s) and 
small ISRU, consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration. Global access was not precluded. 
Because the human exploration mission scenarios largely build upon each other, LRAS chose as its own 
baseline the set of precursor requirements for the baseline ESAS mission scenario.  This allowed the team 
to investigate nearly all the precursor requirements, with a simple, direct approach to de-scoping the 
precursors if a different branch is taken on the decision tree.  The LRAS baseline architecture includes 
lunar robotic missions to meet all the requirements to first fly the human sorties, and then it adds missions 
to support polar outpost development with small ISRU.  A series of excursions to this baseline explores 
alternative ways to fulfill these requirement, plus alternatives that only meet de-scoped requirements.  The 
requirements for the supra-baseline case of large ISRU were examined, but no architecture excursions 
were analyzed. 
Precursor Role in Integrated Architecture 
The LRAS team examined how precursor missions were intended to integrate with the overall lunar 
exploration mission architecture.  The ESAS architecture laid out an expectation for the role of lunar 
robotic precursor missions.  There was a lunar robotic precursor campaign preceding the Apollo lunar 
landings that provided lessons on integration of robotic and human missions.  Having looked at both the 
ESAS and Apollo expectations, the LRAS team felt that the lunar robotic precursors would be best 
deployed to buy down key Constellation risks, and that they must be done with sufficient lead time to 
allow for integration of the results into the Constellation designs. 
 
Robotic missions to the Moon should be undertaken prior to human return to the Moon 
for several reasons. Robotic missions can collect strategic knowledge that permits safer 
and more productive human missions.  Such data includes information on lunar 
topography, geodetic control, surface environment, and deposits of largely unknown 
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character, such as those of the polar regions. This information can be collected by a 
variety of spacecraft, including orbiters and soft landers.  
In addition to collecting important precursor data, robotic missions can deliver 
important elements of the surface infrastructure to the eventual outpost site. Such 
deliveries include exploration equipment (i.e., rovers) and scientific instrumentation (i.e., 
telescopes). Additionally, since the extraction of resources will be an important activity of 
humans on the Moon, robotic precursors can deliver elements of the resource processing 
infrastructure, including digging, hauling, and extraction equipment. It is likely that 
NASA will want to experiment with various processing techniques and methods of 
extraction, and robotic missions can demonstrate process techniques at small scales in 
advance of the requirement to put large amounts of infrastructure on the lunar surface. 
ESAS Final Report, section 4.3.10, November 2005 
 
Overall, the ESAS architecture anticipates that lunar robotic precursors will provide early information for 
human missions to the moon, in particular key knowledge needed for human safety and mission success, 
and scientific results to guide human exploration.  Robotic precursor missions may pre-deliver 
infrastructure elements for eventual human benefit and may themselves be evolvable to later human 
systems.  
Most unknowns are associated with the north and south poles – likely destinations for a lunar outpost. 
The lunar robotic precursors are anticipated to improve our knowledge of these regions, including the 
thermal and lighting conditions, the terrain and surface properties, and the composition and physical 
nature of any deposits of water. Table 3.3-1 shows the preliminary analysis conducted by ESAS for four 
broad classes of potential lunar robotic precursor requirements. ESAS found that if an outpost were 
located at a polar site, all potential requirements would actually be needed to answer all the unknowns. 
For limb and low latitude equatorial sites, ESAS found that there are fewer unknowns and therefore fewer 
actual requirements for lunar robotic precursors.  
 
Sites Navigation, 
commmunication 
Precision 
topography and 
local terrain 
Surface deposit 
characterization 
Site environment 
Low latitude 
equatorial sites 
 
No 
 
Probably not 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Limb sites 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Polar sites 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Table 3.3-1.  ESAS classes of potential precursor requirements as a function of outpost site. The 
boxes indicate whether the classes would actually need to be required for each outpost site. 
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The Apollo Program was supported by a precursor robotic campaign from 1961 through 1967. Three 
major programs supported Apollo with lunar orbital and surface data:  
• Ranger, a series of hard landing spacecraft flown between 1961 and 1965; 
• Surveyor, a series of soft landing spacecraft flown between 1966 and 1968; and 
• Lunar Orbiter, a series of orbiting spacecraft flown between 1966 and 1967.  
 
Of the three programs, only Lunar Orbiter was begun after the decision to send Apollo to the Moon; 
consequently, it was necessary to adapt the Ranger and Surveyor spacecraft designs to support the Apollo 
spacecraft design.  The data from the robotic programs served Apollo in two ways: as confirmatory data 
for evaluating designs and lunar surface models, and in the preparation of maps and topographic models 
of the lunar surface for use in simulation, crew training and mission operational planning and decision-
making. 
The experiments and photographic systems carried on Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter were 
more than adequate to supply the data about the lunar surface environment needed for 
Apollo designers and mission planners; 
Data was not available in time for initial vehicle design; however, the data was available 
for mission operations planning and for design confirmation; 
The best Lunar Orbiter resolution photographs had a detection resolution of 
approximately 4-5 meters for high resolution frames and 30-50 meter resolution for low 
resolution camera frames; 
Robotic Precursor in Support of Project Apollo: 
Data Requirements, Program Review and Evaluation of Results 
Dean Eppler, January 1991 
 
The LRAS team connected the lunar robotic precursors for the Constellation Program to the design 
reviews of the major Constellation elements.  Further detail on this topic is available in Section 5.4.  
Precursor Role in Risk Reduction 
Key among the mission-level risks is the location of the landing site.  Factors influencing the selection of 
the landing site include characterization of the regolith for composition and concentration of useful in-situ 
resources (including use of regolith as radiation protection); the risk from secondary, backscattered albedo 
radiation; and the thermal and insolation environment.  While the fallback to an equatorial site is a lower-
risk option, it is not the first choice.   
The key operational risk is to assure human safety.  Aside from radiation – both solar and cosmic – the 
highest risk identified by the team was likely from the lunar dust.  The overall radiation risk is in two 
forms: (1) ubiquitous cosmic ray radiation, and (2) the continuous stream of particles in the solar wind.  
The former has very low particle fluence, but energies as high as several Gev/nucleon and a composition 
that spans the atomic spectrum.  Hydrogen is the most abundant element, though iron is typically 
considered the most “dangerous” when its higher atomic weight is considered.  Overall, cosmic rays are 
not acutely lethal but they are very difficult to mitigate, and over the long term represent a measurable 
health risk.  The steady-state solar wind is far denser than cosmic rays but easier to mitigate.  The primary 
solar risk is from large-scale coronal mass ejections that result in an intense flood of high-energy (Mev) 
protons and electrons.  These events are infrequent, sometimes hard to predict, and can be lethal, though 
they typically last only a few days.  Astronauts outside the earth’s protective magnetic field for an 
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extended period must be provided a safe haven from these “storms,” either as an integral part of the 
lander or created by a covering of lunar soil. 
The risk from lunar dust is to both humans and mechanical systems.  Lunar dust is very fine (grain size is 
mostly below 100 micron) and highly abrasive.  Apollo astronauts found that after 3 days of EVA on the 
lunar surface, the joints of their suits were adversely affected and the suits could not have been used much 
longer without maintenance.  They also found that dust permeated their living areas and was physically 
irritating.  The overall temporary – and possibly long-term – effects of dust on human health remain an 
open issue, as do reduced operability and life-limiting effects on mechanical systems such as rovers, hatch 
seals and ISRU equipment.  
A further surface-related risk is associated with ISRU, especially if useful amounts of water are found in a 
shadowed crater.  While the elemental composition of the lunar regolith is similar to terrestrial soil – 
about 40% oxygen, with ample amounts of silicon, aluminum and iron – the mineralogical distribution is 
somewhat different.  In principle, this should not be a fundamental problem for ISRU.  However, from a 
practical standpoint not all processing methods are equally compatible with the lunar environment.  Some 
are more sensitive to the specific composition of the feedstock and others tend to consume resources not 
readily replenished on the Moon (for example carbon electrodes).  Thus, if ISRU is a high priority it could 
drive the location of an outpost away from an otherwise more desirable location.  This is more so the case 
if lunar water is found in a quantity and state that can be readily extracted.  If it exists at all it is only in a 
relatively few continuously shadowed regions.  To date the evidence of water is indirect and based on 
abnormally high concentrations of hydrogen detected by the Clementine spacecraft in 1994.  Subsequent 
radar imaging from the Arecibo observatory in Puerto Rico did not fully confirm this data.  As noted, 
water could, in the long term, be a valuable lunar “natural resource.”  However, even if there are ample 
amounts, it would have to be mined from the crater floor or walls in 40K thermal environment and 
transported to an outpost outside the shadowed region for processing.  There is a possibility that water 
does not exist, is not in a useful concentration, or is too deeply imbedded beneath the surface for practical 
excavation.   
A summary of these risk factors is presented in Table 3.3-2. 
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Constellation Risk Factors Considered 
Mapping and characterization of the lunar 
surface: 
• Enables precision landing and hazard 
avoidance 
• Enables more informed landing site 
selection (lighting, thermal, and volatiles) 
• Improved gravity mapping enables more 
accurate navigation for critical mission 
phases such as descent, rendezvous 
Search for lunar volatile resources: 
• Determine potential for mining water and 
other resources 
• Reduce operational risk for mobility 
systems 
• Provide data to support ISRU system 
design 
Provide communications for lander 
missions:  
• Reduces hardware risks for future 
Constellation missions 
ISRU demonstration/production: 
• Reducing ISRU design and operations risk-  
Characterize lunar environment: 
• Reduce risks due to dust: 
o Hardware Design 
o Operations 
o Define human exposure limits Æ 
informs hardware, EVA suits, 
mission operations, habitat… 
• Regolith characterization reduces 
hardware design risk 
• Ground truth lighting and thermal 
environment reduces hardware design risk 
• Direct measurement of the effect of the 
lunar environment may reduce hardware      
design risk for outpost 
Mobility and Operations: 
• Low gravity fluid dynamics will allow 
Environmental Control &  Life Support 
System (ECLSS) risk reduction for outpost 
• Up to 30km roving further reduces 
operational risk for outpost EVA 
Table 3.3-2.  Risk Factors 
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4. Review of Candidate Requirements 
4.1. Overview 
The LRAS team reviewed a variety of materials to 
identify the complete set of requirements and 
additional considerations for lunar robotic 
precursors.  As seen in Table 4.1-1 at right, this 
review intentionally included both official 
requirements documentation and unofficial 
preliminary material. The resulting set of items was 
of very uneven quality. The LRAS team 
consolidated the list into forty-six items, minimized 
the overlap between items, and documented the 
potential benefit of each item.  
The discussion in the next sections provides the 
description, disposition, and rationale for each 
requirement and additional consideration. It is 
important to understand the requirements that were 
carried forward to form the basis for the baseline 
architecture, as well as the items that were 
considered important but were not carried forward. 
Many of the items that not carried forward have 
high benefit and, in fact, may be fulfilled by the 
actual missions NASA develops.  The resulting set 
of requirements that LRAS identified differs from 
the current RLEP requirements set. 
Some additional considerations are also presented because they are critical to the analysis of architectures 
but are not requirements. Opportunity science and nuclear surface power generation are clearly activities 
that may be conducted and will return specific benefits, but were not identified as the basis for lunar 
robotic missions. 
The analytical methodology is discussed in section 3.2. Detailed data and analytical results for each item 
are provided in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
Source Type Status 
Robotic Lunar 
Exploration Program 
(RLEP) Requirements 
ESMD-RQ-0014 Rev. A 
Requirements 
Document 
Outdated – 
Not 
Applicable 
Constellation 
Architecture 
Requirements 
Document (CARD) 
Requirements 
Document 
Preliminary 
LSAM Top Risks 
Discussion 
Issues List Preliminary 
Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study 
(ESAS) Final Report 
Architecture 
Description 
High Level 
Document  
Space Communications 
Architecture Working 
Group (SCAWG) 
Architecture 
Description 
Preliminary 
Other working groups, 
including: LEAG, 
LADTAG, etc…. 
Issues Lists Preliminary 
Table 4.1-1.  Status of Requirements Documents 
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4.2. Communications and Navigation 
Constellation communications and navigation 
requirements are assumed not to be primary drivers 
for the baseline LRAS architecture.  The robotic 
architecture is not required to pre-deploy beacons or 
other surface navigation aids for Constellation and 
is not required to demonstrate precision landing or 
hazard avoidance capabilities, or specific guidance, 
navigation, and control (GNC) sensors or systems.  
However, demonstrations of many of these 
capabilities through robotic precursor missions 
would be highly desirable, and in some cases may 
reduce risk and lower costs later in the program. 
High-priority requirements for an orbiting robotic 
precursor mission with implications for navigation 
include providing high resolution topographical data 
to characterize landing sites (requirement #7), imaging landing sites at landform scales (requirement #8), 
and improving the lunar gravitational potential map (requirement #5).   
There are several communication and navigation requirements that, while not drivers for the lunar robotic 
architecture, may provide significant risk mitigation or other benefits for the Constellation Program.  
Robotic landers provide opportunities to demonstrate precision landing capabilities that will eventually 
enable 100m (3-sigma) landing accuracy, and to demonstrate specific (navigation) software, sensors, and 
algorithms (requirement #40) used for descent and landing.  Objectives that may be satisfied by either 
lander or orbiter spacecraft include demonstration of the routable, IP-based communication architecture 
as described in the Constellation C3I Interoperability Specification, obtaining additional experience with 
tracking and flight dynamics operations for spacecraft in the lunar environment, providing technology 
demonstrations of communication and tracking hardware, and providing residual communication and 
tracking assets for subsequent robotic and human missions. 
Requirement #1: Hazard Avoidance 
The robotic missions should demonstrate automated hazard avoidance sensors and systems in advance of 
the human missions.  This capability has been demonstrated in many Earth applications, and with a high-
resolution topographic lunar map can be adapted to robotic missions.  Demonstration of this capability 
will reduce risk to the human landings. 
Requirement #2: Precision Landing – 1km Unaided, 100m Aided 
The robotic missions should test automated precision landing sensors and systems in advance of the 
human missions.  This will reduce risk to the human landings and enable pre-emplacement of 
infrastructure equipment or consumables.  Specific demonstrations that would provide risk reduction and 
operational experience for human missions include incorporation of onboard surface-relative sensors, 
and/or radiometric tracking data from a lunar relay or surface beacon into the navigation state during 
descent. 
# Requirements and Additional 
considerations  
Type 
1 Hazard Avoidance Requirement 
2 Precision Landing – 1km Unaided, 
100m Aided 
Requirement 
3 Precision Landing – 10m Requirement 
4 Comm Relay (possibly including 
Backside) 
Requirement 
5 Improve Global Gravitational Map Requirement 
6 Over-the-Horizon Propagation of 
RF 
Requirement 
Table 4.2-1 Communications and Navigation     
Requirements 
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Requirement #3: Precision Landing – 10m 
Although not a formal requirement in previous documents, objectives of robotic or human missions may 
require landing accuracies less than 100m.  The robotic missions should attempt pinpoint landings in 
advance of the human missions.  This will enable landing on or near (presumably very small) points of 
eternal light in the polar regions, or on the rim of a crater to support subsequent exploration within the 
crater.  Landings in support of outpost missions may require similar landing accuracies to support 
precision emplacement of infrastructure. 
Requirement #4: Communications Relay (Possibly Including Backside)  
A robotic spacecraft targeted to land at a specific polar landing site is the primary driver for the 
requirement to deploy a lunar relay communication capability as part of the lunar robotic exploration 
program.  NASA’s Space Communications Architecture Working Group has examined direct-to-Earth 
communication coverage for polar landing sites (see Figure 4.2-2).  Even at the most advantageous polar 
landing sites, direct line-of-sight communication to Earth may be extremely limited, with average 
communication blackout periods ranging from 1 to 10 days per month.  In worst-case locations, 
communication outages were as long as 18 days per month.  Furthermore, direct-to-Earth communication 
would not be available for a mobile lander traversing into craters or behind local landscape features that 
obstruct a direct view of Earth.  These facts drive the requirement for a lunar relay communication and 
tracking capability. 
 
Figure 4.2-1.  Direct-to-Earth Communication Coverage Characterization 
There are numerous secondary drivers for a lunar relay communications and tracking capability as part of 
the robotic program:  
• Providing communication coverage for critical events on the lunar far-side;  
• Providing a capability to perform gravity science by direct radiometric tracking of a another 
spacecraft in low lunar orbit (while orbiting the lunar far-side); 
• Reducing the communication burden on vehicles operating in the lunar vicinity; and 
• Providing an opportunity to pre-deploy infrastructure that may be utilized by Constellation.   
 
Additionally, the lunar relay communication and tracking spacecraft enables important risk reduction for 
the Constellation Program in the area of communication, navigation, and flight operations.  Specific 
technology demonstrations for Constellation could include: 
• Demonstrate navigation software, sensors, and algorithms in a packet based communication 
system (requirement #40).  
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• Validate the Constellation C3I methodology (requirement #40). 
• Validate IP at lunar distances (requirement #40).  
• Demonstrate communication and tracking to users in low lunar orbit (LLO) or on the lunar 
surface through a relay.  
• Obtain flight dynamics/operations experience with the lunar relay spacecraft. 
• Use lunar relay tracking data during precision landing. 
 
Relay satellites and corresponding ground infrastructure deployed to support robotic precursor missions 
may provide backup or augmented support for human lunar missions.  Although the Constellation 
Program still will require the deployment of some dedicated relay communication and tracking assets, 
interoperable communication and tracking capabilities between robotic assets and Constellation assets 
will provide greater robustness and open up potential opportunities for risk reduction and lower costs.  
This includes actual relay communication assets as well as ground support infrastructure, communication 
protocols, frequencies, and specific hardware implemented on robotic orbiters and landers. 
 
The following are some of the fundamental communications and navigation requirements for a lunar relay 
spacecraft supporting Constellation missions: 
• Support the Constellation Command, Control, Communication, and Information Interoperability 
Specification, which specifies: 
o Frequencies 
o Data rates 
o Modulation 
o Protocols, including the use of IP 
• Provide communication for landing sites with poor or non-existent line-of-sight communication 
with Earth.  
• Provide communication and tracking for orbiting or surface assets when poor or non-existent 
Earth-based tracking is available. 
• Provide two-way radiometric range and Doppler measurements for navigation of vehicles in the 
lunar vicinity. 
 
The Constellation Design Reference Mission and Operations Concept specifies that Constellation 
missions, specifically lunar sortie missions, can be conducted to any location on the lunar surface.  This 
implies a requirement for a lunar relay system providing global communications coverage to any location 
on the lunar surface; however, the current Constellation Bottoms-Up Review (BUR) guidance states that 
only South Pole coverage is required. 
Requirement #5: Improve Global Gravitational Map 
Robotic precursors shall improve the global gravitational map of the Moon by measuring the lunar-far 
side gravity.  This requires tracking of a low-lunar orbiting spacecraft while it orbits over the lunar far-
side (tracking through a lunar relay), or a mission involving two cooperative spacecraft in low lunar orbits 
performing inter-spacecraft ranging (e.g., GRACE).   
An improved far-side gravity model will benefit all future lunar missions by reducing a primary 
navigation error source, will allow improved mission planning and delta-V budgets, and will allow 
robotic/imaging spacecraft to operate in much lower-altitude lunar orbits. 
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Benefits for human missions include reduced Deep Space Network (DSN) tracking, improved orbit 
accuracies and landed accuracies, and improved robustness in response to contingency situations (loss of 
communication/tracking).   
Requirement #6: Over-the-Horizon Propagation of RF 
A rover or astronaut on a surface EVA may not always have direct line-of-sight communications with 
either Earth or a fixed communications base station.  Examples include EVAs in which astronauts are 
large distances from the outpost/lander, or in which a mobile lander is exploring a crater.  Primary means 
of communications in these situations will be through an orbiting relay satellite, or through an 
intermediate surface asset (rover or other fixed base station). A technology demonstration can establish if 
proposed techniques using the dielectric effect of regolith to achieve over-the-horizon propagation of RF 
are viable.  This may represent significant risk reduction for long-range astronaut surface sorties.  Robotic 
missions shall demonstrate the different techniques for achieving communications between surface assets 
described above. 
4.3. Mapping (Visual, Topographic, and Resources) 
Mapping or characterization of lunar features, 
properties, and resources will assist Constellation’s 
mission in many ways; good maps early on will 
allow the entire mission to be more efficient and 
effective. There are three types of maps: visual, 
topographical, and resource.  Visual maps will help 
to identify good landing sites and understand 
lighting and physical characteristics.  Topographical 
maps will facilitate modeling of the surface.  
Resource maps will help locate bases where ISRU 
can more easily be performed.  Additionally, 
improving lunar gravitational potential models was 
identified as a priority requirement in section 4.2. 
           Table 4.3-1.  Mapping Requirements 
Requirement #7: Topographical Map 
The robotic missions should create a center-of-mass referenced high-resolution topographical map with 
better than 1m relative accuracy.  This will facilitate modeling of the surface, thus refining understanding 
of landing sites and lighting conditions throughout the year (through simulation models).  Furthermore, 
the establishment of a high spatial resolution geodetic grid for the Moon was identified as a key 
measurement for the purpose of reducing the risk to human landings on the Moon. 
Requirement #8: Visual Map – Landform Scales 
The robotic missions should create a complete medium-resolution visual map of the entire surface of the 
Moon, including imaging of selected sites at landform scales as well as landing site scales relevant to 
hazards.  Visual maps will help to identify good landing sites, as well as help characterize lighting and 
physical characteristics, and will reduce the risk to both robotic and human landings on the surface of the 
Moon. 
# Requirements and Additional 
considerations  
Type 
7 Topographical Map Requirement 
8 Visual Map – Landform Scales Requirement 
9 Orbital and Ground Truth 
Measurements of Thermal and 
Regolith Properties 
Requirement 
10 Characterization of Minerals and 
Volatiles in the Regolith 
Requirement 
11 Characterize the Lighting Near 
Permanently Lit Areas 
Requirement 
12 In-Situ Mapping of Water Requirement 
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Requirement #9: Orbital and Ground Truth Measurements of Thermal and Regolith Properties 
This requirement specifically addresses detailed in-situ measurement of the thermal environment and the 
general physical characteristics of the regolith, including the distribution of grain size, density, 
compactness, and general radiation shielding properties.  These data are of primary importance to an 
eventual outpost.  While a sortie mission may choose to land in a relatively uncharacterized site – or even 
a site known to be environmentally hostile – a key aspect in the long-term viability of an outpost will be 
to choose a site that meets mission requirements and is as environmentally benign as possible.  This will 
require a good knowledge of surface temperatures throughout a lunar cycle, as well as the reflectivity and 
emissivity of the soil and possibly the heat capacity of the soil if it is used as a protective covering. This 
may be more important near a shadowed crater, where the lunar surface temperatures can reach as low as 
40K and may act as a very deep heat sink if “seen” by any part of a landed surface system.  Regolith 
surface characterization is important to determine the tribological risk to mechanical systems.  [Note this 
is differentiated from the issues with dust, the smallest of the regolith grains (nominally < 5 µm in size) 
covered in other requirements.]  Also, regolith may be used as radiation shielding in place of shielding 
built into a lander.  However, this may only be practical if its properties do not require excessive amounts 
to enable it to serve as a shield.  Some estimates have been as high as 3m, depending on the ultimate 
biological shielding requirements for safe human habitation and the inherent shielding properties of the 
regolith at the landing site.  While low-resolution measurement of temperature and surface composition 
can be made from orbit for initial screening, high-resolution measurements and physical characterization 
can only confidently be made in-situ.  
Requirement #10: Characterization of Minerals and Volatiles in the Regolith 
A key element of the overall human lunar mission strategy is to preserve the option to utilize in-situ lunar 
resource.  The composition of lunar regolith resembles terrestrial soil (~40% oxygen plus major amounts 
of silicon, aluminum, calcium, and iron as well as small amounts of titanium), but the mineralogy of the 
soil is different from Earth and varies in different parts of the Moon. While there are no gasses present 
above the surface, there are relatively small amounts of hydrogen and helium (~50 ppm) and smaller trace 
amounts of other light elements (e.g., nitrogen) deposited by the solar wind.  Characterizing the mineral 
and volatile composition at a potential landing site is very important since the suitability of a given 
process to extract specific material (in particular oxygen) from the regolith can be very dependent on the 
local mineralogy and inherent elemental concentration.  Also, the absolute and relative abundances of 
solar wind implanted light elements will determine whether there is sufficient volatile material to warrant 
extraction efforts.  Further, there is evidence of water ice in some permanently shadowed regions such as 
Shackleton crater.  If there is water, it could eventually serve as an alternate source of O2 or a unique 
source of H2/O2 rocket fuel.  However, the evidence is only circumstantial based on much higher than 
normal concentrations of hydrogen registered by the Clementine spacecraft in 1994.  It could be clumped 
or dispersed, near the surface or up to a few meters below.  This same information – as well as a more 
complete compositional survey – is of importance to lunar science to understand better the evolutionary 
development of the Moon and the solar system.  While orbital instruments can provide useful data on 
surface mineralogy, in-situ measurements are necessary for ground truth and, in particular, “sub-ground” 
truth at depths of a few meters (possibly down to 10m).  
Requirement #11: Characterize the Lighting Near Permanently Lit Areas 
A polar location with near-permanent solar illumination provides significant advantages for lunar outpost 
or sortie missions.  This would eliminate the burden of surviving a lunar night, which at the equator can 
last 334 hours and be as cold as -150°C.  As such, a sortie mission would not be limited to less than two 
weeks and an outpost would not have to go into “hibernation.”  Further, permanent solar illumination can 
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enable an outpost to be fully solar powered, even possibly in the case of large-scale ISRU operations.  
This becomes more important if water is processed, since a site will have to be near the water source (e.g., 
a crater rim) and illuminated.  While the Moon’s axis of rotation does not have a significant inclination, it 
is tilted about 1 degree, so there is no location with assured continuous illumination.  However, there is an 
indication of small, elevated patches near the poles that may be continuously illuminated, or nearly 
continuously illuminated.  Whether it is full or near-continuous, the variation in the intensity (if it always 
illuminated but not uniformly), and the degree of reflectance from the surface are significant factors in 
determining the suitability of the site especially for a long-term outpost.  Orbital measurements can 
identify with a high probability of continuous illumination, but the LRAS team concluded that site-
specific, in-situ measurement of the actual insolation – both intensity and direction, and direct and 
reflected illumination – would be required to adequately reduce the risk to a long-term sortie mission or a 
permanent outpost.  
Requirement #12: In-Situ Mapping of Water 
A basic requirement of the LRAS study was to maintain the option to produce useful resources from in-
situ lunar materials.  While chemical, electrolytic, or thermal processing of regolith has been considered 
for four decades to produce principally oxygen – and byproducts such as metal and glass –  relatively 
recent evidence suggests that ancient cometary water may still exist in permanently shadowed regions 
near the lunar poles, such as the Shackleton crater near the south lunar pole.  If water exists it is currently 
considered at most to be 1.5% of the soil, based mainly on 1994 data from the Clementine spacecraft that 
first detected concentrations of hydrogen far above the typical background levels of about 50 ppm.  One 
possibility for this anomaly is that the hydrogen is in the form of water, though experiments to confirm 
this have not yet been performed.  If ample amounts of water exist and are readily accessible, this could 
directly serve the needs of human life support, either as a back-up to Earth-supplied water or as a relief 
from the requirements to fully recycle water.  It could also be an alternate to regolith as a source of 
oxygen – but it would also produce hydrogen, providing a possible source of high performance rocket 
fuel on the Moon.  The key questions other than its existence are: how water is deposited in micron-size 
crystals or lunar “ice cubes”; how it is distributed across the surface; and how deep, on a sub-meter scale; 
and where it is located relative to a viable outpost site.  All of these questions need to be answered before 
water can be considered a practical lunar resource.  While the distribution of water can be determined 
from orbit, physical characteristics of the deposits can only be determined in-situ.  Further, the 
temperature in permanently shadowed areas where water may exist is as low as 40K (-233°C), 
eliminating the option for human “prospecting.”  The LRAS team considered both locating possible sites 
for water “mining” and surface characterization of any found sites to be requirements for an extended 
lunar robotic architecture. 
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4.4. Environment (Dust and Radiation) 
The Moon provides a harsh 
environment, with nearly non-existent 
atmosphere; intense ultraviolet (UV), 
galactic, and solar cosmic radiation; lack 
of liquid water; abrasive corrosive, 
potentially toxic dust; and large 
temperature extremes.  In many ways, 
the environment of the Moon is even 
harsher than that of Mars, without the 
mitigating factors of an atmosphere to 
block radiation and an increased gravity 
environment. Assessment of lunar 
environmental effects on systems 
(human and physical) is an essential 
aspect of the development of innovative 
technologies, knowledge, capabilities, 
and infrastructures to support human 
and robotic lunar exploration.  Apollo 
astronauts accepted a high level of risk 
for their short (3-4 day) stays on the 
Moon that will not be acceptable for 
longer sortie missions.  Even more 
technical challenges must be overcome 
for longer duration stays on the lunar 
surface; based on Apollo experiences, 
dust and radiation may be limiting 
issues that will determine the extent of 
capabilities and mission durations that 
can be supported.  Requirements related 
to the lunar environment include both 
better characterization of the 
environment, better understanding of its 
interactions with humans and 
machinery, and demonstrations of 
technologies for monitoring and 
mitigating environmental impacts.  
Environmental characterization should occur as early as possible in the robotic lunar architecture in order 
to provide significant risk mitigation and other benefits for the Constellation Program by informing 
technology development and the design of vehicles, suits, life support, and other systems.  
Requirement #13: Characterize Lunar Dust Environment 
Lunar dust is a heterogeneous mix of broken particles (<50µm) of minerals and agglutinated glass that are 
the result of space weathering.  Space weathering consists of the combined results of the lunar deep 
vacuum (~10-12 torr), micrometeorite impacts over billions of years, radiation (solar wind particles, 
galactic, cosmic), and temperature (+125oC to -240oC).  Lunar dust is extremely abrasive with very large 
surface areas per mass and large numbers of nanophase iron particles in the glass.  There are no terrestrial 
analogs for lunar dust, as all Earth minerals are exposed to the weathering of air and water.  The closest 
# Requirements and Additional 
Considerations  
Type 
13 Characterize Lunar Dust 
Environment 
Requirement 
14 Determine the Effects of Lunar 
Dust on Systems 
Requirement 
15 Characterize 1/6 g Fluids/Two-
phase System Characteristics 
Requirement 
16 Demonstrate Systems That May 
Be Affected by Partial Gravity 
Non-RLEP 
Requirement 
17 Measure Biologically Relevant 
Radiation Environments 
Requirement 
18 Investigate Potential Biological 
Impacts of Combined Lunar 
Environmental Factors (Radiation, 
Partial Gravity, Thermal, 
Micrometeorites, Dust) 
Requirement 
19 Conduct Correlated Experiments 
at Molecular, Cellular, and Whole-
organismal Levels 
Additional 
consideration 
20 Prototype Systems for Monitoring 
Lunar Environmental Effects 
(Radiation, Dust, Gravity 
Transitions, Thermal Effects) on 
Humans 
Non-RLEP 
Requirement 
21 Prototype Systems for Mitigating 
Space Environment Effects on 
Humans (Radiation, Partial 
Gravity, Dust, Thermal Effects) 
Requirement 
22 Measure the Radiation Shielding 
Capabilities of In-Situ Materials at 
the Moon  
Additional 
consideration 
23 Validate Planetary Protection 
Strategies and Technologies 
Additional 
consideration 
Table 4.4-1.  Environmental Requirements and Considerations 
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facsimile is industrially processed silicates, which are fine grained, have reactive surfaces, and have 
unusual morphologies that cause very serious and often lethal medical problems.  Apollo astronauts found 
dust to be one of the most aggravating and restricting facets of lunar surface exploration, especially its 
adherence to all materials (including skin, suit material, and metal) and its restrictive friction-like action 
on everything. 
All Apollo regolith samples returned to Earth were exposed to air, so reactivity measurements were not 
possible.  To reduce the uncertainty associated with potential acute and chronic lunar dust toxicity to 
crewmembers conducting lunar exploration sortie and outpost missions, it is essential to understand the 
reactivity and particle size distribution of lunar soil.  The uncertainty currently results in more 
conservative standards for astronaut dust exposure than may otherwise be required.  Required 
measurements are the magnitude of reactive oxygen species (e.g., hydroxyls, superoxides, etc.) levels on 
the surface of lunar soil, the rate and degree of reactivity passivation upon exposure to oxygen, and the 
percentage of lunar dust/mass <5 µm in size.  The dust exposure standards have impacts on the lunar 
surface vehicle, airlock, and module systems design; thus more precise information about lunar regolith 
should be obtained robotically as early as possible in order to influence vehicle design and the 
development of measures to ensure astronaut health and safety. 
Requirement #14: Determine the Effects of Lunar Dust on Systems  
The abrasive nature and electrostatic charge of dust leads to major system and mission failure risks. The 
top two risks identified by multiple studies are 1) the risk of critical life-safety systems failing due to dust 
build-up on systems, and 2) the risk that adverse health effects will result if the crew inhales or ingests 
dust.  Systems do not currently exist that can function in the lunar dust environment.  Understanding how 
to shield filters, pumps, materials, seals, and other hardware is essential to driving the design of life 
support components that will be exposed to fine lunar dust.  Dust contamination of the habitat and EVA 
systems, as well as the introduction of dust into the breathing volume, are viewed as significant issues.  
Both the extent and mechanisms of dust damage as well as the techniques to remove (e.g., magnetic 
brushes) or limit dust from breathing and mechanical systems (e.g., airlocks or electrostatic repellers) 
should be investigated on early lunar robotic missions in order to inform Constellation system design.  
Requirement #15: Characterize 1/6 g Fluids/Two-Phase System Characteristics 
Multi-phase flow in partial gravity needs to be understood to ensure that all components that utilize a 
liquid-vapor or liquid-gas system behave in a predictable manner in the lunar gravity environment.  
Validated engineering data currently do not exist to design these systems adequately.  For example, gas-
liquid packed-bed reactors are a critical operational component for many exploration life support unit 
operations (e.g., water recovery) and ISRU chemical processes.  The most common mode of operation is 
“trickle flow,” where the liquid phase is gravity-driven and trickles downward over the solid packing.  In 
the absence of gravity, the bed operates in a different flow regime (usually bubbly or pulse flow).  It is 
important to ensure that the liquid phase is evenly distributed throughout the bed.  Accurate prediction of 
the amount of liquid holdup is critical to successful operation.  Also, if flooding occurs in the bed, the 
chemical or biological performance of the bed is greatly reduced.  Understanding of flow boiling heat 
transfer and critical heat flux (CHF) at 1/6 g is needed for the design and safe and efficient operation of 
thermal and phase-change subsystems on the Moon.  Short testing periods using aircraft have shown that 
nucleate flow boiling at low flow velocities greatly lowers the CHF in reduced gravity.  Operating at CHF 
can lead to burnout in which metal walls can reach the melting point and fail.  Exploration of the Moon 
requires enabling technologies for efficient and reliable energy generation (e.g., nuclear, chemical, solar 
sources), storage (e.g., rechargeable batteries, regenerative fuel cells, flywheels, latent heat phase change), 
and transfer (cabin temperature control, space suit temperature regulation).  In order to improve energy-
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to-mass ratios, present single-phase operations will need to be replaced with two-phase systems.  Future 
design of important thermal subsystems in boilers, condensers, evaporators, heat exchangers, cryogenic 
fluid storage units, fuel cells, radiators and heat pipes involve complex multiphase fluid flow and 
transport challenges, which require measurement and testing of different active heat removal and 
intermittent forced-mixing behavior. The necessary information is g-dependent and not testable on Earth.  
Information obtained early in the lunar robotic program will contribute the most to decreasing design risk 
for the LSAM and subsequent Constellation modules. 
Non-RLEP Requirement #16: Demonstrate Systems That May Be Affected by Partial Gravity 
Multi-phase flow in partial gravity needs to be understood to ensure that all components that utilize a 
liquid-vapor or liquid-gas system behave in a predictable manner. The National Research Council report 
Microgravity Research In Support of Technologies for the Human Exploration of Space and Planetary 
Bodies (2000) identifies this as a high priority, because the validated engineering data currently do not 
exist to adequately design systems such that may be affected by partial gravity, including life support and 
advanced environmental monitoring and control components, ISRU, and in-situ fabrication and repair. As 
a general rule of thumb, subsystems, such as those for life support, should be fully validated six years 
prior to deployment of a system.  Therefore, those Constellation subsystems that are affected by partial 
gravity will require demonstration robotically before human missions.  However, the LRAS team felt that 
the LSAM robotic test missions were likely to be early enough to provide those demonstrations. 
Requirement #17: Measure Biologically Relevant Radiation Environments 
Galactic cosmic rays (GCR) have heavy nuclei and generate many secondary particles in the lunar soil 
that are hazardous to humans and sensitive electronic equipment.  While the space radiation environment 
is reasonably well understood in general, characterization of the neutron albedo of the Moon (in particular 
energies in excess of 10 MeV, which are more damaging to humans) is a high priority in order to reduce 
uncertainty about the biologically relevant radiation environment that astronauts will be exposed to during 
lunar exploration measurement.  In order to set dose limits, increased knowledge of both the biologically 
relevant radiation environment and biological responses to that environment is required.  The 
characterization of the orbital and surface radiation environments will allow for proper mitigations to be 
developed to reduce risk for future missions to the Moon.  Radiation monitoring instruments should be 
included as standard equipment on all lunar robotic orbital and lander missions. 
Requirement #18: Investigate Potential Biological Impacts of Combined Lunar Environmental 
Factors (Radiation, Partial Gravity, Thermal, Micrometeorites, Dust) 
Investigation of biological impacts of the lunar environment is necessary to reduce risk to crew safety 
during human missions to the Moon.  Health risks from radiation include: carcinogenesis; acute and late 
central nervous system damage; tissue degeneration; fertility and sterility problems; and acute radiation 
syndromes. Most data on human responses to radiation come from studies of atomic bomb and nuclear 
accident survivors who suffered acute exposure to high-flux gamma rays, rather than chronic or 
fractionated exposure to the low-flux protons or heavy ions that astronauts are more likely to encounter. 
Currently, the effects of space radiation on humans must be extrapolated from data on humans exposed to 
other types of radiation or animals exposed to space-like radiation.  The Moon affords an excellent 
opportunity to advance our understanding of radiation effects on humans and study the interactive effects 
of partial gravity, radiation, dust, and thermal extremes on humans and other organisms.  Each of these 
environmental challenges has been studied singly to a lesser or great extent, but there has not been an 
opportunity to look at the potential synergistic impacts.  For example, there is evidence that reduced 
gravity, radiation, thermal stress, and dust exposure all reduce the immune response of humans and other 
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organisms.  However, no tests have been conducted yet to determine whether those impacts on the 
immune system are additive or have some other synergistic interaction when multiple challenges are 
present simultaneously.  Especially in the case of partial gravity, these experiments are impossible to do 
on Earth, and the ISS provides a poor model for radiation or dust.  Early lunar robotic studies on small 
organisms may provide knowledge critical for validation of risk models that will be used for projecting 
human health risks and performance degradation, and influence mission design requirements (e.g., 
shielding, operational mandates, and countermeasure development). This approach will result in 
significant risk mitigation for human exploration missions to the Moon and Mars. The capability to 
perform experiments in orbit or on the lunar surface should include remote autonomous experiments that 
provide statistically meaningful sample sizes. 
Additional Consideration #19: Conduct Correlated Experiments at Molecular, Cellular, and 
Whole-Organismal Levels 
As with early lunar robotic studies (see requirement #18), early applied robotic studies on small 
organisms can provide knowledge critical for the validation of risk models.  In order to mitigate the risk 
to humans of exposure to the lunar environment, it is important and necessary to use a comparative 
approach to understand how biological organisms transduce, perceive, integrate, and respond to the 
impacts of reduced gravitational force and the integrated effects of radiation, dust and the reduced gravity 
environment.  Human performance consequences, such as reductions in cognition, immune system 
function, wound healing, and other key functions, can be understood by utilizing correlated experiments 
with model biological systems and organisms to develop transfer standards that apply directly to 
determining human risk and developing countermeasures.  Modern biomedical and pharmaceutical 
research and development relies heavily on the use of model systems, ranging from cells and microbes to 
larger organisms such as mice, rats, and pigs, for the bulk of research and the careful development of 
transfer standards of that research directly to human interventions, with final validation always through 
human trials.  Research on Spacelab, Neurolab, and the Space Shuttle has already demonstrated the 
efficacy of utilizing model biological systems to elucidate and understand biological consequences of 
space flight and to inform the development of countermeasures to mitigate health and performance 
impacts.  Lunar biological studies that begin with molecular, cellular, and microorganism responses can 
be carried out autonomously on lunar robotic missions and contribute to the development of technologies 
necessary for expanded studies with larger organisms.  Biosentinel studies on robotic precursor missions 
to deep space can act as environmental monitors that inform many aspects of human risk by indicating 
bio-responses that correlate with human responses to that particular environmental challenge.  More 
complex biological experiments carried out at lunar outposts offer unique opportunities to validate 
countermeasures and demonstrate and validate enabling bio-related technologies for Mars missions. 
Non-RLEP Requirement #20: Prototype Systems for Monitoring Lunar Environmental Effects 
(Radiation, Dust, Gravity Transitions, Thermal Effects) on Humans 
Missions of greater duration and distance require human support technologies that are more autonomous, 
efficient and reliable. Environmental monitoring technologies for the Moon are required to guarantee 
crew health and safety, and enable optimal performance throughout the mission.  Reliable, validated 
environmental monitoring systems for radiation, dust, and temperature that function well in reduced 
gravity, remain functional without the possibility of support from Earth, and can be used repeatedly will 
significantly lower cost and risk.  (The International Space Station, or ISS, is not an acceptable 
validation.)  The protoyping of radiation monitors must be performed outside Earth's magnetosphere.  For 
monitoring radiation, passive detector stacks to measure the accumulated dose of heavy ions should be 
designed to survive flight and be sensitive to the correct spectrum of particles.  Lunar surface 
temperatures increase about 280K from just before lunar dawn to lunar noon, with the temperature at 
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lunar noon varying throughout the year. An accurate thermal monitoring system that can cover that range 
of temperatures in the partial gravity environment is required to enable the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the astronaut suits.  Knowledge of the lunar dust environment gained from the initial lunar robotic 
lander(s) will inform the development of appropriate dust monitoring technologies.  When astronauts 
adapt to the Moon’s gravitational environment, balance, locomotion and eye-head coordination are 
transiently disrupted.  In addition, during gravitational transitions such as entry descent and landing, head 
movements and/or vehicle maneuvering can cause spatial disorientation, perceptual illusions and/or 
vertigo.  Monitoring of the gravity forces during transitions is critical to the mitigation of these effects.  
Prototyping of environmental monitors could be done on either robotic orbiters or landers for radiation, 
but should be carried out on robotic lander missions for dust, gravity, and thermal monitoring.  Validation 
should occur prior to human sorties, but could take place on LSAM test flights rather than as part of the 
Robotic Lunar Exploration Program.  
Requirement #21: Prototype Systems for Mitigating Space Environment Effects on Humans 
(Radiation, Partial Gravity, Dust, Thermal Effects) 
Technology maturation in preparation for human sorties is one of the key objectives of lunar robotic 
missions.  As with lunar environmental effects (see requirement #20), reliable, validated systems for 
mitigating space environmental effects on humans – such as radiation and thermal shielding, exercise 
equipment to mitigate the deleterious health impacts of partial gravity, and dust removal mechanisms – 
will significantly lower cost and risk.  Recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences, the 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, and the radiation protection community 
have remained constant since 1970, and include using new radiobiology knowledge and data to develop 
optimal shielding approaches.  Measurements of the radiation shielding properties and performance of 
imported radiation materials must be performed and radiation transport models calibrated for each 
potential shielding option.  Extended periods at the reduced lunar gravity of the Moon will likely result in 
the loss of both bone and muscle mass, potentially reducing human performance during lunar missions 
and posing risks upon return to Earth gravity.  Exercise systems, together with other countermeasure 
protocols, will be critical to the mitigation of these effects.  
Additional Consideration #22: Measure the Radiation Shielding Capabilities of In-Situ Materials at 
the Moon  
Radiation shielding must be provided for any long-term human mission to the Moon. For sortie missions, 
adequate protection will have to be incorporated into the lander.  However, an outpost will require a much 
higher level of shielding to protect astronauts from the long-term effects of high-energy, low-intensity 
cosmic rays and short-term but energetic and very intense solar mass ejections.  It may not prove practical 
to build a habitat with adequate inherent shielding.  If that is the case, in-situ materials can be used (i.e., 
regolith).  Currently, it is not clear what level of shielding will be required or what amount of regolith 
shielding will be needed to meet that requirement.  The uncertainty in the latter is related to the 
uncertainty in the measurement of basic, high-energy radiation transport to predict accurately the 
shielding properties in elementally diverse lunar soil.  Ideally, the shielding material should have a low 
average atomic weight, which is not consistent with regolith.  As such, shielding thickness can be reduced 
by “beneficiating” the soil (removing unwanted material and concentrating desired material), a possible 
common requirement for large-scale ISRU.  The extent to which this helps will depend on the nature of 
soil at a landing site.  Note that requirement #9 (“Orbital and Ground Truth Measurements of Thermal 
and Regolith Properties”) will address the bulk in-situ shielding properties.  This will establish a baseline 
that can be compared with current knowledge of lunar soil from Apollo samples.  However, validation of 
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modeling accuracy for well-characterized and compositionally well-separated samples at a potential 
outpost site is highly desirable for risk reduction.   
The LRAS team felt that this was a valuable consideration, but that it would be premature to require it.  
The outpost requirements, concept of operations, design reference missions, and preliminary designs are 
notional at this time. The nature of the radiation to shield still remains to be tested in detail as per 
requirement #17. Further, this consideration could be accomplished during a sortie mission with 
astronauts available to conduct the necessary soil pre-processing and tests, or possibly to return samples 
to Earth for testing.  
Additional Consideration #23: Validate Planetary Protection Strategies and Technologies 
Planetary protection ensures that space exploration avoids forward biological contamination of planetary 
bodies by outbound spacecraft that could jeopardize the search for extraterrestrial life.  In addition, the 
Earth and its biosphere must be protected from potentially harmful organisms that could be present in 
materials returned from extraterrestrial bodies.  Under the current planetary protection policy for the 
Moon of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council for Science, no 
decontamination procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft.  However, chemical and 
microbiological studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by lunar spacecraft 
and Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans, 
including planetary protection requirements for a human mission to Mars.  Instruments that can detect 
minute levels of biologically derived organic compounds can also be used in studies to provide “ground 
truth” data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future 
Mars-bound spacecraft carrying life-detection equipment. 
4.5. In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU)  
The LRAS team assumed the use of in-
situ lunar resources to support lunar 
surface operations – and potentially, in 
the long-term, broader exploration goals – 
to be an integral part of the overall 
exploration program.  However, it was 
not considered a requirement for lunar 
sorties mission or an initial outpost.   
Further, the study considered two classes 
of ISRU: (1) a small-scale ISRU facility 
with a production capacity of about one to 
several metric tons/year (As a reference, 
the ESAS study determined that about 8 
metric tons of O2 would be needed to fuel 
two LSAM ascents per year and about 1 
metric ton/yr as a “back-up” to closed-
loop life support), and, alternately (2) a 
large facility nominally producing 50 to 
100 metric tons/year of O2 from regolith,  
or possibly O2 and H2 from water existing in a permanently shadowed crater.     
# Requirements and Additional 
considerations  
Type 
24 Demonstrate New Surface 
Mobility Technologies 
Additional 
consideration 
25 Demonstrate Excavation to Bury a 
Habitat or Stockpile Shielding 
Additional 
consideration 
26 Smoothing, Obstacle Removal, 
Emplacement of Registration 
Markers 
Additional 
consideration 
27 Demonstrate ISRU (O2) 
Production from Regolith 
Requirement 
28 Demonstrate O2 Production from 
Regolith Including Benefication 
and Storage 
Requirement 
29 Demonstrate H2/O2 Production 
from Lunar Water 
Requirement 
Table 4.5-1.  ISRU requirements 
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Additional Consideration #24: Demonstrate New Surface Mobility Technologies 
The LRAS team had concerns regarding the long-term durability of mechanical systems (including seals) 
in a harsh lunar environment.  Of particular concern is the abrasive effect of soil, including highly 
penetrating dust grains.  This was a problem on the Apollo flights and there is no relevant experience to 
validate with confidence the multi-year durability of a lunar outpost.  The specific concern over mobility 
systems is the risk of astronauts being stranded due to mechanical failure or the need to replace mobility 
systems much more frequently than planned.  An indirect consequence is that the range of allowed 
astronaut mobility – and the mobility of robotic systems – may be restricted to the point where actual 
exploration or science is adversely affected.  As such, the LRAS team considered in-situ validation of any 
new, untried mobility systems –such as rovers, hoppers or astronauts aids – to be highly desirable, but not 
required for an initial lunar robotic architecture.  The specific systems at risk could just as well be 
demonstrated during a sortie mission.  Note that this additional consideration complements requirement 
#32 “Demonstrate ‘Safe Roving’ and Return (to ~10 to 30 km),” which addresses validation of long-
distance roving prior to initial mission use.  
Additional Consideration #25: Demonstrate Excavation to Bury a Habitat or Stockpile Shielding  
If adequate radiation protection requires a habitat to be excessively massive, it may prove more effective 
to use in-situ materials in construction.  The two likely approaches are to cover the habitat with loose, 
bagged or, in some manner, consolidated regolith; and the other is to bury the habitat.  Prior studies have 
indicated the required level of covering could be a few meters, requiring a substantial amount of material.  
This could become a problem if the time required to cover a habitat is more than a few days, since the 
astronauts would be using up their allowed surface exposure time.  Thus, in-situ shielding would have to 
be applied relatively quickly in order for it to be a practical option.  This may further require site 
preparation prior to landing, such as stockpiling soil near the habitat emplacement site.  While the top 10 
cm of the lunar soil are relatively loose and easily scooped, the soil below is high compacted to a density 
as high as 85% of theoretical as a result of eons of micrometeorite impact.   Thus, digging in the soil 
could prove to be very difficult.  However, one study conducted during the period of the Space 
Exploration Initiative of the early 1990s indicated that explosive excavation may be done very precisely  
due to the absence of moisture in the soil.  This may prove a better option than digging.  Given the 
uncertainly in either option, the LRAS team concluded it is highly desirable to validate any in-situ 
shielding process and operational stress experienced by the required mechanical systems on the lunar 
surface prior to an actual mission application.  The team also concluded that if this option is tested, it does 
not have to be done as part of a lunar robotic mission.  While the actual site preparation could be done 
robotically from earth, the LRAS team believed this option could be better tested during a sortie mission 
to the outpost site since astronauts would be present to oversee the operations and best identify any 
limiting problems.  Note that this additional consideration complements other site preparation risk 
reductions presented in additional consideration #26 (“Smoothing, Obstacle Removal, Emplacement of 
Registration Markers”). 
Additional Consideration #26: Smoothing, Obstacle Removal, Emplacement of Registration 
Markers 
If a lunar outpost is built, it will likely be highly desirable to perform some degree of general site 
preparation prior to emplacement, including removal of obstacles or flattening small undulations that may 
pose a risk to safe landing.  It would be desirable to place positioning aids or beacons at specific locations 
to assist landing and to enable precise robotic placement of outpost systems.  This would reduce risk and 
enable an optimum site to be selected and prepared for the habitat and other permanently placed systems. 
This can probably be done robotically from Earth with the necessary site preparation equipment in place.  
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It represents a potentially significant risk reduction operation, and should be part of outpost emplacement, 
rather than part of a lunar robotic architecture.  Note that this additional consideration complements other 
site preparation risk reductions presented in additional consideration #25 (“Demonstrate Excavation to 
Bury a Habitat or Stockpile Shielding”). 
Requirement #27: Demonstrate ISRU (O2) Production from Regolith 
A basic requirement of the LRAS study was to maintain the option to produce useful resources from in-
situ lunar materials, specifically regolith.  This requirement has been a strong consideration for all 
proposed human missions to the Moon.  Most emphasis has been placed on extracting oxygen from lunar 
material, which constitutes about 40% of the lunar soil (similar to Earth) and could be used for life 
support and rocket fuel.  The first processes for lunar O2 production were proposed before the first Apollo 
landing, and though studied for over 40 years, no demonstration has ever been performed on the lunar 
surface.  There are currently multiple processes that could potentially produce O2 – ranging from a few 
kilograms to over 100 metric tons per year – from lunar soil.  Each has its specific benefits and liabilities. 
Some are very tolerant of feedstock, but very energy demanding; others are more energy efficient but 
require a specific feedstock.  In all cases, the critical issues are related to engineering feasibility, not basic 
physics or chemistry.  Processes can be simulated on Earth to determine feasibility, and possibly tested on 
real lunar material.  However, concerns over long-term stability, degradation of processing equipment, 
and start-up/shutdown in the lunar environment – particular in1/6 gravity – cannot be confidently resolved 
on Earth.  If lunar O2 production is to be part of an architecture that supports a sustained human presence 
on the Moon, it must first be proven reliable, not just feasible.  The LRAS team and NASA ISRU experts 
concluded that a lunar ISRU experimental demonstration was required for process validation and risk 
reduction, and that it could readily be carried and powered by a robotic lander.  The emphasis of the 
experiment would be on basic process dynamics.  If successful, a small pilot plant would likely be the 
next step prior to full implementation.  This requirement is complementary to requirements #28 
(“Demonstrate O2 Production from Regolith Including Benefication and Storage”) and #29 (“Demonstrate 
H2/O2 Production from Lunar Water”). 
Requirement #28: Demonstrate O2 Production from Regolith Including Benefication and Storage 
This requirement is closely coupled to requirement #35, which focuses on an in-situ experimental 
demonstration that validates the feasibility O2 production from regolith.  The experiment would focus on 
basic process dynamics.  The next step, if justified, is to validate the process at a more integrated pilot 
plant level.  NASA ISRU experts believe a pilot plant would weigh about 100 kg, consume only a few 
kilowatts of power, and could be deployed on a robotic lander.  The plant would exercise the complete 
production process including long-term storage, and if necessary, beneficiation.  (The latter refers to some 
processes being sensitive to the feedstock.  In some cases the feedstock is a relatively small part of the 
lunar soil.)  Using bulk regolith could result in processing an excessively large amount of material, most 
of which would be inert to the O2 extraction.  In other cases, the extraction process could produce 
byproducts that interfere with the O2 process or damage processing hardware if bulk regolith is used.  
Both cases are fairly typical of many terrestrial processes, and there are standard beneficiation processes 
that may be useful on the Moon.  However, the lunar constraints on mass, energy, and consumables 
present a very different engineering challenge than on Earth.  As such, the LRAS team considered an end-
to-end small pilot plant demonstration necessary for adequate risk reduction and appropriate for an 
extended lunar robotic architecture.  
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Requirement #29: Demonstrate H2/O2 Production from Lunar Water 
If water exists it may directly serve the needs of life support (both as native water and a source of oxygen) 
and represent a unique source of rocket fuel on the Moon: H2/O2.  Currently, the existence of water is still 
unproven and the economic value of producing rocket fuel depends on the nature and extent of future in-
space exploration.   In any case, the viability of using lunar water as a valuable in-situ resource is highly 
dependent on the difficulty of “mining” water-bearing soil in the shadowed regions and extracting the 
water from the soil.  This includes determining the extent to which water would have to be – or even 
could be – separated (beneficiated) from the soil at the mining site or prior to electrolysis, and what 
unwanted byproducts may be produced along with O2 and/or H2.  This assumes the thermal environment 
precludes human operations in a shadowed region, and that all “mining” activities would have to done 
robotically.  Assuming ample amounts of accessible water are found and processing is determined to be 
economically advantageous, a proof-of-concept, end-to-end validation demonstration should be 
conducted from mining to storage (if cryogens are produced).  The LRAS team recognized the speculative 
nature of lunar water but concluded a robotic demonstration could, and should, be part of an extended 
lunar robotic architecture.  Further, the actual decision on whether to conduct such a demonstration could 
wait until the question of whether lunar water would be of any practical value was  answered.   This 
requirement complements requirement #12 (“In-Situ Mapping of Water”), which is focused on locating 
and characterizing possible deposits of lunar water in very cold (~40K) permanently shadowed regions 
such as Shackleton crater near the lunar south pole.   
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4.6. Other Risk Reduction for Development and Operations  
There are a number of technologies that 
will need to be proven before a lunar 
outpost can be established.  A number of 
other technologies might be beneficial, 
but are not required.  
Requirement #32: Demonstrate “Safe 
Roving” and Return (to ~10 to 30 km) 
While astronauts have operated a lunar 
rover for several kilometers on two 
separate Apollo missions, they did not 
rely on the rover for an extended period 
of time.  Future lunar astronauts, whether 
serving on an extended sortie mission or 
a long-term outpost mission, will explore 
the region surrounding their landing site. 
For any distance over a few kilometers, a 
mobility system such as a rover will be 
required; this system must operate safely 
for the duration of the mission.  For a 
permanent outpost, the useful life of the 
rover will likely be several years.  Due to 
the potentially harsh thermal 
environment, lunar dust and inherently 
high abrasive nature of the regolith, the 
operational life of a rover – or any 
mechanical system – cannot be assured 
by terrestrial testing alone.  In principle, 
the thermal environment can be simulated, but the combined effect of temperature and physical/chemical 
effects involving actual soil can at best be approximated on Earth.  As an example, the abrasive lunar soil, 
coupled with exposure bare metal surfaces in a cold, oxygen-free environment, may wear away protective 
or lubricating surfaces and result in a kind of welding known as galling. This is similar to the assumed 
problem with the Galileo spacecraft that prevented deployment of its primary antenna.   Contrarily, there 
is evidence that lunar soil may passivate bare surfaces.  The LRAS team considered in-situ risk reduction 
essential to assure the safety of astronauts for extensive lunar excursions. The range of ~10 to 30 
kilometers was considered the limit for astronauts to travel and for “safe roving.”  Apollo 15 completed 
three rover operations of 10.3 km (6 hr. 33 min.), 12.5 km (7 hr. 12 min.), and 5.1 km (4 hr. 50 min.), for 
a total of almost 28 km.  Apollo 17 conducted similar roving operations for a total of almost 29 km. 
A second issue is the ability of an unpiloted rover to be driven into a 40K crater to extract water and 
return the “raw material” to a processing plant.  If useful amounts of water exist in these regions, the 
greatest operational risk is the failure of mechanical systems in this environment, both repeatedly 
traversing long distances and digging into hard, extremely cold soil.  While the thermal condition on the 
Moon can be duplicated on Earth, the physical conditions of the lunar terrain and soil cannot likely be 
duplicated to sufficiently reduce the risk of mining operations.  A precursor rover mission into the crater 
could both search for water and determine the extent of the mobility system risk.  
# Requirements and Additional 
considerations  
Type 
32 Demonstrate “Safe Roving” and 
Return (to ~10 to 30 km) 
Requirement 
33 Validate In-Space Cycling of 
LSAM Engine 
Non-RLEP 
Requirement 
34 Demonstrate Telemedicine Non-RLEP 
Requirement 
35 Demonstration of Robotic 
Emplacement/Assembly 
Equipment 
Additional 
consideration 
36 Demonstrate Precise, Dexterous 
Assembly Operations 
Additional 
consideration
37 Demonstrate Thermal 
Management Technologies 
Additional 
consideration
38 Demonstrate Power Technologies Additional 
consideration
39 Demonstrate New Propulsion 
Technologies 
Additional 
consideration
40 Demonstrate New Software 
Technologies 
Additional 
consideration
41 Demonstrate Hardware Structural 
Integrity 
Additional 
consideration
42 Validate Cost Models Additional 
consideration
Table 4.6-1.  Other Risk Reduction Requirements 
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Non-RLEP Requirement #33: Validate In-Space Cycling of the LSAM Engine 
Safe human landing on the surface of the Moon will require throttling the LSAM engine to about 10% of 
full thrust as well as in-space engine start and cutoff, based on current mission studies. Validation of this 
capability can generally be accomplished through ground-based testing. However, the LRAS team 
considered in-space validation a necessary risk reduction requirement to assure adequate safety for a 
human mission.  Furthermore, considering sustained lunar exploration will involve a campaign of 
missions of about two per year, likely lasting over a decade, in-space validation seemed both prudent and 
affordable.  The team did not believe that the LSAM engine validation should be part of a lunar robotic 
architecture.  Validation should not be an integral part of LSAM development and does not need to be 
done in the vicinity of the Moon.  In principle, the required engine cycling could be performed in LEO or 
anywhere outside Earth’s atmosphere.    
Non-RLEP Requirement #34: Demonstrate Telemedicine  
Telemedicine is the use of telecommunications technology for medical diagnosis, patient care, and 
medical training – including pathology, radiology, and patient consultation – when the provider and client 
are separated by distance.  Huge challenges include the integration of telecommunications, computer, and 
medical technologies and selecting the correct equipment in a field where technology may become 
obsolete before it is used.  NASA has been actively monitoring the physiological and medical impact of 
space flight on astronauts since the beginning of the human space flight program, but venturing beyond 
low-Earth orbit will provide increased challenges as the possibility of return for medical treatment 
diminishes.  The Moon provides an excellent platform for demonstrating advanced telemedicine 
technologies; those tests, however, can be best accomplished during human sorties rather than robotic 
lunar missions. 
Additional Consideration #35: Demonstration of Robotic Emplacement/Assembly Equipment 
It is likely that a significant amount of critical infrastructure, such as the power system and habitat, will be 
emplaced or assembled robotically prior to human occupation of a lunar outpost.  This may be done 
remotely from Earth or in combination with sortie missions to the outpost site.  This will likely require 
specialized equipment, such as a mobile transporter and a lifting device (e.g., crane).  While these systems 
can be validated on Earth, their operation on the Moon will still not be proven.  In particular, the 
combined effects of dust, 1/6 gravity on traction in the lunar soil, and in-situ lighting cannot be fully 
simulated on Earth.  Considering the importance of safely and efficiently preparing an outpost for 
astronauts, the LRAS team believed a demonstration mission to assure eventual successful operation 
would be highly desirable to reduce risk but not required.  This will be more important if extensive 
robotic setup activities are controlled from Earth.  The team also concluded that such a demonstration 
should not be part of a lunar robotics architecture but integral to lunar surface systems development.  Note 
that this consideration is complementary to consideration #36, which focuses on precise, dexterous 
assembly operations. 
Additional Consideration #36: Demonstrate Precise, Dexterous Assembly Operations 
In addition to emplacing or assembling major infrastructure components, such as a habitat prior to human 
occupation, lesser, more precise operations will likely be required.  These may include operations such as 
connecting electrical cables, deploying solar arrays or radiators, deploying relatively delicate scientific 
instruments, or exercising latches and seals to assure integrity.  Unlike major system emplacement, these 
operations could be performed by astronauts or robotically, and in the latter case either controlled from 
the surface of the Moon or from Earth.  In either case, dexterous systems capable of precise movement 
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and force control are envisioned to perform the actual operations.  While the systems themselves could 
likely be validated on Earth, the LRAS team believed a demonstration mission would be highly desirable 
to reduce risk but is not required.  Such a mission could use actual operational robotic hardware and 
conduct simulated operations on test articles. The team also concluded that such a demonstration should 
not be part of a lunar robotics architecture, but integral to lunar surface systems development.  Even if the 
experiments are done from Earth, it may be beneficial to conduct them during a sortie mission, with 
astronauts available to inspect the work to assure correctness.  This additional consideration complements 
#35, which addresses validation of outpost emplacement/assembly equipment.   
Additional Consideration #37: Demonstrate Thermal Management Technologies 
This demonstration was labeled as an additional consideration because current thermal management 
technologies are adequate for a human flight to the Moon.  However, little is understood about the 
problems associated with longer stays, such as: how does lunar dust affect a radiator?  How well does a 
radiator work when it is receiving not just sunlight, but also reflected light from regolith? 
Additional Consideration #38: Demonstrate Power Technologies 
This demonstration was labeled as a additional consideration because current power systems such as solar 
panels are sufficient for a return to the Moon.  If new power technologies are to be used, a robotic 
precursor could demonstrate them in the environment of the Moon; however, it is not anticipated that new 
technologies will be needed for sortie missions or longer-duration missions to the polar regions. 
Additional consideration #39: Demonstrate New Propulsion Technologies 
This demonstration was labeled as an additional consideration because any demonstration of a propulsion 
technology will have to be scaled to fit the smaller robotic precursor missions.  It is assumed that a “test 
as you fly, and fly as you test” philosophy will be implemented by Constellation – if modifications are 
made to a piece of hardware after it is tested, that hardware should be retested before flight.  Testing a 
scaled propulsion system on a robotic precursor by scaling its thrust down does not test the equipment in 
its intended flight use; therefore it has less benefit than a full-up test.  
Additional consideration #40: Demonstrate New Software Technologies 
This demonstration was labeled as an additional consideration because any software technologies that are 
demonstrated on a robotic precursor mission will most likely be updated and reconfigured to run on the 
final platform.  Robotic precursor missions provide important opportunities for technology demonstration 
and/or risk mitigation for Constellation missions in the area of software and systems.  Examples include: 
demonstrating navigation software used for descent and landing; autonomous navigation capabilities; 
software supporting contingency operations; and demonstrating software and algorithms used to 
implement a packet-based communication system per the Constellation C3I methodology. 
Additional Consideration #41: Demonstrate Hardware Structural Integrity 
This demonstration was labeled as an additional consideration because hardware structural integrity tests 
preformed on a robotic precursor can generally be simulated in an Earth environment.  Operating 
structures in a simulated lunar environment presents a design challenge that can be addressed without the 
need for a lunar robotic mission.  Current design and analysis capability are sufficient to provide adequate 
margin for robotic and planned human exploration systems.  
48 
Additional Consideration #42: Validate Cost Models  
This was labeled as an additional consideration because lunar robotic cost models are based on past 
experience with robotic systems and can be modified as the RLEP program evolves.  
4.7. Additional Consideration: Nuclear power  
The Lunar Robotics Architecture Study 
examined the requirements for nuclear 
power capability, both from the 
standpoint of what robotic activities are 
required to support eventual deployment 
of nuclear systems and what 
requirements robotic exploration of the 
Moon may have for nuclear systems.  
Generally, nuclear systems are 
advantageous since they provide power 
though the lunar day and night cycle, obviating the need for energy storage to support nighttime 
operations when only solar power sources are used.  Nuclear systems also have the advantage of naturally 
supplying energy in the form of heat for processes and maintaining a desired thermal environment.  Note, 
however, that if large-scale ISRU becomes an integral element of a lunar outpost, nuclear power may be 
the only practical means to provide adequate levels of continuous power (about 50 to 100 kW).  
Additional Consideration #30: Nuclear Power for ISRU 
The only current requirement identified for nuclear power to support robotic exploration was for several-
hundred-watt-class radioisotope power to enable extended exploration of permanently shadowed regions, 
where a mobile lander would search for the form and characteristics of hydrogen.  This requirement is a 
mission enhancement rather than a need, as the mission could be accomplished using energy storage with 
periodic trips to sunlight for recharging batteries. 
Additional Consideration #31: Long Distance (2 km) Cable Laying Equipment 
Nuclear reactor power sources will have to be located a distance from power loads due to the radiation 
generated by their operation, and to a lesser extent, due to the thermal environment around a nuclear 
reactor.  Humans, electronics, and some structures must be shielded by mass or distance from radiation 
and high heat input.  This necessitates cable, laid on the lunar surface, as the only practical means of 
distributing the electrical power.  The distance trade, where greater distance reduces radiation shield mass 
while increasing cable mass and complexity, optimizes to around 2 km if the shield material is brought 
from Earth. (It optimizes to less than 200m if regolith is used as shielding.)  Several issues are in need of 
investigation with distributing electric power through cable over long distances in vacuum and on the 
lunar surface, as well as with laying the cable.  These issues include: cable size and mass; line losses; 
thermal environments; micro-meteoroid and orbital-debris protection; and the challenges of tele-robotic 
deployment of cable over the varied lunar surface.  Lunar robotic missions will need to investigate these 
issues prior to deploying large-scale ISRU or any other system requiring the distribution of power over 
long distances.  Radioisotope power sources do not have the same constraints on proximity for operations 
and other surface elements, because the active radiation generated is alpha particles and low-energy 
gammas (for Plutonium 238), which are much more benign. 
# Requirements and Additional 
considerations  
Type 
30 Nuclear Power for ISRU Only 
Required for 
Heavy ISRU 
31 Long Distance (2km) Cable 
Laying Equipment 
Only 
Required for 
Heavy ISRU 
Table 4.7-1.  Nuclear Power Requirements 
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4.8. Additional Consideration: Opportunity Science  
 
The fundamental goal of the President’s Vision for Space Exploration is “to advance U.S. scientific, 
security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.”  NASA has clearly 
assigned the responsibilities and authorities to its Mission Directorates for achieving this.  The Science 
Mission Directorate (SMD) has a vital role to represent the space and earth science interests of the U.S. 
scientific community.  Science missions lay a vital foundation for exploration by providing the 
framework for the strategic knowledge that enables exploration.  For example, SMD’s Heliophysics 
Research Program is undertaking the scientific study of the radiation environments beyond Earth’s 
magnetosphere where future space explorers will live and work.  It is vital that to understand this 
environment in order to design missions and systems that can mitigate its effects.  SMD’s Planetary 
Science research program will answer basic science questions about the Moon, Mars, and other solar 
system destinations, providing results that will inform the essential engineering decisions concerning the 
design and implementation of human exploration systems.   
For the Moon, SMD competitively selected through the Discovery program the Moon Mineralogy 
Mapper (M3) as a mission of opportunity.  M3 will fly on the Indian Space Research Organization's 
(ISRO) Chandraayan-1 Mission.  SMD will issue by the end of the year a request for studies of 
innovative “suitcase science” instruments and packages to accompany future lunar astronauts.  SMD will 
support the analysis of scientifically valuable results from ESMD missions.  Science enabled by 
exploration activities will compete in the same prioritization process as the rest of the SMD science 
program.  For example, if confirmed and implemented, the results of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
will address priority science objectives identified by the National Research Council (NRC) in the 2002 
decadal survey.  As these data become available, SMD will support their scientific analysis by funding 
proposers selected through openly competed solicitations for SMD’s science research programs.   
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5. Analytical Results 
5.1. Overview 
This section provides the results of analyses to translate the identified requirements into architecture 
options.  This includes: the mission scenarios and requirements prioritization; mission; schedule; and 
implementation risk. Additional detail is provided in the appendices to this report. 
5.2. Mission Scenario Analysis 
As discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, the LRAS team identified several human exploration mission 
scenarios in which potential requirements were categorized.  The scenarios included mission sorties only 
and sorties leading to a lunar outpost.  Variations in these top-level groupings included front-equatorial 
missions only, global access, or the inclusion of either a small or large ISRU capability.  The LRAS 
baseline human exploration mission planning scenario is a series of sorties leading to an outpost at the 
south pole with a small ISRU capability.  Excursions to de-scope to lower levels of capability were 
identified, as shown in Figure 5.2-1.   
 
 
Figure 5.2-1. The study focused on precursor requirements to support development of human polar 
outpost(s) and small ISRU, consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration. Global access was not 
precluded. 
 
The potential requirements supporting each scenario were then identified.  It is clear that the mission 
scenario shapes the requirements. 
The potential requirements were prioritized by importance.  Those deemed necessary to complete each 
mission scenario were identified as “requirements,” and those deemed very useful toward the mission 
scenario were designated as “additional considerations” or “strong considerations,” depending on the 
52 
potential benefit to the program scenario.  The requirements were then assigned a designation according 
to the particular scenario they supported.  
The scenarios and associated requirements are shown in Table 5.2-1.  Robotic lunar exploration program 
requirements are marked “RQ,” requirements that would be best fulfilled by other programs are marked 
“n-RQ,” and desires are labeled according to the benefit gained by fulfilling them.  To emphasize the 
earliest scenario for which something is required, the boxes for all subsequent scenarios may not be filled 
in in the table. For instance, if is it required to conduct a measurement before a human sortie mission, then 
it is therefore automatically required to be conducted ahead of an outpost mission. This sets the stage for 
the next step in the analysis in section 5.3, where the LRAS team needed to focus in on the earliest 
scenario to identify the earliest date by which the requirement must be fulfilled.   
 
      Scenario Analysis 
 # Requirement Sorties Only Sorties Leading to Outpost Outpost 
Outpost with 
Small ISRU 
Outpost with 
Large ISRU 
LRAS 
Baseline
 
      Front Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global   
              
Communications and Navigation            
 1 Hazard Avoidance 
n-RQ  RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 2 Precision Landing – 1km unaided, 
100m aided 
Add’l 
Consid RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 3 Precision Landing – 10m 
   RQ       RQ 
 4 Comm Relay (possibly including 
Backside)  n-RQ   n-RQ        
RQ 
 5 Improve Global Gravitational Map 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid     
RQ 
 6 Over-the-Horizon Propagation of 
RF    
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid n-RQ  n-RQ      
RQ 
              
Mapping (Visual, Topographic, and Resource)           
 7 Topographical Map 
Strong 
Consid RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 8 Visual Map – Landform Scales Add’l 
Consid RQ 
Add’l 
Consid RQ       RQ 
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      Scenario Analysis 
 # Requirement Sorties Only Sorties Leading to Outpost Outpost 
Outpost with 
Small ISRU 
Outpost with 
Large ISRU 
LRAS 
Baseline
 
      Front Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global   
 9 Orbital and Ground Truth 
Measurements of Thermal and 
Regolith Properties Add’l 
Consid RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 10 Characterization of Minerals and 
Volatiles in the Regolith Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid RQ RQ RQ RQ     RQ 
 11 Characterize the Lighting Near 
Permanently Lit Areas  
Add’l 
Consid  RQ       RQ 
 12 In-Situ Mapping of Water 
       RQ  n-RQ  RQ 
              
Environment (Dust and Radiation)            
 13 Characterization of Lunar Dust 
Environment 
RQ RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 14 Determine Environmental Effects on 
Systems Including Dust (T70) 
RQ RQ RQ RQ       RQ 
 15 Characterize 1/6 g Fluids/Two-
Phase Studies 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid RQ RQ       RQ 
 16 Demonstrate Systems That May Be 
Affected by Partial Gravity (T80) Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid n-RQ n-RQ n-RQ n-RQ     
Non-
RLEP 
Requirem
ent 
 17 Measure Biologically Relevant 
Radiation Environments Strong 
Consid RQ RQ RQ n-RQ n-RQ     RQ 
 18 Investigate Potential Biological 
Impacts of Combined Lunar 
Environments (Radiation, Partial 
Gravity, Thermal, Micrometeorites, 
Dust)  
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid RQ RQ       RQ 
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      Scenario Analysis 
 # Requirement Sorties Only Sorties Leading to Outpost Outpost 
Outpost with 
Small ISRU 
Outpost with 
Large ISRU 
LRAS 
Baseline
 
      Front Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global   
 19 Conduct Correlated Experiments at 
Molecular, Cellular, and Whole-
Organismal Levels Add’l Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid     
Strong 
Consid 
 20 Prototype Systems for Monitoring 
Lunar Environmental Effects on 
Humans (Radiation, Partial Gravity, 
Dust, Thermal Effects) n-RQ  n-RQ RQ RQ n-RQ n-RQ     
Non-
RLEP 
Requirem
ent 
 21 Prototype Systems for Mitigating 
Space Environment Effects on 
Humans (Radiation, Partial Gravity, 
Dust, Thermal Effects) 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid RQ RQ       RQ 
 22 Validate Radiation Transport 
Shielding Modeling Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid       
Strong 
Consid 
 23 Validate Planetary Protection 
Strategies, Technologies 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid     
Add’l 
Consid 
              
In-situ Resource Utilization (ISRU)            
 24 Demonstrate New Surface Mobility 
Technologies Add’l 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid     
Strong 
Consid 
 25 Demonstrate Excavation to Bury a 
Habitat or Stockpile Shielding   
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid       
Add’l 
Consid 
 26 Smoothing, Obstacle Removal, 
Emplacement of Registration 
Markers 
  Add’l Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid     
Add’l 
Consid 
 27 Demonstrate ISRU (O2) Production 
from Regolith 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid   RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ 
 28 Demonstrate O2 Production from 
Regolith Including Benefication and 
Storage 
      RQ RQ n-RQ n-RQ RQ 
 29 Demonstrate H2/O2 Production from 
Lunar Water        RQ  n-RQ RQ 
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      Scenario Analysis 
 # Requirement Sorties Only Sorties Leading to Outpost Outpost 
Outpost with 
Small ISRU 
Outpost with 
Large ISRU 
LRAS 
Baseline
 
      Front Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global   
 30 Nuclear Power for ISRU 
        n-RQ n-RQ 
Only 
Required 
for Heavy 
ISRU 
 31 Long Distance (2km) Cable Laying 
Equipment 
        n-RQ n-RQ 
Only 
Required 
for Heavy 
ISRU 
              
Other Risk Reduction for Development and Operations         
 32 Demonstrate “Safe Roving” and 
Return (to ~10 to 30 km)   RQ RQ       RQ 
 33 Validate In-Space Cycling of LSAM 
Engine 
n-RQ  n-RQ n-RQ n-RQ       
Non-
RLEP 
Requirem
ent 
 34 Demonstrate Telemedicine 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid n-RQ n-RQ       
Non-
RLEP 
Requirem
ent 
 35 Demonstration of Robotic 
Emplacement/Assembly Equipment 
  Add’l Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid n-RQ n-RQ 
Strong 
Consid 
 36 Demonstrate Precise, Dexterous 
Assembly Operations 
  Add’l Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid 
 37 Demonstrate Thermal Management 
Technologies 
  Strong Consid
Strong 
Consid       
Strong 
Consid 
 38 Demonstrate Power Technologies 
  Strong Consid
Strong 
Consid       
Strong 
Consid 
 39 Demonstrate New Propulsion 
Technologies 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid       
Add’l 
Consid 
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      Scenario Analysis 
 # Requirement Sorties Only Sorties Leading to Outpost Outpost 
Outpost with 
Small ISRU 
Outpost with 
Large ISRU 
LRAS 
Baseline
 
      Front Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global 
Front 
Eq Global   
 40 Demonstrate New Software 
Technologies Strong 
Consid 
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid
Strong 
Consid     
Strong 
Consid 
 41 Demonstrate Hardware Structural 
Integrity 
Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid     
Add’l 
Consid 
 42 Validate Cost Models Add’l 
Consid 
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
Add’l 
Consid
add’l 
Consid     
Add’l 
Consid 
 
Table 5.2-1.  Scenario Analysis, Sorted by Requirements 
5.3. Mission Implementation Analysis 
The next step in the analysis was to determine how the requirements might be implemented.  The linkages 
between Constellation missions and robotic requirements were identified.  Some robotic requirements 
inform the design of the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM), while some requirements are for the 
lunar outpost phase of exploration.   
In addition, the team assessed appropriate platforms for each requirement, such as an orbiter or lander.  
The appropriate platform identification and linkages Constellation needs supported the later time-phasing 
of requirements in the development of the schedule (described in section 5.4). 
Potential payloads to fulfill each requirement were also identified.  Potential instruments or existing 
payloads were assigned to each requirement, allowing for approximate mass, volume and power 
allocations to the platform types. Not every requirement required a specific instrument and additional 
considerations were not allocated to a spacecraft platform. Therefore, as seen in Table 5.3-1, instrument 
approximations were generated only as needed.  This resulted in various mission options, which were 
grouped into architecture options.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    57
 
      Implementation Analysis 
 # Requirement 
Earliest CX 
Mission 
Informed 
Orbiter / 
Lander / 
Other 
Instruments 
Mass 
Range 
(kg) 
Power 
Range 
(W) 
          L H L H 
         
Communications and Navigation       
 1 Hazard Avoidance LSAM 
Design 
Lander LIDAR, Descent Imager, ,  5 22 1.5 8 
 2 Precision Landing – 1km Unaided, 
100m Aided 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander LIDAR, Descent Imager, Radar 
Altimeter, IMU, Beacons 
1 22 1.5 8 
 3 Precision Landing – 10m Outpost Lander LIDAR, Descent Imager, Radar 
Altimeter, IMU, Beacons 
1 22 1.5 8 
 4 Comm Relay (Possibly Including 
Backside) 
All Flights Orbiter ECANS, Andrews, Ball, Boeing, 
Lockheed 
   
 5 Improve Global Gravitational Map LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter Orbital tracking via radio link 
using spacecraft, laser ranging 
   
 6 Over-the-Horizon Propagation of RF  Outpost Lander     
         
Mapping (Visual, Topographic, and Resource)      
 7 Topographical Map LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter Laser Altimiter, Visual Camera if 
useful at 50 X 50 m pixels 
1 20 1.5 4.8 
 8 Visual Map – Landform Scales LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter Visual Camera 1 20 1.5 4.8 
 9 Orbital and Ground Truth 
Measurements of Thermal and Regolith 
Properties 
LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter  / 
Lander 
Temp Sensor, Radiation Sensor,  
Radiation Telescope, 
Thermal Sensor, 
Thermal Spectrometer, 
Thermal Emission 
Imaging, Imaging IR 
Spectrometer,  
2.1 11.2 14 
 10 Characterization of Minerals and 
Volatiles in the Regolith 
Outpost Orbiter  / 
Lander 
DANS, X-ray spectrometer, 
Gamma Ray Spectrometer, Laser 
Induced Breakdown 
Spectrometer, Thermal Gas 
Analyzer, Volatile Sensor, 
Tunable Diode Laser, Neutron 
Detector, Radiometer, Alpha 
Detector, Infrared Spectrometer, 
Minerology Mapper, Low energy 
x-ray spectrometer, Radar 
Sounder, Spectrometer, Thermal 
Emission Spectrometer, IR 
Mineralogical Mapping 
Spectrometer, Radar Altimiter, 
Neutron Spectrometer, High 
Energy Neutron Sensor, Thermal 
Imager, Mass Spectrometer, X-
ray defractometer, Soil 
2.1 30 5.7 32 
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      Implementation Analysis 
 # Requirement 
Earliest CX 
Mission 
Informed 
Orbiter / 
Lander / 
Other 
Instruments 
Mass 
Range 
(kg) 
Power 
Range 
(W) 
          L H L H 
         
Conductivity Experiment, Bearing 
strength 
 11 Characterize the Lighting Near 
Permanently Lit Areas 
Outpost Orbiter  / 
Lander 
Cameras .27 ea.  
 12 In-Situ Mapping of Water Outpost Orbiter  / 
Lander 
Radar Sounder, CRISM, Neutron 
Spectrometer, HEND, Thermal 
Spectrometer, MVACS, Evolved 
Water Experiment 
0.06 20 1.5 14 
         
Environment (Dust and Radiation)       
 13 Characterization of Lunar Dust 
Environment 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander Magnet Arrays, Dust Counter, 
Atomic Force Microscope, 
Electron Spin Resonance,  
0.73 + 3.8 30 
 14 Determine Environmental Effects on 
Systems Including Dust (T70) 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander Magnet Arrays,  0.73 + 3.8 30 
 15 Characterize 1/6 g Fluids/Two-Phase 
Studies 
Outpost Lander     
 16 Demonstrate Systems That May Be 
Affected by Partial Gravity (T80) 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander     
 17 Measure Biologically Relevant 
Radiation Environments 
Outpost Orbiter  / 
Lander 
Small Bio Experiments, Radiation 
Sensor 
5 10  
 18 Investigate Potential Biological Impacts 
of Combined Lunar Environments 
(Radiation, Partial Gravity, Thermal, 
Micrometeorites, Dust)  
LSAM 
Design 
Lander Small Thermal and Electrical 
Conductivity experiment, Small 
Bio Experiments, Radiation 
Sensor, Bio-reactor 
5 10 7 + 
 19 Conduct Correlated Experiments at 
Molecular, Cellular, and Whole-
Organismal Levels 
Outpost Lander Cell growth and plant growth 
modules 
   
 20 Prototype Systems for Monitoring Lunar 
Environmental Effects on Humans 
(Radiation, Partial Gravity, Dust, 
Thermal Effects) 
LSAM 
Flight 
Lander personal dosimeters, others    
 21 Prototype Systems for Mitigating Space 
Environment Effects on Humans 
(Radiation, Partial Gravity, Dust, 
Outpost Lander     
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      Implementation Analysis 
 # Requirement 
Earliest CX 
Mission 
Informed 
Orbiter / 
Lander / 
Other 
Instruments 
Mass 
Range 
(kg) 
Power 
Range 
(W) 
          L H L H 
         
Thermal Effects) 
 22 Validate Radiation Transport Shielding 
Modeling 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander     
 23 Validate Planetary Protection 
Strategies, Technologies 
Mars Lander     
         
In-situ Resource Utilization (ISRU)       
 24 Demonstrate New Surface Mobility 
Technologies 
Outpost Lander     
 25 Demonstrate Excavation to Bury a 
Habitat or Stockpile Shielding 
Outpost Lander     
 26 Smoothing, Obstacle Removal, 
Emplacement of Registration Markers 
Outpost Lander     
 27 Demonstrate ISRU (O2) Production 
from Regolith 
Outpost Lander Small extraction and processing 
plant 
50 200  
 28 Demonstrate O2 Production from 
Regolith Including Benefication and 
Storage 
Outpost Lander     
 29 Demonstrate H2/O2 production from 
Lunar Water 
Outpost Lander     
 30 Nuclear Power for ISRU Outpost Lander     
 31 Long Distance (2km) Cable Laying 
Equipment 
Outpost Lander     
         
Other Risk Reduction for Development and Operations     
 32 Demonstrate “Safe Roving” and Return 
(to ~10 to 30 km) 
Outpost Lander Pathfinder/MER like hardware 10.5 185  
 33 Validate In-Space Cycling of LSAM 
Engine 
LSAM 
Design 
Other 
(options 
include 
LEO 
testing) 
Sensing and telemetry of engine 
operation 
   
 34 Demonstrate Telemedicine Outpost Other 
(Options 
include 
ground and
ISS testing) 
Cameras, X-rays, monitors from 
Req 20, "Point-of-presence" 
testing  
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      Implementation Analysis 
 # Requirement 
Earliest CX 
Mission 
Informed 
Orbiter / 
Lander / 
Other 
Instruments 
Mass 
Range 
(kg) 
Power 
Range 
(W) 
          L H L H 
         
 35 Demonstration of Robotic 
Emplacement/Assembly Equipment 
Outpost Lander     
 36 Demonstrate Precise, Dexterous 
Assembly Operations 
Outpost Lander     
 37 Demonstrate Thermal Management 
Technologies 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander  
 38 Demonstrate Power Technologies LSAM 
Design 
Lander GRC Stirling cycle system 
 39 Demonstrate New Propulsion 
Technologies 
LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter  / 
Lander 
 
 40 Demonstrate New Software 
Technologies 
LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter  / 
Lander 
 
 41 Demonstrate Hardware Structural 
Integrity 
LSAM 
Design 
Lander  
 42 Validate Cost Models LSAM 
Design 
Orbiter  / 
Lander 
 
 
Table 5.3-1.  Implementation Analysis, Sorted by Requirements 
The instrument data were used to estimate the total payload mass required to satisfy the requirements that 
each mission in the baseline.  Instrument implementations were classified as orbiter- or lander-based 
instruments.  Once those instrument types were chosen, representative masses were chosen from 
historical instruments.  Once instrument groups were chosen, it was a fairly easy task to group them into 
theoretical missions: 
 
Orbiter     ~51kg 
• Laser Altimeter and Camera:  21kg 
• Temperature Sensor:   2.1kg 
• Neutron Detector:    28kg 
 
Fixed Lander     ~51kg 
• Imaging system    4kg 
• Thermal Emission Spectrometer  2.1kg 
• Wet Chemistry Lab, Microscopy, etc. 10kg 
• Electron Proton Resonance  5kg 
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• Chemical Luminosity   3kg 
• Reference Impedance Sensors   1kg 
• Magnetic array, brushes  1kg 
• Regolith characterization package 25kg 
 
Mobile Lander     ~40kg 
• Radiometer & other inst. yeast canister 20kg 
• Pancams and support structures  5kg 
• Thermal Gas Analyzer   5kg 
• Small robotic arm   10kg 
 
Mobile Lander/Rover    ~201kg 
• ISRU demonstration plant  200kg 
• Fluids testing equipment for 1/6g 1kg 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Schedule Analysis 
  
 
 
Figure 5.4-1. LRAS Analysis Process 
As can be seen from the above chart, there are three groups of requirements keyed to various points in the 
Constellation timeline.  These groups are linked to events in the timeline, not hard dates: 
1) To reduce risk for the LSAM, the following requirements should be fulfilled at least one year 
before LSAM PDR: 
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a. A visual map of the entire lunar surface should be constructed, with resolution at or better 
than 25m/pixel. 
b. A topographical map of the polar regions should be constructed, with relative accuracy of 
0.2m. 
c. A resource map of the polar regions should be constructed, with resolution better than 
10km/pixel. 
d. Significantly improved lunar gravitational potential model should be developed through a 
dedicated gravity science investigation to measure far-side gravity. 
e. A lander (or landers) should be sent to the polar region(s) of the Moon to get ground truth 
measurements of the polar environment, including lighting, terrain features, regolith 
characteristics, radiation and other environmental measurements.  
f. This same lander should fully characterize lunar dust, and specific mitigation techniques 
should be tested to inform LSAM airlock design and human surface suit design.  Specific 
characterization of the dust should include: 
i. Determine the percent of dust <5 micrometers in size. 
ii. Measure relative reactivity. 
iii. Measure passivation characteristics. 
2) Satisfying a second set of requirements will further reduce risk for the human lunar outpost. 
These requirements, if addressed and phased properly, could also inform the CDR of the 
LSAM—for instance, if something is significantly different about the Moon than initially 
believed and it affects the design of the LSAM, the information will be determined in time to 
inform system design.  These requirements should be fulfilled in time to inform the design of 
outpost hardware, assumed here to receive Authority to Proceed (ATP) in 2018.  Regardless of 
when ATP occurs, these robotic missions should complete their primary mission at approximately 
the same time. 
a. The answers to some ISRU questions will affect the initial design of the outpost and 
should be answered at this time: (1) Determine if useful resources can be extracted 
economically from lunar soil and (2) Determine if water-ice exists at the polar regions 
and whether it is in an extractable state, amount, and location. 
b. The combined lunar environment might have some unknown synergistic biological 
effects; several biological experiments should be completed robotically to determine the 
long-term effects of the combined dust, radiation, and thermal environments. 
c. Long-term operation in the lunar environment should be conducted to determine how 
mechanical systems will degrade over time. 
d. Finally, the radiation shielding properties of the lunar regolith should be characterized to 
inform potential use as a shielding material. 
3) A final set of requirements can inform habitat operations, roving capability and potential ISRU 
development and usage. These requirements will need to precede habitat development and the use 
of ISRU plants by at least the time required to design the habitat systems and develop the ISRU 
plants. 
a. An ISRU demonstration should be performed. This will be either extraction of hydrogen 
and oxygen from water-ice or extraction of oxygen from regolith. 
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b. Characterize fluid and two-phase systems in lunar gravity.  This requirement may be 
moved forward into section 2) or 1), but is thought to be essential for a chemical ISRU 
plant, while state-of-the-art knowledge is sufficient for the design of an outpost. 
c. Demonstrate up to 30km roving capability; the system will likely be designed after a 
thorough assessment of the effects of (2c) above. 
5.5. Implementation Risk Analysis 
It is important to note the risks to implementation of the architecture.  Technical risks include: operation 
in the lunar environment, including lunar dust, thermal, and radiation; and, in particular, operations in the 
deep cold of permanently shadowed regions.  The ability to perform landings in the near-permanently lit 
regions, and reliable mobility in the lunar environment (dust, thermal, power) also presents difficulties.  
In addition, if seeking to utilize in-situ hydrogen and/or water, it is important to understand the form and 
location in which the resource exists. 
Additional implementation risks of the lunar robotic architecture involve: the appropriate phasing of lunar 
robotic requirements, such as environment characterization; development and demonstration of lunar 
resource utilization technologies; and technology development and demonstration for systems to directly 
support human presence on the Moon.   The driving factor is selecting program content that realizes 
useful lunar data in a timely manner to inform future architecture or design decisions, guides further 
human exploration, and employs technology in compelling preparatory and assistive missions.   An 
underlying emphasis on economy requires one to be judicious in tailoring the complexity of mission 
systems to the meet the overall goals of exploration.  In the earliest phases of the lunar robotic 
architecture, the emphasis is on data gathering and the expectation is that mission systems will emphasize 
re-utilization of technologies used for other planetary survey missions (e.g., instrument technology 
development costs should be minimal).  With enhanced knowledge of the lunar environment in 
combination with better definition of manned-missions to the Moon, more complex mission systems can 
be defined that insert technology at the appropriate interval to support safe and robust human exploration.  
Definition of direct support of human missions via the lunar robotic architecture will by necessity be 
iterative as the Constellation Systems Program matures and program interfaces are developed. 
Program budget is a driver in influencing how much can be done at a given time to meet the lunar robotic 
requirements.  It is critical that the budget to support robotic missions be sustained.  Due to the 
evolutionary nature of the knowledge gained, short-term decreases in budget will have a ripple effect on 
the entire architecture.  Insufficient budget for the lunar robotic architecture early on causes higher levels 
of uncertainty and risk to be reflected in design standards (based on knowledge of the lunar environment) 
and thus in likely higher cost for follow-on human missions.  It is equally important that attention be paid 
to achieve the maximum value within acceptable risk for the minimum possible cost and risk.  Striking 
this balance is important to achieving an effective architecture within the program budget. 
In addition, there is schedule risk associated with the development of both a lander and 
communications/navigation relay spacecraft in time for a 2011 or 2012 launch unless concept 
development for these spacecraft were to begin immediately.  Moreover, it is recognized that a “new 
start” on a reduced-scope lunar orbiter to replace LRO would have a very low probability of meeting a 
2008-2009 launch date. 
Technology development to support the lunar robotic missions also poses some risk to implementation of 
the architectures presented.  In particular, required long-lead technologies to support the missions were 
not included in the mission development schedules presented.  To support the budget and timeline of this 
architecture, new technologies will require a level of development and bench testing to mature the 
technologies prior to consideration for the missions. 
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Commercial launch vehicle availability is also cause for concern.  The availability (or lack) of the 
smaller-class launch vehicles may require NASA to utilize evolved expendable launch vehicles for 
robotic missions.  Use of these larger-class vehicles for lower-cost robotic missions will require 
innovative approaches, such as co-manifested payloads with other science missions or those of other 
government agencies, or consideration of some alterations in the timeline presented here. 
Additional risks are foreseen related to the level of maturity of several drivers.  The Exploration Strategy 
with international and commercial stakeholders is under development.  This activity will identify the 
collective needs, goals, and objectives for endeavors on the Moon and an associated architecture.  The 
first workshop was held at the end of April and the activity is planned to provide a strategy by December 
2006.  These results should provide further clarity to the goals for the lunar robotic architecture.  The 
Constellation Systems Program is in the process of developing requirements and competitive selection of 
some elements of the exploration systems architecture.  These requirements, as well as potential cost and 
schedule growth, would affect the requirements for the lunar robotic architecture as well.  In addition, the 
implementation risks of the Constellation Systems Program should provide input about knowledge 
needed from the lunar robotic missions.    
It is also noted that if nuclear power sources are deemed necessary, there is some risk associated with 
review and approval of such technology and/or systems which typically has taken several years. 
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6. Architectures 
6.1. Overview 
Beyond simply identifying and prioritizing requirements for the lunar robotic architecture, the LRAS 
attempted to establish a link between the requirements and appropriate Constellation Program milestones.  
This approach allows the identification of a minimal mission set and timeline. 
The LRAS team’s analytical results indicated that there are three groups of requirements, each linked to a 
Constellation Program milestone laid out in the ESAS Architecture.  This led to the identification of three 
groups of LRAS architectural elements.  The LRAS team tried to maintain traceability to Constellation’s 
needs throughout its process.  To this end, the team categorized requirements based on which needs were 
addressed, and sequenced the architecture’s missions according to when those needs were realized.  A 
sketch of the process is shown in Figure 6.1-1 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.1-1.  The architectures are constructed around specific groups of requirements. 
 
As can be seen, there were three major groups of requirements that needed to be informed: LSAM 
Preliminary Design Review, outpost missions, and ISRU use.  Accordingly, the team ordered the 
missions within each architecture to address these needs, including the highest-priority requirements on 
the first missions flown.  
6.2. Baseline Architecture 
 
Figure 6.2-1 shows the baseline architecture timeline: 
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Figure 6.2-1.  Baseline Architecture 
The baseline architecture includes four separate launches occurring approximately every two years.  The 
first mission is a lunar orbiter.  The second mission is a fixed lander co-manifested with a 
communications relay satellite.  The final two missions are mobile lander/rovers.  The first two missions 
are scheduled on a timeline that allows the major results to inform the design of the LSAM (available 
prior to LSAM PDR). 
Figure 6.2-1 shows an orbiter flying in late 2008.  This orbiter is considered to be a new mission, 
designed to meet the minimum lunar mapping requirements, not the current Lunar Reconnaissance 
Orbiter (LRO).  The information gathered from this orbiter’s experiments would inform LSAM Authority 
To Proceed. The major concerns addressed by this mission are: mapping the Moon, with measurement in 
visible light; measuring lunar topography; and areas of potential water deposits.  The information 
gathered would include: 
• A high-resolution visual map, including information on the near permanently lit regions of both 
poles. The polar regions and other sites of interest would be measured at approximately 1m/pixel, 
the rest of the Moon at approximately 50-100m/pixel. 
• A high-resolution topographical map of the Moon. Absolute altitude would be gained at 
approximately 25m error limit, with relative error less than approximately 0.5m. 
• A map of hydrogen deposits >100ppm on the Moon <10km/pixel. 
• A measure of the space radiation environment near the Moon. 
 
Additional objectives for the first orbiter mission include developing an improved lunar gravitational 
potential map, and demonstration of a secondary communications relay payload. 
 
Based on the assumption that the initial sorties leading to the outpost will land at polar locations 
(consistent with the ESAS reference outpost site), the LRAS team concluded that a mission smaller than 
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LRO and focused on mapping the poles would be sufficient to meet requirements.  Preliminary cost 
estimates, based upon parametric methods, indicate that this mission would cost less than our current 
understanding of the cost to complete the LRO.  Any final Agency decision to pursue this architecture 
should factor in: the greater uncertainty of this cost estimate compared to the relatively mature estimates 
for LRO; the decreased architectural flexibility to implement early sortie missions to locations other than 
polar sites or those mapped during Apollo; and the time required to develop a new mission that could 
delay its launch beyond 2008.  NASA confirmed the LRO mission late in the preparation of this final 
report. 
The major concerns addressed by the fixed lander are: ground truth measurements of lighting, soil 
composition, thermal environment and characterization of lunar dust to inform mechanical designs and 
biological concerns.  The fixed lander would perform the following measurements: 
• Demonstrate precision landing (<100m error eclipse) 
• Characterize the lunar dust 
o Measure percent of dust < 5um 
o Relative reactivity 
o Passivation characteristics 
• Characterize regolith thickness and composition 
• Ground truth lighting and thermal environment of landing site 
 
Robotic landers provide opportunities to demonstrate precision landing capabilities that will eventually 
enable 100 m (3-sigma) landing accuracy, and to demonstrate specific (navigation) software, sensors, and 
algorithms (LRAS-34) used for descent and landing.   
A relay communication orbiter would be co-manifested with the fixed lander in 2011, taking advantage of 
excess payload capacity available with the second launch.  The communications orbiter is to be deployed 
into a frozen elliptical orbit, providing partial communications coverage to the south polar region.  It will 
serve as a relay for the information gathered by the lander and the following two missions, and is 
therefore designed as a long-life orbiter (5-6 year life). 
There are several communications and navigation requirements that, while not drivers for the lunar 
robotic architecture, may provide significant risk mitigation or other benefits for the Constellation 
Program.   Objectives that may be satisfied by either lander or orbiter spacecraft include: demonstrating 
the routable, IP-based communications architecture as described in the Constellation C3I Interoperability 
Specification; obtaining additional experience with tracking and flight dynamics operations for spacecraft 
in the lunar environment; providing technology demonstrations of communications and tracking 
hardware, including secondary communications/tracking payloads; and providing residual 
communications and tracking assets for subsequent robotic and human missions. 
The third mission in the baseline series is a mobile lander.  It was not determined what sort of mobility 
this lander would have, as the team did not wish to stifle innovative architecture possibilities or creative 
thinking.  The primary goals of this mission are to determine if there is water on the Moon in a 
sufficiently accessible form and location, and in sufficient quantities to make it worthwhile to attempt to 
mine it for in-situ resource utilization.  This mission primarily informs the eventual construction of an 
outpost, and its measurements would include: 
• Checking for water-ice in at least 20 sites in a shadowed crater.  It was noted that hydrogen 
deposited by the solar wind is ubiquitous but only in a concentration of 50-100 ppm; 
consequently mining H2 is not practical.  The large number of sites is necessary to employ a 
scientific process to determine with confidence, that if there is water available in the selected 
crater, it has not been missed. 
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• Measure the radiation shielding effects of regolith.  (This experiment could be moved up to as 
early as the fixed lander mission if necessary.) 
• Through a yeast or similar biological experiment, measure the combined lunar environmental 
effects on life. (This experiment could be moved up to as early as the fixed lander mission if 
necessary.) 
• Prove that mechanical systems can survive and operate for ~1 year in this lunar environment. 
 
The final mission in the recommended architecture is a rover. This mission’s primary goal is to 
demonstrate ISRU of one sort or another on the Moon.  If the third mission determines the presence of 
accessible water-ice in sufficient quantity that is deemed worthwhile of mining, the final mission will 
attempt to demonstrate mining and processing of water-ice.  If not, then oxygen can be extracted from the 
regolith anywhere on the Moon through chemical processes.  This mission will inform the eventual use of 
ISRU at a lunar outpost.  In all, three different experiments are intended for this mission: 
• ISRU production of oxygen or oxygen and hydrogen of up to 1,000kg.  
• Characterize fluid and two-phase systems in 1/6 gravity. (This experiment could be moved up to 
as early as the fixed lander mission if necessary.) 
• Roving up to 30km as a precursor to human rovers for the outpost. 
6.3 Excursions to the Baseline Architecture 
 
Several excursions to the baseline architecture were considered. These excursions were meant to highlight 
possible de-scopes or expanded opportunities that could be leveraged in implementing the exploration 
objectives. 
Excursion 1 – Baseline with LRO as the orbiter 
The first of these excursions is the deployment of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) instead of the 
notional orbiter listed here in the baseline architecture.  LRO is already underway, and there may be good 
reason to allow this mission to complete its development. LRO meets the LRAS mapping requirements, 
has already completed concept development, and is in the preliminary design phase.  Moreover, even if a 
significant savings could be realized by reducing the scope of the first orbiter, a “new start” on an 
alternative orbiter at this late time would have a very low probability of meeting the 2008 date set as a 
goal of the Vision for Space Exploration. Second, once a mission has been started initial design costs are 
incurred that would not be recovered if the mission were cancelled.  Finally, it is sufficient in its 
information gathering. In fact, it performs more measurements than are actually needed to reduce the risk 
to Constellation. The notional cost profile and timeline is shown below in 6.3-1. 
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Figure 6.3-1.  Excursion 1 -- Baseline with LRO as the Orbiter 
The changes to this architecture consist solely of replacing the initial mapping orbiter with LRO. As the 
diagram shows, there would be an increased initial cost incurred in the first two years. A decreased 
schedule risk would likely be a benefit of this excursion. 
With the exception of providing a dedicated gravity science investigation or including a secondary 
communications/tracking payload, LRO meets all of the LRAS objectives for orbiter #1.  Note that 
NASA confirmed the LRO mission late in the preparation of this report. 
Excursion 2 – Baseline with an additional fixed lander to the north pole 
Excursion 2 is an opportunity for NASA.  For a nominal increase in cost of approximately $100M, NASA 
could send two fixed landers, one to the north lunar pole, and one to the south.  There is good reason to do 
this, as the northern pole may have points that are even more exposed to continuous light than does the 
south pole.  Figure 6.3-2 shows the changes in the budget profile that would occur as a result. 
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Figure 6.3-2.  Excursion 2 -- An Additional Fixed Lander to the North Pole 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3-2, there is a very slight increase in the year-to-year cost estimate in years 
2010-2013. Approximately 40% of the increase is due to the triple manifesting of two landers and an 
orbiter onto an EELV instead of a Delta-II class vehicle; the other 60% is in the recurring engineering 
cost of constructing a second fixed lander.  
Note that the communications relay satellite from the baseline architecture provides partial 
communications and tracking coverage to a region near the south pole.  A second lander at the opposite 
pole would have very limited coverage from this relay satellite, and thus would require a landing site with 
some DTE communications availability.   
There are several other possibilities for providing coverage to multiple locations on the lunar surface, 
including: different lunar relay orbit selection, a lunar relay orbiter at the Earth-Moon L2 point, or 
deploying additional lunar relay assets.  Examining these trades, however, was beyond the scope of the 
LRAS study.  The LRAS study relied upon the results of the Space Communication Architecture 
Working Group in recommending the polar relay satellite approach. 
Excursion 3 – Baseline with combined fixed lander and first mobile lander to “touch the water 
early,” no ISRU demonstration 
Excursion 3 highlights the large costs associated with an immediate need to determine the potential for 
water in craters on the Moon. By developing and flying a communications orbiter, a mapping orbiter, and 
an “all-in-one” rover (one meant to fulfill the functions of the fixed lander and the first mobile lander) 
simultaneously, the unknowns about presence and accessibility of water on the Moon could be resolved.   
This excursion exceeds the current budget guideline in the near-term. This is shown below in Figure 6.3-
3. 
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Figure 6.3-3.  Excursion 3 – Combining the Fixed Lander with the Rover to “Touch the Later Early” 
and Conduct No ISRU Demonstration 
As 6.3-3 shows, the planned launch date of the rover has not been moved, and occurs in late 2011.  This 
timeframe could shift if the timeline for the LSAM shifts, as it is linked to the LSAM PDR.  Shifting it to 
the right (a later date) would allow it to fit more closely to the planned RLEP budget, but the total 
estimated cost would increase due to inflation as well as a longer timeline.  Such a change in the normal 
development cycle might also increase the cost risk of the mission. 
Another possible negative in addition to the high cost is the technical risk associated with this scenario.  It 
has been suggested that relatively frequent launches are beneficial for distributing risk, developing 
exploration technology, and maintaining public interest and support of NASA’s return to the Moon.  This 
scenario includes only two launches, one in 2008 and one in 2011, and no subsequent launches prior to 
LSAM.  
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Excursion 4 – Baseline with combined fixed lander and first mobile lander to “touch the water 
early” followed by ISRU demonstration 
Figure 6.3-4 below shows the estimates for a full-up mission to “touch the water early,” followed by the 
ISRU rover.  The time-phasing of this architecture is calculated to inform the outpost early enough to 
develop the ISRU technologies in time for the first occupation of the outpost. 
 
Figure 6.3-4.  Excursion 4 -- “Touch the Water Early” (as in Excursion 3) but with Added ISRU 
Demonstration 
This is a logical follow-on to the previous excursion.  If water-ice is found, it would be possible to send a 
mission to mine such resources.  Again, the timing of both of these missions is linked to the Constellation 
timeline, and so the second rover is flown later in the program cycle.  It would be possible to smooth the 
cost curves by stretching the development cycle out with the likely increase in cost risk; another possible 
extension might occur if there is a delay in the LSAM development cycle.  This excursion also exceeds 
the budget guideline. 
Excursion 5 – Baseline with both mobile landers deferred, no ISRU demonstration 
Since it is not critical to the Constellation timeline to determine if there is accessible water early in the 
lunar exploration, it is feasible to defer the mobile landers.  The fixed lander and the communications 
orbiter could be sent together.  The communications orbiter and the mapping orbiter could be combined 
for a truly minimum-cost (and minimum-activity) scenario but the spacecraft would have to be designed 
for other considerations, including significantly more delta- V (net velocity change to the vehicle) to 
maneuver to a higher orbit and better reliability of parts for longer lifetimes. It should be noted that in this 
case, since there is only one mission to the surface, the communication satellite does not need to be long-
lived. This is shown in Figure 6.3-5. 
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Figure 6.3-5.  Excursion 5 – Baseline with Both Mobile Landers Deferred 
Note that in this scenario, all ISRU activities are .postponed until human exploration begins. It would be 
possible to move up the regolith characterization to the fixed lander to determine how much oxygen was 
in the regolith at the chosen site. It would also be possible to manifest another lander to the north pole, as 
in excursion #2, for an additional $100M.  
This excursion foregoes an opportunity for bolstering public support.  Frequent launches are beneficial for 
increasing public interest and support of the exploration program.  This excursion can be accommodated 
within the budget guideline. 
Excursion 6 – Baseline with both mobile landers deferred and with LRO as the first orbiter, no 
ISRU demonstration 
If LRO is selected to be the orbiter, there are two impacts: 1) LRO has a higher cost than the orbiter in the 
baseline architecture, and 2) LRO is not designed to be a communications orbiter, so a separate 
communications satellite would need to be sent.  Note that NASA confirmed the LRO mission late in the 
preparation of this report.  Figure 6.3-6 shows the expected impact to the budget of enacting this 
excursion: 
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Figure 6.3-6.  Excursion 6 – Baseline with Both Mobile Landers Deferred and LRO as the Orbiter 
Again, this excursion contains only two launches, one in 2008 and one in 2011.  This excursion can be 
accommodated within the budget guideline. 
Excursion 7 – MER-class rover and robust communication 
In excursion 7, the lander is given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity. Additionally, several extra comm/nav satellites are added, allowing the build-up of a 
constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions. 
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Figure 6.3-7.  Excursion 7 – Baseline with MER-like Rover and a Robust Communication 
Infrastructure 
 
Excursion 8 – Two MER-class rovers and robust communication 
In Excursion 8, two landers are given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity.  It is thought that these rovers would explore both north and south polar regions. 
Additionally, several extra communications and navigation (comm/nav) satellites are added, allowing the 
build-up of a constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions.  These multiple satellites also 
mitigate the risk of covering both poles with a single satellite.  Excursion 7 and Excursion 8 are nearly 
identical.  It is thought that an additional rover would cost on approximately 20% over the original cost, 
and that cost is spread through 6 years, so the graphs appear almost identical. 
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Figure 6.3-8.  Excursion 8 – Baseline with Two MER-like Rovers and a Robust Communication 
Infrastructure 
 
Excursion 9 – MER-class rover, ISRU demonstration, and robust communication 
In this excursion, the lander is given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity, and is also given a small In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) package.  This package is 
meant only to demonstrate the technology’s feasibility, not to produce any substantial amount of usable 
resources.  Additionally, several extra comm/nav satellites are added, allowing the build-up of a 
constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions. 
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Figure 6.3-9.  Excursion 9 – MER-like Rover, ISRU Demonstration, and a Robust Communication 
Infrastructure 
 
Excursion 10 – 2 MER-class rovers, robust communication, ISRU demonstration, followed by 
search for water, followed by ISRU rover 
In Excursion 10, the landers are given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity, and are also given small In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) packages.  This package is 
meant only to demonstrate the technology’s feasibility, not to produce any substantial amount of usable 
resources. Additionally, several extra comm/nav satellites are added, allowing the build-up of a 
constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions.  This is followed by the deep-cold crater-
ice searching rover, and finally by the ISRU rover mission.  Excursion 9 and Excursion 10 are nearly 
identical.  It is thought that an additional rover would cost on approximately 20% over the original cost, 
and that cost is spread through 6 years, so the graphs appear almost identical. 
78 
 
Figure 6.3-10.  Excursion 10 – Baseline with MER-like Rover and a Robust Communication 
Infrastructure 
 
Excursion 11 – MER-class rover, robust communication, and ISRU deferred 
In Excursion 11, the lander is given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity.  Additionally, several extra comm/nav satellites are added, allowing the build-up of a 
constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions.  All ISRU work is deferred to a later date.  
This excursion can be accommodated within the budget guideline. 
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Figure 6.3-11.  Excursion 11— MER-like Rover, a Robust Communication Infrastructure, and 
Deferred ISRU 
 
Excursion 12 – 2 MER-class rovers and robust communication 
In Excursion 12, two landers are given minor mobility hardware, similar to the Mars Rovers Spirit and 
Opportunity, and are also given small In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) packages. This package is 
meant only to demonstrate the technology’s feasibility, not to produce any substantial amount of usable 
resources.  Additionally, several extra comm/nav satellites are added, allowing the build-up of a 
constellation of satellites by the beginning of human missions.  All large ISRU work is deferred to a later 
date.  This excursion can be accommodated with an adjustment of funding in the budget guideline. 
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Figure 6.3-12.  Excursion 12 – Two MER-like Rovers, a Robust Communication Infrastructure, and 
ISRU Demonstration 
6.4 Cost / Benefit Analysis  
The costs and benefits of the baseline architecture and its excursions were computed based on the cost 
models and experience from previous orbiter and planetary lander missions.  The total real-year costs 
were tabulated and then normalized so that the baseline architecture equaled 100.  A table summarizing 
the results is presented below. 
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Architecture 
Normalized 
Real-year 
Costs 
 
Benefits 
Baseline Mission (Orbiter, Fixed 
Lander, Comm Satellites,  Two 
Mobile Landers with ISRU Demo) 
100 Covers identified major needs for 
Constellation 
Baseline with LRO as the Orbiter 102 Covers identified major needs for 
Constellation – Leaving LRO as the first 
orbiter 
Baseline with Additional Fixed Lander 
to North Pole 
102 2 fixed landers, one to each pole—helps 
characterize points of eternal light at both 
poles; possible comm. limitations 
Baseline with Combined Fixed 
Lander and First Mobile Lander  to 
“Touch the Water Early”, No ISRU 
Demo 
46 Covers identified major needs for 
Constellation and identifies water early on; 
not supported by near-term budget 
Baseline with Combined Fixed 
Lander and First Mobile Lander  to 
“Touch the Water Early”, with ISRU 
Demo 
98 Covers identified major needs for 
Constellation and identifies water early on; 
not supported by near-term budget 
Baseline with Both Mobile Landers 
Deferred, No ISRU 
14 Covers identified major needs for LSAM, 
but does not cover mobile lander functions 
or ISRU 
Baseline with Both Mobile Landers 
Deferred w/ LRO as the Orbiter, No 
ISRU 
20 Covers identified major needs for LSAM, 
leaving LRO in place, and does not cover 
mobile lander functions or ISRU 
Table 6.4-1.  Summary of Normalized Costs and Benefits of the Baseline Architecture and Its Excursions 
6.5 Architecture Flexibility 
An overarching assumption of the LRAS study is that the final decision on the human lunar mission 
architecture would not be decided for several years, and that any proposed lunar robotic architecture must 
have a high degree of flexibility.  A specific requirement given to the study team was to assume global 
lunar access and use of in-situ resources.  Initially the study considered a wide range of sortie and outpost 
options to determine robotic requirements.  It allowed for just sortie missions and sortie missions 
followed by an outpost.  This was the same basic scope assumed by the ESAS team.   
Based largely on lunar geography and environmental factors, the missions divided into three main groups: 
(1) equatorial missions, (2) polar missions and (3) high-latitude, sub-polar missions.  The first group was 
characterized positively by commonality with Apollo missions on the front side.  These represented the 
easiest landing sides, with the backside considered somewhat more difficult.  The major detraction from 
equatorial missions is the very long (334 hr), cold (~ -150°C) lunar night.  This limited sorties to about 10 
days and set limitations on a possible outpost.  One serious limitation would be the almost-certain 
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requirement for a nuclear power source for any needs over 50 kW, such as large-scale ISRU.  The polar 
regions offer the possibility of sites with continuous, or near-continuous, solar illumination.  Such a site 
would potentially be very benign thermally – no long, frigid lunar night – allowing for sorties of 
unrestricted duration, as well as the possibility of relying totally on solar power.  Another potential 
advantage is the possible existence of ancient cometary water in permanently shadowed areas such as the 
Shackleton crater near the south pole.  Also, a polar landing is only slightly more demanding in terms of 
energy than an equatorial mission.  Missions between the equatorial and polar regions offer no particular 
advantage and are the most demanding energy-wise.  They also do not impose any significant robotic 
challenges beyond those of equatorial and polar missions.  
The LRAS team also separated missions into large-scale and small-scale ISRU missions.  In all cases 
when large-scale ISRU (e.g. 50-100 mt/yr O2) was considered, the issues associated with resource 
mapping, mining, beneficiation, processing, power and storage dominated the robotic architecture.  As 
such, the team considered this a special case and subsequently only considered small-scale ISRU (e.g. 1-
10 mt/yr O2).  Other than that, the LRAS study considered all human mission scenarios possible and 
developed a basic architecture that could accommodate the full range of options.  However, to define a 
baseline the team focused on a series of sortie missions followed by a polar outpost with small-scale 
ISRU.  This provided a robust set of requirements that met the needs of most other mission scenarios. 
The most significant variation from the baseline may be in assuring continuous communication with 
Earth.  A single lunar relay satellite can provide partial communications to a single lunar region (i.e., the 
south pole).  Two relay satellites in a frozen elliptical orbit can provide continuous communications to a 
single region.  A polar mission (or a mission to another lunar limb location) may have some limited DTE 
communications.  A backside mission would require a minimum of one relay satellites, and more likely 
two in order to provide redundant communications capability.  Continuous communication over the entire 
lunar surface could be met by a constellation of 5-6 satellites.  The latter was beyond the scope of the 
LRAS study.  However, the LRAS team determined that additional small relay satellites could be part of 
each LRAS and human sortie mission as secondary payloads if needed.  
While the team determined that lunar resource mapping was, in general, a key early robotic requirement, 
the commitment to ISRU could wait if there was no early economic advantage to using water for rocket 
fuel.  If O2 and its primary byproducts (metals and glass) are the principle benefits of ISRU, then regolith 
can serve as a ubiquitous and practical source of raw material.  This puts no hard restriction on sortie or 
outpost siting, and a decision of whether to exploit ISRU is not critical.  NASA ISRU experts estimate 
that a small regolith ISRU experiment could be developed in five years, and the capability for operational 
small-scale ISRU in ten tears.  However, if rocket fuel is a high priority, a polar outpost is required and 
the existence of large amounts of accessible water is crucial to achieving this objective.  Furthermore, the 
feasibility of conducting “mining” operations in a 40K environment would need to be demonstrated 
relatively early, likely prior to the first human landing.  If a good polar site is selected for thermal and 
illumination reasons, then validation of water processing can wait, as long as there is a source nearby.  
This latter case makes the issue of “finding the water” critical; it does not address whether it can or will 
be used.  Currently, the search for water is part of the extended baseline lunar robotic architecture with the 
validation of mining maintained as an option. 
Overall, the LRAS architecture includes an orbiter and lander to meet the initial core common 
requirements and later rovers (or other mobility systems, such as hoppers) to address the “human mission-
specific” issues such as “mining” water-ice.   Characterization of the elemental and mineralogical 
composition of the lunar soil, both on the surface and up to several meters below, will contribute to 
answering scientific questions about the Moon and about the formation of the Earth and solar system.  
This includes looking for water and other volatiles, one of the National Research Council decadal 
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survey’s scientific priorities.  As such, there is significant opportunity for lunar orbiters, landers and 
rovers to serve both exploration and science.   
Beyond the synergies of meeting exploration requirements and addressing key science questions, there is 
the opportunity to co-manifest science missions with exploration missions.  The conceptual missions 
comprising the current baseline architecture for the six primary excursions have a launch vehicle mass 
margin of at least 20% to 25% on top of conservative estimates for mission hardware (e.g., spacecraft bus, 
lander, reference instruments, etc.).  Further, many assume use of an EELV, for which the Air Force has 
developed a special secondary payload adapter ring capable of accommodating multiple payloads.  This 
makes the design and integration for one or more secondary exploration or science payloads 
comparatively easy, greatly enhancing the flexibility of the lunar architecture. 
6.6 Future Work 
Results of this study will be provided to the NASA Administrator, the Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, and the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD), the Space Operations Mission 
Directorate (SOMD) and the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) for consideration and implementation.  
There are several areas that the LRAS team would like to recommend for future study in developing a 
final lunar robotic architecture.  
Improved Definition of Human Lunar Mission Requirements and Risks 
For this study the LRAS team developed and now recommends adoption of a set of requirements drawn 
from the ESAS report, the outdated/early set of requirements of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program 
(RLEP), and other recent analyses.  As the elements of the Constellation lunar architecture are refined, all 
aspects of these requirements should be updated in order to: preserve linkage to the intent; improve the 
clarity of the requirement; allocate more accurately and quantify the performance and other parameters 
required; improve the assessment of risk; clarify the interdependencies among requirements; and improve 
the understanding of the time-phasing of the need dates.   
Ultimately, all human lunar mission risks must be identified and quantified, and a process must be 
implemented to allocate the reduction of those risks among technology programs, robotic precursor 
missions, and any other available means.  For those risks identified as being most appropriately handled 
via robotic mission (data collection, experiments, technology demonstrations, or deployment of 
infrastructure), the cost of conducting the experiments and/or demonstrations must also be quantified, 
along with the risks of failing to conduct those experiments or demonstrations.  With both the benefits 
(human mission risk/cost reduction) and the costs (precursor mission experiment/demonstration cost) 
understood, managers can make accurate assessments of the robotic experiments and demonstrations, 
missions, or mission sets that provide the greatest amount of human mission benefit for the least cost and 
risk. 
It is also important to align the architecture with the Constellation Systems Program schedule, which was 
undergoing significant changes during the execution of this study.  To ensure alignment, it is 
recommended that the robotic architecture be revisited after an initial baseline Constellation Systems 
schedule has been established. 
In-Situ Resource Utilization and Surface Power Option Analysis 
Since in-situ resources utilization is a key factor in lunar exploration, it is also recommended that a more 
detailed ISRU trade study be performed that examines the costs and benefits associated with options such 
as the level of ISRU employed, the resources selected, and the approach selected.  One trade that has been 
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frequently discussed is the selection of obtaining oxygen directly from heating of the lunar regolith or 
from potential water ice in permanently shadowed regions.  It is important to understand the costs and 
benefits within the larger exploration architecture context, including factors such as launch mass, 
comparable lifecycle cost reduction, infrastructure cost, and risk.  It is also important to understand the 
cost and benefit of potential precursor missions to demonstrate feasibility and operations of ISRU 
systems.  
Surface power in support of the lunar outpost phase is also an area that merits further study.  The 
performance, cost, and risk of nuclear and solar power options should be well understood early.  Robotic 
missions may also provide emplacement of the systems needed for future crewed use. 
International Cooperation 
International cooperative opportunities should also be considered.  In order to achieve the cost savings to 
the U.S. that this study sought, it may be critical to employ international cooperation to achieve some of 
the more ambitious goals in the architecture.  Cooperation through the lunar robotic program may also 
provide pathfinder opportunities for a larger cooperation in the lunar outpost phase and toward the 
establishment of a permanent human presence on the Moon. 
Technology Development 
The LRAS team also recommends further work in understanding the technology development needs to 
achieve the lunar robotic architecture.  This study did not include the time or funding necessary for 
significant technology development; for its purposes, an assumption of four years from project start to 
launch was employed.  It is critical to have an understanding of the underlying technology development 
needs to execute the requirements provided, and the costs associated with those needs.  For the robotic 
precursor missions supporting the initial human return to the Moon, the schedule does not allow for any 
significant technology development.  This is not true for later robotic missions, such as the companion 
robotic systems that will support, complement and supplement human activities on the Moon.  The LRAS 
team recommends near-term investment in systems analysis studies to identify long-lead, high-payoff 
technologies for the robotic systems that will accompany and support human explorers.   
Communications, Navigation, and the Lunar Gravity Model 
Though specific requirements for communications and navigation are still to be refined by the programs, 
the robotic communications/navigation relay is envisioned to be a small- to mid-sized spacecraft that co-
manifest with the second robotic mission (lander) in 2011.  It is recommended that a set of guidelines be 
developed regarding the advantageous use of secondary communications and navigation payloads on 
robotic precursor missions as well as Constellation residual assets.  
Improvements to the lunar gravitation model will be important for executing precision landings and 
providing robustness in the face of contingency situations for human missions to the Moon.  In the 
implementation of the lunar robotic architecture, consideration should be given as to how a lunar gravity 
science investigation might be conducted in the most cost-efficient manner. 
Launch of a relay satellite as a co-manifest with a fixed lander in 2011 or 2012 already represents a short 
design cycle.  Pre-phase A activities should be initiated immediately to begin the processes of: forming a 
team; defining and maturing requirements; vetting the spacecraft lifetime and deployment strategy against 
the evolving robotic and constellation mission set; maturing the architectural views for the robotic lunar 
    85
relay; developing an operations concept; and identifying technology demonstrations that may be included 
as secondary payloads. 
The “Communications and Navigation” section of the appendix (Appendix D) to this report includes a 
more detailed discussion based upon the work of the Space Communications Architecture Working 
Group (SCAWG), including sections on “LRAS Relay Future Plans” and “Summary and Recommended 
Next Steps.”   
Definition of an Exploration Space Weather System 
As discussed in the “Space Radiation and Space Weather” section of the appendix (Appendix J), the 
scope of the LRAS did not include implications for the non-lunar robotic space weather architecture.  The 
LRAS team recommends that the NASA Exploration Systems, Space Operations, and Science Mission 
Directorates (ESMD, SOMD, and SMD) jointly study and understand the requirements for space weather 
robotic systems needed to safeguard human voyages to the Moon, Mars, and other destinations.  The 
appendix provides additional recommendations for this effort.   
Examination of Lower-Cost Mission Options 
It is also important to note that several lower cost mission concepts were presented to the team during the 
course of this study.  The team recommends some effort to fully understand the benefits and risks of 
utilizing such lower-cost approaches to fulfilling the requirements for a lunar robotic architecture.  It is 
possible that such approaches will provide for more frequent, lower-cost mission opportunities.
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7. Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
 
This report of the Lunar Robotic Architecture Study (LRAS) responds to a charter from the NASA 
Headquarters Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) on behalf of the NASA Administrator 
to recommend an architecture for lunar robotic precursors.  PA&E chartered the Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study (ESAS) during the spring and summer of 2005 to provide an overall architecture for 
NASA’s exploration mission.  It then chartered LRAS to provide a flexible architecture for the robotic 
spacecraft that would be required on or near the Moon as precursors to each of the architectural elements 
that ESAS recommended. 
The LRAS team was asked to address a basic set of questions: 
• Do we need robotic missions at all?  If so, why and under what conditions? 
• How would they be accomplished and at what cost?  Are they within budget? 
• What are the minimum requirements?  What is the minimum mission set? 
 
The LRAS team concluded that there are compelling reasons to conduct robotic precursor missions. 
However, the extent of the requirements depends on the degree to which NASA will implement the ESAS 
architecture. The Agency still has many decisions to make. Many additional decisions will present 
themselves as exploration of the Moon proceeds.  LRAS analyzed a set of scenarios, and assembled a set 
of potential requirements. 
LRAS makes two recommendations: 
1.  Adopt the set of requirements presented in Section 4 of this report.  
a. Establish a linkage between the risk reduction of the Constellation Program and 
individual requirements.  As Constellation’s risk strategy evolves, so may the precursor 
requirements. 
2.  Adopt the baseline architecture option through 2012 presented in Section 6 of this report. 
b. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) could be the first orbiter – it has passed 
confirmation review. 
c. Decisions concerning ISRU and robotic missions starting beyond 2012 depend on results 
of earlier missions and therefore do not have to be made now. 
In addition, the LRAS team recommends NASA pursue the future work identified in the “Future Work” 
section of this document (Section 6.6).   
LRAS did not have a current set of robotic precursor requirements.  Instead, the team drew upon the 
ESAS report, the outdated and early set of requirements of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program 
(RLEP), and other recent analyses to lay out a linkage to Constellation needs.  These linkages connect 
Constellation risks to discrete precursor requirements, and are flexible to evolve as the elements of the 
Constellation architecture are refined.  Further, the robotic precursor missions support Constellation 
milestones and development.  Schedule linkages were used to phase the requirements in time. 
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At first order, it appears the existing RLEP budget can accommodate all high-priority near-term (through 
2012) requirements.  Additional consideration was given to potential requirements, many of which might 
still provide tremendous benefit.  Within each category, the LRAS team examined a wide range of 
activities and determined whether “we would still send humans if we didn’t do them.”  This provided a 
range of potential activities scalable with the available resources.  The requirements comprise a minimum 
set; significant risk can be “bought down,” or reduced, with additional resources.  
The robotic precursor requirements emphasize communication and navigation, high-fidelity mapping 
(visual, topographic, and resource), characterizing the environment (dust and radiation), preparing for in-
situ resource utilization (ISRU), and searching for water. The primary uses of the results of these missions 
would be risk reduction for Constellation development, sortie site selection, sortie operations, and outpost 
development and site selection.  The requirements are time-phased to match these needs. This means, for 
instance, that communications, mapping, and dust mitigation must be addressed before attempts can be 
made to characterize any deposits of water in permanently shadowed craters. 
 
Figure 7.1-1.  LRAS identified, grouped, and time-phased lunar robotic precursor requirements. 
Opportunities exist for lunar science in conjunction with each element of the LRAS architecture. LRAS 
documented the competitive process by which these opportunities could be realized.  The team identified 
no lunar science requirements for precursor missions. 
The LRAS baseline architecture consists of a series of missions, linked back to their driving requirements:  
• 2008 - Orbiter to provide visual, topographic, and resource mapping  
• 2011 - Fixed Lander to characterize the polar environment for Lunar Surface Access Module 
(LSAM) risk reduction 
• 2011 - Long-Life Communications Relay to support all other robotic precursors 
• 2013 - Mobile Lander to investigate potential presence of water in cold shadowed craters  
• 2015 - ISRU Rover to demonstrate resource production  
LRAS also analyzed a series of excursions from this baseline to evaluate de-scoped ESAS mission 
scenarios and other potential decisions.  The excursions examined decision options on a lunar orbiter, 
extensible communications, the number of landers, lander mobility, and ISRU.  In particular, the 
minimum architecture – one that is within the budget profile – assumes a deferral of both the Mobile 
Lander and the ISRU Rover.  The decision on whether an outpost will need to take advantage of ISRU 
and if so, whether water is required, does not have to be made until the results of the initial orbiter 
mission have been analyzed.   
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During the course of this study, the LRO project passed its confirmation review.  The LRO meets all the 
requirements identified by LRAS for a lunar orbiter, exceeds some requirements, and accomplishes many 
of the additional considerations of highest value. Though LRO is not in the baseline, this report provides 
architecture excursions that support the LRO as the initial lunar obiter missions 
 
 
Figure 7.1-2.  LRAS Baseline Architecture and Linkages to the Elements of the ESAS Architecture 
 
LRAS identified promising opportunities that may increase efficiency and reduce budget demands. 
Innovative, low-cost missions; international partnerships; and selective NASA center assignments could 
improve the LRAS baseline architecture and potentially reduce cost. 
Current work on innovative, low-cost missions may produce tremendous benefits using novel approaches 
to further lunar exploration objectives.  The recently announced secondary payload to accompany LRO is 
an early result of this promising work.  The LRAS baseline resources ensure that the risk reduction 
requirements of Constellation are accomplished, but additional savings may be realized through 
implementation of lower-cost missions. 
International partnerships may supplement the results of the baseline architecture. The baseline focuses on 
those things required to buy down Constellation risks.  However, a number of activities – such as 
international lunar orbiter missions – were also identified that, while not absolutely required, would still 
produce tremendous benefit. 
Additional long-term efficiencies may accrue to NASA by the choice of center assignment.  The LRAS 
baseline provides a number of opportunities for small- and mid-sized spacecraft development.  The skills 
required to develop these spacecraft vary from communications and navigation to landers and mobility 
systems to search for water-ice in lunar craters.  Implementing the LRAS baseline using NASA research 
and spaceflight center capabilities could provide opportunities to strengthen NASA’s space systems 
development and operations workforce and enhance center technical skills and capabilities for future 
exploration missions. 
This report of the Lunar Robotic Architecture Study (LRAS) provides guidance and flexibility for 
decisions on lunar robotic precursor missions.  The recommendations link to the results of the ESAS 
architecture and the needs of the Constellation Program. The analysis of various requirements and 
excursions is intended to provide the flexibility to evolve with the overall exploration architecture of the 
Agency.  This LRAS report should serve as a valuable resource for NASA and others as we build the 
systems for exploring the Moon, Mars, and beyond. 
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Background 
The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) specifies a series of campaigns to return humans to the Moon, 
use it as a testbed, then conduct human expeditions to Mars. Preceding the human campaigns to both the 
Moon and Mars are preparatory robotic exploration campaigns.  
 
• Undertake lunar exploration activities to enable sustained human and robotic exploration of Mars and 
more distant destinations in the solar system; 
• Starting no later than 2008, initiate a series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare for and 
support future human exploration activities; 
• Conduct the first extended human expedition to the lunar surface as early as 2015, but no later than 
the year 2020; and 
• Use lunar exploration activities to further science, and to develop and test new approaches, 
technologies and systems, including use of lunar and other space resources, to support sustained 
human space exploration to Mars and other destinations. 
A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for 
U.S. Space Exploration, January 14, 2004 
 
 
NASA established the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP) in mid-2004 to conduct the robotic 
lunar campaign, and established the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter as the first Project within this 
Program. 
In the spring and summer of 2005, NASA conducted the Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
(ESAS). The ESAS study produced an overall architecture for human lunar return, in particular laying out 
the launch vehicles, propulsion elements, crew transport vehicles, and crew surface elements. During the 
development and testing of these architecture elements, a campaign of lunar robotic vehicles will be 
conducting precursor lunar science, scouting out potential landing sites, and laying the communication 
and navigational infrastructure upon which the human lunar missions will rely. ESAS framed out the 
expected costs of such a robotic campaign, based on the prior RLEP budget formulation work, but did not 
address the specifics of the campaign architecture. 
To complete the set of exploration architectures, a lunar robotics exploration architecture must be defined. 
It must fit within the environment established by the derived requirements of the human lunar exploration 
architecture. There are also existing and planned communication and navigation assets that can be 
leveraged, including the Deep Space Network and TDRS System. There are also existing and planned 
spacecraft from potential partners, including international partners. The precursor lunar science must fit 
into the existing environment of International Space Station research on space environmental effects and 
space science research on the solar system’s evolution. Finally, as the architecture is being deployed, it 
may be itself leveraged to conduct priority science. 
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Purpose 
The study shall assess and compile the top level requirements derived from the Vision for Space 
Exploration and the ESAS human lunar return architecture: 
• What are the robotics architecture requirements for reducing the risks to human lunar return 
and how do these compare to other risks and mitigations? 
• When does the specific site of the lunar base need to be established? How much surveying 
needs to be done, if any, to down-select to a site and how much surveying needs to be done 
on the selected site? 
• What are the precision navigation requirements that must be met with a robotic lunar 
infrastructure and what navigational technologies must be tested on the lunar surface prior to 
human lunar return? 
• What communication architecture needs to be deployed by the time of human lunar return 
and what benefits are there to deploying these elements earlier during the robotic campaign? 
• What priority science on or from the moon must be addressed prior to human lunar return, i.e. 
biological science, and what scientific results would be important inputs to future architecture 
decisions, i.e. lunar base location or in-situ resource utilization? 
• What are the necessary precursors for demonstrating technologies for human surface 
activities, including supplying power and conducting in-situ resource utilization? 
• How are the requirements best distributed among the existing Programs and Projects across 
the set of potential robotics architectures? 
 
The study shall provide a range of architectural options and a recommended option. For each option, the 
study shall answer the following:  
• What are the costs of the architecture elements, including leveraged assets? Are these costs 
within the existing budgets or, if they go outside them, do they do no harm to higher priorities 
such as CEV acceleration? 
• By what dates or milestones do the robotic elements need to be deployed, technologies 
validated, or scientific questions investigated prior to human lunar return? 
• What technical requirements or critical needs does each element fulfill? How do these 
requirements or needs vary across architectural options? 
• What are the highest cost, schedule, and performance risks that might impact the success of 
an individual element and overall campaign success? 
 
The study shall assess the integration of the potential lunar science with NASA’s existing research 
strategy: 
• What priority science of the moon could be enabled by robotic precursor missions meeting 
exploration requirements?  
• What priority science on or from the moon is enabled by robotic precursor missions? 
 
Duration 
The study shall provide the NASA Administrator a baseline architecture recommendation by Friday, 
March 31, 2006.  Additional study may be commissioned beyond that date. The final full report, with all 
background analysis shall be provided by Friday, April 28, 2006 to the Office of PA&E.  
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Scope of Work 
Requirements scope: the full set of science and exploration precursor requirements relevant to the Moon. 
This includes all lunar science requirements (including prioritization), requirements from the CEV, 
LSAM, and other human architecture elements, and communication requirements. 
Architecture scope: the architectures required to meet all science and exploration precursor requirements 
relevant to the Moon. This includes elements of multiple Programs in multiple mission directorates. In 
particular, the entire RLEP Program, the Constellation ECANS Project, the SOMD Space Network 
communication infrastructure, and the SMD Deep Space Network communication infrastructure. 
Consideration should also be given to how other non-NASA partners – including international partners – 
might contribute data and services as well as implied hardware elements to the architecture. The 
expectation is that the U.S. will lead lunar exploration with options for international partners to 
contribute. 
 
Study Approach 
The study will use the following baseline work breakdown structure to conduct its analysis: 
 
• Gather, integrate, and synthesize prior work 
o Including products from ESAS, RLEP, the Lunar Exploration Analysis Group (LEAG), 
ESMD Requirements Division, and the Advanced Planning and Integration Office 
(APIO) strategic roadmaps 
• Synthesize and document derived requirements and constraints 
o Develop metrics based on the requirements for assessing architecture options 
• Develop architectural options 
o Assess the options against the metrics 
• Validate requirements, metrics, and options at a mid-term brief 
• Conduct final options assessment 
• Develop recommendations 
• Conduct “Red Team” review 
• Write report 
 
• In parallel, work with other analysis activities: 
o LEAG (SMD/ESMD), Communication architecture study (SOMD), RLEP planning 
(ESMD), RLEP readiness reviews (PA&E) 
 
Resources 
The study team shall consist of approximately fifteen core members drawn from the NASA civil service 
and from outside of NASA as needed. The core team membership must include representatives from the 
major existing programs affected by the scope of the study, including the RLEP Program and the lunar 
science community. In addition, the core team should have among its members a familiarity with 
developing architectures and technology and research portfolios within given constraints. Finally, 
additional support to the core team members shall be used as needed for tasks such as cost estimation and 
for providing background on previous architecture work. 
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Deliverables 
The goal is to provide a technical report as a companion document to the ESAS architectures. Additional 
presentation materials will be provided for interim review of the technical work prior to the final report. 
Deliverables include: 
  
Mid-term Presentation 
Summary of derived requirements 
Preliminary architecture options 
 
Final Presentation 
Architecture options 
Recommendations 
 
Final Report 
Summary of derived requirements and critical needs, and their traceability 
Options plus analysis, measures, etc… 
Assessment of how requirements and options vary over different assumptions 
Assessment of how risk is bought down over time and how the strategy can adapt as 
conditions change and discoveries are made 
Recommendations 
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Appendix B. Team 
 
The core team consisted of the following members: 
Dan Mulville  PA&E, Study Team Lead 
Garth Henning  PA&E, Study XO 
Terri Lomax  PA&E / Human Safety and Life Support 
Jason Derleth  PA&E / ESAS Study 
Len Dudzinski  PA&E / Nuclear Study 
Tom Morgan  SMD Representative / Lunar Science 
Gordon Johnston SMD Representative 
Mark Borkowski ESMD Representative / RLEP  
Michele Gates  SOMD Representative 
John Rush  SOMD / Comm Study 
Mike Moreau  ESMD / Navigation 
Murray Hirschbein ARMD 
Jim French  JRF Engineering Services 
 
Additional support provided by: 
Tom Coonce  PA&E / Cost Analysis 
Charles Hunt  PA&E / Cost Analysis 
Butler Hine  ESMD / RLEP 
Sylvia Cox  ESMD / RLEP 
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Appendix C. Inputs 
 
During the course of the 60-days LRAS work, the study team received inputs from a variety of sources. 
These inputs were intended to provide the team with all the relevant data needed to conduct the analysis. 
Detailed Architectural Analysis 
• ESAS       (week 1, Stanley) 
• ESMD/DIO (pre and post ESAS)  (week 2, Craig, Timm)   
• RLEP Program      (week 2, Hine) 
Detailed Programmatic Briefings  
• RLEP       (week 1, Borkowski) 
o LRO      (week 4, Chin) 
o RLEP-2     (week 3, Lavoie) 
• Constellation      (week 3, Woodward) 
o Draft CARD     (week 2, Volosin) 
o LSAM      (week 3, Sayied) 
o ECANS     (week 2, Vrotsos) 
• HSRT       (week 3, Lomax) 
Status Reports 
• Science (Decadal Survey, LEAG)   (week 1, Morgan) 
• FY07 Budget Request Rollout      (week 3, Leshner) 
• LRO PDR      (week 4, Tooley) 
• Nuclear Study      (week 1, Dudzinski) 
• Communication Architecture Study          (week 1, Rush) 
• NAC/NRC      (week 3, visited NAC) 
Additional Briefings  
• ISRU 
• Dust 
• LRO Co-manifest payloads 
• Updates from LEAG, Comm, Nuclear  
• MIT/Crawley Commonality Study 
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Appendix D. Communication and Navigation 
Constellation Communication and Navigation Requirements  
One of the high-level “Needs, Goals, and Objectives” stated for the Constellation Program implies a 
capability to land at any location on the Moon, including polar and backside landing sites for which 
direct-to-Earth communication would be difficult or impossible: 
Provide the capability for the Constellation system to allow global access to any site on the moon 
with anytime return. [Constellation P-033] 
In order to enable global access, a lunar relay communication and tracking capability will be required.  
Some existing requirements with direct implications for the lunar relay include: 
•	 Landed accuracy (1km unaided, 100m aided) 
•	 Support the Constellation Command, Control, Communication, and Information Interoperability 
Specification: 
o	 Frequencies 
o	 Data rates 
o	 Modulation 
o	 Protocols, including the use of IP 
o	 Other key parameters 
•	 Provide communication for landing sites with poor or non-existent line-of-sight communication 
with Earth 
•	 Provide communication and tracking for orbiting or surface assets when poor or non-existent 
Earth-based tracking is available 
•	 Provide 2-way radiometric range and Doppler measurements for navigation of vehicles in lunar 
vicinity 
Other significant drivers for the eventual lunar relay that have not been specified include: 
•	 Will there be a requirement for communication coverage of critical events (maneuvers) 

performed on the lunar far side (out of view of Earth)? 

•	 The Constellation Design Reference Mission and Operations Concept specifies that Constellation 
missions, specifically Lunar Sortie missions, can be conducted at any location on the lunar 
surface. Assuming that communication is required to at “any location,” a Lunar Relay system has 
to be deployed.  However, the current Constellation budget guidance states that only south pole 
coverage is required. The actual need date for “global” communication and tracking capability 
will have a significant effect on deployment, lifetime, and sustainability decisions.   
Assumed RLEP Communication and Navigation Requirements 
RLEP2 preliminary design activities conducted in early 2006 provided some definition of notional 
communication and navigation requirements for robotic precursor missions: 
•	 Communication coverage of mission surface elements = 90% (note: this is a major driving 
requirement that will effect the number or size of relays, depending on implementation`) 
•	 Mobile Solution (MS) navigation via two-way range and range-rate 
•	 Assumed command rates: 4 Kbps for Lander; 10 Kbps for Mobile Solution 
•	 Assumed data rates: 300 Kbps for Lander; 100 Kbps for Mobile Solution 
•	 Landing accuracy 100 m, 3-sigma, unaided 
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•	 Improved lunar gravitation potential model (to achieve precision landing and to enable operation 
of lunar orbiters at very low altitudes). 
The RLEP2 study also provided an opportunity to examine notional data-rate requirements on a lunar 
relay spacecraft to support robotic precursor missions.  The backhaul communication includes the direct-
from-Earth (DFE) link and the direct-to-Earth (DTE) link; the notional data rates are 12 kbps and 1800 
kbps respectively. To ensure compatibility with the Constellation frequencies and protocols, it is 
assumed that S-band communication will be employed for proximity communication, and S-band 
(contingency) and Ka-band (nominal) for backhaul communication. 
Communication and Navigation Elements of LRAS 
The LRAS developed a set of missions with the objective to satisfy the highest-priority Constellation 
requirements.  Overall, most of the communication and navigation requirements identified through the 
LRAS study were not deemed to be significant drivers for the baseline or excursion architectures 
presented in this report. 
The highest-priority navigation requirements were incorporated into the first robotic precursor mission 
(orbiter) in the LRAS baseline.  These included providing high-resolution topographical data to 
characterize landing sites [LRAS-7], imaging landing sites at landform scales [LRAS-8], and improving 
the lunar gravitational potential map [LRAS-5].  The gravity science investigation is the only one of these 
key requirements not satisfied by the excursions with LRO as the first orbiter. 
Robotic landers provide opportunities to demonstrate precision landing and hazard avoidance capabilities 
that will eventually enable 100 m (3-sigma) landing accuracy, as well as specific (navigation) software, 
sensors, and algorithms [LRAS-41] used for descent and landing.  Objectives that may be satisfied by 
either lander or orbiter spacecraft include: demonstrating the routable, IP-based communication 
architecture as described in the Constellation C3I Interoperability Specification; obtaining additional 
experience with tracking and flight dynamics operations for spacecraft in the lunar environment; 
providing technology demonstrations of communication and tracking hardware; and providing residual 
communication and tracking assets for subsequent robotic and human missions. 
The robotic architecture is not required to pre-deploy beacons or other surface navigation aids for 
Constellation, nor is it required to demonstrate precision landing or hazard avoidance capabilities in 
advance of the actual LSAM test flight (unmanned landing), or specific navigation/GNC sensors or 
systems.  However, demonstrations of many of these capabilities through robotic precursor missions 
would be highly desirable and in some cases may reduce risk and lower costs later in the program. 
LRAS Lunar Relay Implementation and Alternatives Considered 
The decision to send robotic spacecraft to specific polar landing sites is the primary driver for the 
requirement to deploy a lunar relay communication capability as part of the lunar robotic exploration 
program.  NASA’s Space Communication Architecture Working Group has examined direct-to-Earth 
communication coverage for polar landing sites (Figure 1).  Even at the most advantageous polar landing 
sites, direct line-of-sight communication to Earth may be extremely limited, with average communication 
blackout periods ranging from 1 to 10 days per month.  In worst-case locations, communication outages 
were as long as 18 days per month.  Furthermore, direct-to-Earth communication would not be available 
for a mobile lander traversing into craters or behind local landscape features that obstruct a direct view to 
the Earth. These facts drive the requirement for a lunar relay communication and tracking capability. 
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Figure D-1.  Direct-to-Earth Communication Coverage Characterization 
The baseline Lunar Robotic Architecture includes a single communication and navigation relay satellite 
launched as co-manifest with a fixed lander in 2011.  This spacecraft is assumed to have a lifetime of 5-6 
years which would provide relay communication for three robotic lander missions flown between 2011 
and 2017.  The manifest with the first (fixed) lander was chosen because of excess launch vehicle 
capacity available with this launch.   
Several requirements are implicit in the assumption that a single lunar relay satellite will meet the needs 
of all of the subsequent robotic missions.  Analysis performed by the Space Communication Architecture 
Working Group (SCAWG) and Exploration Communication Navigation Systems (ECANS) has shown 
that activities focused in a specific region of the Moon (i.e., its south pole) can be supported by a 
specialized elliptical orbit with two assets providing continuous coverage.  Polar or backside landing sites 
could be supported by single relay satellite in elliptical orbit providing partial coverage.  Truly global 
coverage – maintaining the flexibility to visit any lunar landing site at any time – would require more 
satellites.  The SCAWG has presented several concepts for full lunar coverage starting with a minimum 
of five lunar relay satellites.  The landers in the LRAS baseline are assumed to be deployed to the south 
polar region of moon, to landing sites in which reliable direct-to-Earth communication will not be 
possible.  The lunar relay satellite is assumed to be deployed into a frozen elliptical orbit, providing 
partial communication coverage of the south polar region. 
The spacecraft is assumed to provide moderate data rates that can be met through an S-band 
communication link.  Furthermore, the spacecraft is designed with sufficient redundancy of critical 
systems and with sufficient orbit maintenance capabilities to ensure a lifetime of 5-6 years.   
Based in part on the results of a recent JPL Team X study conducted by the LCNS Project, it was 
assumed that these capabilities could be met by a spacecraft with a (wet) mass of between 350 and 600 kg 
and costing approximately $360 million.  The Team X study assumed a long-life, fully redundant lunar 
relay spacecraft suited for human spaceflight operations and communication data rates and burdens 
meeting the current Constellation communication requirements.   
In recognition that the design trade space for the lunar relay capability is very much open, the LRAS 
considered several other lunar relay implementation options.  Figure D-2 illustrates the LRAS 
communication and navigation relay baseline, and some alternative implementations considered.  
Alternative #1 represents an approach considered for some of the RLEP 2 lander concepts, in which each 
missions brings along a dedicated, short-duration communication relay to support specific landed 
operations for that mission.  Alternative #2 represents an accelerated deployment of the Constellation 
lunar relay satellites to support later robotic precursors, with the possible augmentation by a dedicated 
relay satellite to support earlier missions.   
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Figure D-2.  Range of Lunar Relay Options Considered 
 
A robotic lunar relay spacecraft is included in the architecture specifically to support the deployment of 
robotic landers to the south polar region, but it may also be leveraged to provide significant value to the 
overall robotic precursor program by: 
• providing communication coverage for critical events on the lunar far-side;  
• providing capability to perform gravity science by direct radiometric tracking of another 
spacecraft in lunar orbit; and  
• reducing the communication burden on vehicles operating in the lunar vicinity.   
 
Although these requirements were not deemed to be drivers for the robotic architecture, the relay satellite 
also provides a number of opportunities to reduce risks for the Constellation Program in the area of 
communication, navigation, and flight operations.  Areas of interest to Constellation include: 
• demonstration of communication and tracking to users in LLO or on the lunar surface through a 
relay;  
• flight dynamics/operations experience with the lunar relay spacecraft;  
• demonstration of Constellation C3I and IP at lunar distances; and 
• enabling a capability to improve the lunar gravity model through tracking of another spacecraft in 
low lunar orbit. 
 
Lunar Relay Trade Space and Recommendations 
The SCAWG and the Lunar Communication and Navigation Systems (LCNS) Formulation Project have 
conducted extensive analysis and trade studies regarding lunar relay spacecraft concepts, deployment 
strategies, and operations concepts.  Some of the key capabilities or characteristics that are part of the 
lunar relay trade space include: 
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• Required data rates and multiple access requirements (support for low-rate telemetry and/or voice 
communication, or high rate video and science data) 
• Support two-way range and Doppler tracking of spacecraft in lunar vicinity 
• Lifetime/redundancy requirements 
• Orbit selection and maintenance requirements (circular, elliptical, or libration point orbits) 
• Continuous or partial communication coverage, coverage of critical events 
• Deployment/replacement strategy 
• Similar or dissimilar spacecraft 
 
The following section summarizes some of the key considerations in the development of the lunar relay, 
and previous analysis and trades that have been performed.  More details are provided in referenced white 
papers from the LCNS project and reports developed by the SCAWG. 
Spacecraft Capability and Lifetime 
The capability of the lunar relay satellite is driven by the communication and tracking requirements as 
well as any technology demonstrations that will be flown.  The coverage requirements drive the number 
and orbital location of satellites.  In turn, the link distances from these orbits drive the size of antennas 
and transmitters on the relay, which impact the satellite power and attitude controls design.  The number 
of users (multiple access requirements) further drives antenna design and power requirements.  Orbit 
selection and spacecraft lifetime may be large factors in the size of the lunar relay spacecraft due to orbit 
maintenance requirements and the corresponding delta-V (net velocity change to the vehicle) required.   
There are a number of other important drivers on the lunar relay satellite design.  A lunar relay spacecraft 
that supports the Constellation C3I interoperability specification is expected to require a highly stable 
reference oscillator onboard the satellite for generation of reference frequencies and ranging codes.  Data 
rates and multiple access requirements are key drivers to the communication system design, especially to 
the power subsystem and the antenna subsystem.  To a first order, supportable data rate is linearly 
proportional to the spacecraft transmitting power and the antenna size.  The antenna subsystem is often a 
critical factor in the spacecraft design because of its impact on total mass and stability, the possible need 
for stowage during launch and erection in orbit, and the requirement for accurate target pointing.  A 
steerable high gain antenna provides high data rate performance, but it requires dedicated mechanical 
structure and pointing control, which adds weight and operational complexity to the spacecraft since both 
the lunar relay and the user spacecraft may be required to have onboard ephemeris for both vehicles.  An 
omni antenna, on the other hand, has poor link performance but it has a wide beamwidth and does not 
usually require additional structure and complicated control.  A phase array antenna can produce a large 
number of beams simultaneously, thus providing a multiple access function.  They can be steered 
electronically over a rather large angular range without the need for mechanical pointing systems.  The 
main disadvantage is the hardware complexity, as the signal path of each array element requires precisely 
controlled phase and amplitude that must be maintained over a wide range of temperature, signal level, 
and other space operation conditions.   
An attempt was made to assess the range of spacecraft sizes/capabilities that might be considered for the 
lunar relay.  The Team-X study provides the most recent data point on a lunar relay satellite conceptual 
design that meets the currently assumed Constellation lunar relay requirement.  Tables 1 and 2 give some 
of the general trends one can expect for small, medium, and large satellites based on current Earth 
communication satellite systems and conceptual lunar communication satellite systems.  Smaller satellites 
generally have lower throughput due to restrictions of mass and power.  Less power typically results in 
lower-orbit (because of the shorter link distance) with a more stringent antenna-pointing requirement.  To 
reduce the requirement for pointing of antennas (i.e., mobile users) a low-frequency communication 
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payload is generally chosen.  The larger satellites have more capacity, allowing for greater throughput and 
life duration, but they also require greater power and mass, resulting in higher cost.  The higher power 
allows for higher altitude satellites (for the longer link distance).  The major advantages of high-frequency 
payloads are increased available bandwidth and decreased user antenna size.  Moderate performance can 
be obtained with a medium satellite, at a higher cost than a small satellite and lower than a larger satellite.   
 
Size Name/Manufacturer 
Mass 
(kg) 
Life 
Cycle 
(years) Link Data Rates 
Pow
er 
(W) Orbits 
    
Relay to 
Trunk 
Relay to 
User 
Relay to 
Trunk 
Relay to 
User   
Small 
Relay 
(<250 kg) 
XSS-11 Derivative 
(proposal) <100 n/s S UHF <1 Mbps ~1 Mbps 380 
Frozen 
Elliptical 
(polar) 
APL Big Sky 350 n/s S/? UHF/? 1 Mbps 1 Mbps n/s n/s 
Mid (250 
to 750 kg) GSFC RLEP2 Relay 400 kg (wet) 6 Ku S (USB) ~3 Mbps 
N chan 
at 300 
kbps 
400 
Frozen 
Elliptical 
(polar) 
Large 
(>750kg) Team X 
1240 
(w/cont) 10 Ka/X Ka/S 
25-400 
Mbps 
10 Mbps 
25-200 
Mbps 
25Mbps 
1472 
Frozen 
Elliptical 
(polar) 
Table D-1.  CN Lunar Relay Satellite Options (Based on Conceptual Lunar Communication Satellite System) 
 
Size
Name/Manufacture 
(EXAMPLE) Mass (kg)
Life cycle 
(YRS)
POWER 
(W) Orbits
Satellites to 
Trunk
Satellites to 
User
Satellites to 
Trunk
Satellites to 
User
Small <250 kg        
Relay
ORBCOMM 43 3 UHF/VHF UHF/VHF 57.6 KBPS 4.8 KBPS 160 LEO
Mid <750 kg 
Network/interface
IRIDIUM 556 8 KA K/L ~2.64MBPS 2.4 KBPS 1400 LEO
Large >750 kg   
Constellation 
Class
TDRSS 800 10 KA S 25-300MBPS 300KBPS-6MBPS 1800 GEO
Link Data Rates
Comm/Nav Lunar Relay Satellite Options (Based on Earth Communication Satellite System)
 
Table D-2.  CN Lunar Relay Satellite Options (Based on Earth Communication Satellite System 
 
Orbit Design and Delta-V requirements 
The selection of the relay satellite orbit and assumed spacecraft lifetime will be significant drivers for the 
spacecraft propellant mass fraction (propellant mass divided by initial spacecraft wet mass).  Multiple 
relay orbit types were considered during the early stages of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program - 2 
(RLEP2) trade studies.  These included circular orbits, elliptical orbits, frozen orbits, and 3-body orbits 
(Earth-Moon, L2, and Butterfly).  The percent orbit visibility as a function of the propellant mass fraction 
was plotted in Figure 3 for all of the cases.  The 718 x 8088 km frozen orbit exhibits the best 
characteristics; this represents a compromise between the low-ΔV circular orbits and the high-visibility 
elliptical orbits.  Furthermore, the propellant mass fraction is less than 25 percent.  While the Butterfly 
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orbit looks promising, additional analysis is required before it can be considered as a viable option for a 
relay satellite. 
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Figure D-3.  Orbit Visibility vs. Propellant Mass Fraction for 6-Year Mission 
 
Full Lunar Coverage vs. Re-Deployment of Assets 
A study was conducted by the SCAWG to explore the feasibility of deploying communication relays to 
cover specific sortie regions, in which enough fuel was budgeted to maneuver the relay and change the 
orbit significantly to support follow-on sorties at different locations on the lunar surface.  A set of 
scenarios, or sortie and outpost sequences, were assumed for comparison.  The following are common 
assumptions for this set of scenarios: the period of interest is 12 years; the outpost location, after the 
sorties conclude, is at the south pole; and one mission is flown every six months.  The various sequences 
are intended to span the relative difficulty associated with providing continuous coverage for missions, 
assuming that assets are deployed in conjunction with the mission flight if at all possible.  For each 
sequence, where possible, several different approaches to providing coverage were explored.  An example 
might be that south pole coverage could be provided by three relays in a circular polar orbit or by two 
relays in a highly inclined elliptical orbit.  For each solution, the maximum ΔV requirement for a relay in 
the 12-year period was recorded, along with the total number of relays needed over the time span, and the 
wet mass of the largest relay. 
When the results of this study are combined and compared to the results of the full coverage 
constellations developed in other SCAWG studies, several basic conclusions can be drawn.  The first is 
that if the sequence of sorties results in a demanding (high total delta-V) set of maneuvers and there is a 
need to have relays revisit previous sortie sites on a more-than-infrequent basis for data collection from 
remaining assets, then the fuel penalty and number of relays required is often higher than would be the 
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case for simply deploying a full-coverage constellation to begin with.  However, if the sortie sequence is 
less demanding (begins with several near-side missions that can use DTE comm) and infrequent revisit 
rates for previous sortie locations are acceptable, there are several more efficient solutions using the "re-
deployment" approach—needing less propellant and/or fewer relays than deploying a full coverage 
constellation.  The difficulty at the current juncture is that the exploration plan is still somewhat unknown, 
making it difficult to optimize the deployment approach and orbit selection.  
South Pole Relay Configuration – Potential for Critical Event Coverage 
Analysis was conducted to investigate the concern about the SCAWG recommended architecture for 
south pole exploration with respect to its ability to cover critical events for an orbiting spacecraft.  The 
relay orbit configuration assumed for the study is two spacecraft in an elliptical-inclined orbit with 
apoapsis over the south pole region.  This also assumes that near-side events are covered by direct-to-
Earth (DTE) communication.  The representation of a vehicle in a far-side maneuver is simplified as a 
low equatorial orbit (altitude 110 km).  This configuration is illustrated in Figure D-4. 
 
Earth
Earth
View: Lunar North Pole Looking Down
Moon with elliptical orbit 
containing two comm relays 
(blue) and sample “vehicle” 
conducting “critical 
maneuvers” – simplified as a 
low equatorial orbit (red).
Constraint applied to analysis 
run: between -80 longitude 
and +80 longitude (Earth-
facing region) connectivity to 
the relays is not calculated –
assumption is that DTE 
comm would be used here.
Period of low lunar equatorial 
orbit is such that ~66 minutes 
are spent in “far-side” regime 
(shaded yellow). 
+90deg Longitude
-90deg
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Figure D-4.  Frozen Orbit Far-side Coverage 
The results for contact times over a one-month period indicate that performance changes as the apoapsis 
rotates in longitude; when the apoapsis is “near-side” the far-side connectivity between the relays and the 
vehicle drops, and when the apoapsis is “far-side” the connectivity peaks.  The results of the study show 
that there are multi-day periods of good connectivity (>90% of the far-side orbit covered) to vehicles in 
equatorial low lunar orbit, as well as multi-day periods of performance presumably not suitable to critical 
event coverage (<30%).  Later investigation will use example lunar orbit insertion profiles or trans-Earth 
injection profiles as a more accurate representation of critical maneuvers.  
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Deployment Options and Tie to Constellation 
The major deployment options for a lunar relay capability to support robotic precursor missions can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Each mission provides its own communication capability for the duration of the mission (LRAS 
Alternate #1).  This approach has two sub-options: 
a. No technology validation ties to the Constellation Program (current approach for LRO 
and RLEP2). 
b. With technology validation ties to the Constellation Program. 
2. Early mission(s) carry communication infrastructure that services the mission on which it is 
launched and subsequent robotic missions.  Technology validation ties to the Constellation 
Program could be a subordinate decision; however, since this option is more expensive than 
deployment option 1, the additional investment strongly argues in favor of making the investment 
pay off by coupling it with the Constellation Program.  This has three sub-options: 
a. Provide short-term infrastructure (i.e., less than 3 years) that allows use of lightweight, 
single string spacecraft (modification to LRAS Baseline in which multiple small satellites 
are launched instead of one medium class orbiter); 
b. Provide medium-term infrastructure (i.e., the 6-year duration of the Lunar Robotic Phase) 
that requires use of mid-size, dual string spacecraft (LRAS Baseline); 
c. Provide long-term infrastructure (i.e., 10+ years) enabling the spacecraft to be used to 
support both the Lunar Robotic Phase and the Human Sortie Phase, requiring use of 
large, dual string spacecraft (LRAS Alternate #1). 
 
Coupling the robotic communication and navigation (C&N) with the Constellation Program offers 
significant potential for risk mitigation and cost reduction during the human sortie and outpost phases but 
carries additional costs during the lunar robotic phase.  The degree of technology validation plays a role in 
determining the benefits and the extent of programmatic interdependency created.  Technology validation 
can include: measuring performance of prototype hardware and software, space qualifying components; 
demonstrating C3I Interoperability capabilities; and calibrating navigation techniques. 
Determination of the sub-option for Option 2 is also partly a technology validation factor.  Option 2a, 
using a 3-year spacecraft, provides an opportunity to fly an upgraded payload on the replacement 
spacecraft needed to cover the 6-year Lunar Robotic Phase.  Option 2b does not provide the upgrade 
opportunity but costs less than Option 2a.  Option 2c provides the least opportunity to evolve the C&N 
capability, costs less than Options 2a or 2b, and pre-positions at least one relay spacecraft prior to the first 
Constellation flight.  Cost estimates of these options were performed as part of prior SCAWG studies.   
Option 2c would couple the lunar robotic and human sortie phases for C&N operations.  Thus, the LRAS 
spacecraft providing C&N capability for lunar robotic phase would have to meet performance 
requirements for the human sortie missions as well as either being placed into an orbit that satisfies 
coverage for both phases or is capable of being moved from its lunar robotic phase orbit to its human 
sortie phase orbit.  The first case constrains the choice of orbits but does not impose additional mass 
penalties, while the second case relaxes the orbit choices but may impose significant additional burden on 
propellant (100-300 kg) for performing a plane change. 
Summary and Recommended Next Steps 
The Lunar Robotic Architecture provides a set of missions that satisfies a prioritized set of lunar precursor 
requirements, including opportunities to reduce risk related to implementing communication and 
navigation capabilities for the Constellation Program. 
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A lunar relay capability was included in the baseline architecture as a mid-sized spacecraft co-manifested 
with the second robotic mission (lander) in 2011.  The relay satellite will require some level of 
redundancy of critical systems to provide reliable communication and navigation services to RLEP 
missions.  The relay will provide several Mbps data rate likely at S-band, and be compliant with the 
Constellation C3I Interoperability Specification.  The navigation payload will enable minimally two-way 
Doppler tracking of another robotic spacecraft and would support recovery of far-side gravity 
measurements (assuming availability of a low-orbiting spacecraft to track).  The spacecraft and 
expendables will be sized to provide a 5-6 year lifetime in order to support the three landers identified in 
the baseline LRAS architecture.  Development of the lunar relay spacecraft and primary payload is 
considered low risk, as all technologies have a high TRL, however the development timeline for such a 
spacecraft must start immediately to support availability for a 2011 launch. 
In addition to the primary payload, the lunar relay should provide opportunities for technology 
demonstration payloads such as new antenna designs, optical communication elements, beacons, 
reconfigurable radio devices, and/or science payloads.  The lunar relay satellite will also allow important 
experience operating a relay satellite and utilizing it for tracking and navigation functions at lunar 
distances.   
A goal for the robotic lunar relay should be to realize a maximum level of extensibility to the eventual 
lunar relay satellites that will be deployed to support Constellation missions.  In addition to providing the 
foundation for Constellation ground infrastructure and operational procedures, the robotic relay satellite 
may actually implement and demonstrate the specific communication frequencies and protocols specified 
in the Constellation C3I spec. 
An important aspect of the LRAS communication and navigation architecture is a policy or set of 
guidelines for the advantageous use of secondary communication and tracking payloads on robotic 
precursor missions, thereby incrementally developing a communication and tracking infrastructure.  This 
approach has been demonstrated very successfully at Mars with the incremental establishment of the Mars 
Network.  The mission cost delta of a secondary payload may be as much as an order of magnitude less 
than the cost of a dedicated communication and navigation satellite.  The suite of secondary payloads that 
may be launched with an orbiter, lander, or a residual asset (lunar landing platform, lunar delivery 
vehicle) includes a full up orbital communication and navigation relay payload, a navigation beacon or 
transponder, and a landed relay payload.  For example, an orbiter can carry all three types of packages, 
while a lander platform may carry a beacon transmitter/transponder or a relay for landed assets.  Even if 
the communication or tracking capabilities afforded by secondary payloads do not fully satisfy 
Constellation requirements, they may still provide significant advantage in terms of redundancy and 
flexibility.1 
Improvements to the lunar gravitation model will be important to executing precision landings and for 
providing robustness in the face of contingency situations for human missions to the moon.  The LRO 
mission proposes to obtain moderate improvements in lunar far-side gravity errors through utilization of 
laser ranging measurements to the surface recorded on the far-side; however, significant improvements in 
lunar gravity models will require a dedicated gravity science investigation.  The Japanese Selene mission 
promises to provide some additional lunar gravity science improvements, and NASA has been in 
negotiations with the Japanese to share data from this mission.  Dedicated lunar gravity science proposals, 
providing the best opportunity to improve lunar gravity models, have been made to recent SMD calls.  A 
novel proposal has also been made in which the Wind spacecraft could be maneuvered to the Earth/lunar 
L2 point and used to collect two-way Doppler data to the LRO spacecraft, thereby improving knowledge 
of lunar far-side gravity.  Since the LRO mission will provide only a small improvement in the current 
                                                     
1  See LCNS white paper. 
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lunar gravity knowledge and the LRAS architecture does not include a second robotic orbiter, a priority 
should be assigned to evaluating these and other options for improving lunar gravity knowledge to ensure 
this requirement will be met before lunar sortie missions begin. 
Some key drivers for the lunar relay implementation were recognized to be undefined or at a low level of 
maturity, including: 
• What will be done on the Moon (Doug Cooke study)?  What is the specific Constellation mission 
manifest (landing locations, dates)?  Is global communication coverage required, or only 
coverage focused on a particular landing site of interest, such as the lunar south pole? 
• Detailed Constellation communication and tracking requirements for polar or backside landings, 
and for coverage of critical events. 
• Detailed communication and tracking requirements for robotic precursor missions.   
• Formal list of Constellation risks to be mitigated through robotic missions. 
 
A high priority should be assigned to achieving better definition of some of these driving issues. 
Launch of a relay satellite as a co-manifest with a fixed lander in 2011 or 2012 already represents a short 
design cycle.  Pre-phase A activities should be initiated immediately to begin the processes of :forming a 
team; defining and maturing requirements; vetting the spacecraft lifetime and deployment strategy against 
the evolving robotic and constellation mission set; maturing the architectural views for the robotic lunar 
relay; developing an operations concept; and identifying technology demonstrations that may be included 
as secondary payloads.  Some key studies that should be conducted as a follow-up to the LRAS report 
include: 
• Additional Team X or IMDC studies to investigate the range of spacecraft sizes/capabilities to 
support both robotic and Constellation requirements. 
• A trade study to assess the requirements for radiometric beacons, either for landing aids or for 
navigation aids for orbiting vehicles and relay satellites. 
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Appendix E. Mapping (Visual, Topographic, and Resources) 
 
As NASA considers the next phase of lunar exploration, reflection on historical expeditions of 
exploration provides a touchstone for the utility of maps created in the course of exploration.  The United 
States Exploring Expedition conducted by the U.S. Navy during 1838-1842 provides allegorical evidence 
of the enduring value of maps and related geographical data.  The detailed maps of the South Pacific and 
geographical information generated during the course of this scientific expedition were still in use by the 
U.S. military a century later in planning and executing military campaigns during World War II.  In short, 
it is difficult of overestimate the enduring value of applying state-of-the art measurement techniques to 
best characterize terrain characteristics and distribution of potential resources in the form of maps and 
geographical information systems products.  
Further lessons on the value of maps and their development come from comparisons of historical 
examples to help set the context and expectations for the current era of lunar exploration.  Just as Lewis 
and Clark led the Corps of Discovery to first visit the vast, uncharted regions of the western U.S., the 
Apollo missions to the Moon (supported by launches of 21 robotic precursors, including impactors, 
orbiters, and landers) proved that it is possible for man to land on the Moon and safely return to Earth.  
Following Lewis and Clark’s monumental achievement, more than four decades of intensive surveying of 
the western frontier ensued, which led to the development of the transcontinental railroad, the discovery 
of mineral resources, and the settlement of agricultural areas that have formed the bedrock of the most 
successful economy in history.  Apollo did not lead to more detailed exploration of the Moon.   
Clementine in 1994 and Lunar Prospector in 1998 have marked the early stages of our return to the Moon 
and have provided resource maps that compel further exploration, particularly of the polar regions.  
 
Figure E-1.  Priority exploration sites identified by ESAS 
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The map resulting from the data gathered by remote sensors of a modern orbiting platform is the 
representation of knowledge from the combined data products.  The lunar map should be a tool to enable 
cost-effective exploration both "now" and when routine human access is possible.  A map that combines 
human-scale imaging of the Moon with the fine-scale topography provides both the context for safe 
exploration as well as information for autonomous precision navigation of both precursors and human 
landings.  For near-term utility, an accurate depiction of the lunar topology will assist with the design and 
employment of low-cost landers that will provide “ground truth” to calibrate data collected from orbiting 
sensors.  Adding resource information, to the extent that it can be assayed by remote sensors (and later 
calibrated by landers), would be a key ingredient for making assessments of future commercial activities 
on the Moon.  
While the long-term value of commercial activities that are stimulated by detailed knowledge of the 
Moon is difficult to assess at this time, the near-term pay offs are clearly articulated through the 
satisfaction of requirements such as those levied on the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).  The LRO 
data products assimilated in a map of the Moon provide the following:  
• recognition of landing hazards as well as those that could challenge EVAs 
• navigation-scale topography in a center-of-mass coordinate frame at scales suitable to enable 
cost-effective and safe surface-based exploration 
• information about local environments that could pose challenges to human spaceflight systems 
and habitats (i.e., cold surface temperatures, dust, steep slopes, huge boulders) 
• information about local resources worthy of further in-situ reconnaissance 
Intelligent exploration planning requires a map that is effectively a “data frame” in which information 
from a variety of sources can add to a more complete understanding of the lunar environment.  The basis 
for a map with enduring value is a global topographic grid that is geodetically tied to the Moon’s center-
of-mass.  Enabling navigation solutions for landing on the moon and planning traverses across the lunar 
surface are obvious valuable attributes of a map, but additional information tied to the grid makes a map 
strategically important for long-term utilization.  Attributes of the grid resolution as will be provided by 
LRO are altimetry with sampling density at finer than 1 km globally and finer than 100m in the polar 
regions (i.e., latitudes above 75 degrees N or S), with vertical accuracy of ~ 1-3 m RMS, depending on 
local tilts and slopes.  The map further consists of a global 100m scale visible wavelength imaging dataset 
under suitable illumination for documenting shadowed regions, with layers that represent the seasonal 
variation of illumination of the polar regions where permanently shadowed regions prevail.  The LRO 
map includes a global, sub-km scale dataset of temperatures with finer than 5K accuracy, spanning the 
range from~ 40K to 400K, with finer approximately 300m-range sampling in the polar regions as defined 
above. The LRO map further includes a simplified global oxygen resource map at scales finer than 500m 
that utilizes color ratios (UV/Vis) to isolate regions of elevated ilmenite and other titanium oxides in the 
lunar soils potentially suitable for ISRU extraction studies.  Finally, the LRO map includes a 10km scale 
global dataset that describes the hydrogen (H) abundance of the sensible upper 1m of the lunar regolith at 
sensitivity levels as fine as ~ 100-200ppm, and an associated neutron albedo dataset that describes the 
neutron environment out to energies as high as 10 MeV (for purposes of human adaptation to the deep 
space lunar environment).  
Layered on top of the LRO map will be hundreds to thousands of sub-meter resolution image mosaics that 
describe candidate human landing sites for sorties and outposts and associated hazards due to blocks and 
local landscape features.   Each of these 10x10 km^2 samples will formally identify all 1m scale features 
within each candidate landing zone from which probabilistic models of landing hazards can be derived.   
 
The definition of the LRO map will engage all baseline LRO datasets and will be augmented by an 
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affiliated global gravity field for the Moon, embellished by far-side gravity acquired by whatever means 
possible (e.g., potentially to include far-side tracking of the JAXA Selene sub-satellites, as well as 
topography-gravity solutions from LRO/LOLA). 
 
Other datasets, as they become available, can be layered on top of the LRO map, as needed, including 
regolith characteristics from microwave imaging experiments on Chandrayaan, Mini-RF technology 
demonstration on LRO, and other orbiters.  A global mineralogical map at sub-km resolution can also be 
attached, as acquired from the NASA-developed hyperspectral mineral mapper (MMM) onboard the 
ISRO Chandrayaan orbiter. 
Another perspective on the value of the LRO base map is the sophistication and complete global coverage 
of the Moon when compared to the Apollo-era robotic precursors.  During Apollo, 9 Rangers (6 of which 
failed), 7 Surveyors, and 5 Lunar Orbiters characterized the moon globally at a 4 km scale and at a limited 
number of equatorial landing sites at the 2-3m scale.  (They achieved higher resolution at the lander sites.)  
As was evidenced by the Apollo 11 landing experience, a great deal of piloting skill was needed to avoid 
unanticipated hazards.  For the cost of a single LRO mission, the knowledge of the Moon will greatly 
increase beyond what was learned during Apollo and the Clementine and Lunar Prospector missions that 
flew in the 1990s.  As this enhanced understanding of relevant facets of the lunar environment is 
translated into exploration hardware development, the value of mission success and appropriate 
development cost can be realized for spacecraft and lunar habitat designs that are neither “over-designed” 
due to uncertainty in landing areas and habitat site nor “under-designed” in not accounting for hazards. 
Finally, the value of perceiving the Moon as another world in the context of human exploration will be 
realized through a map that layers multiple levels of information to spark popular imagination.  By 
presenting facts about the lunar environment that leverage modern information technology, such as 
“Google Moon,” school children, academics, and stakeholders of future space commerce interests can 
study the Moon from a variety of perspectives and levels of sophistication.  The value of stimulating 
education and potential business opportunities to maintain a growing economy cannot be solely attributed 
to a map, but one can argue that such a map may be the necessary catalyst to popularize the lexicon of 
exploration among NASA’s stakeholders: the American public.  
116 
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Appendix F. Environment (Dust and Radiation) 
 
The Moon provides a harsh environment: nearly non-existent atmosphere; intense ultraviolet (UV), 
galactic, and solar cosmic radiation; lack of liquid water; abrasive corrosive, potentially toxic dust; and 
large temperature extremes.  In many ways, the environment of the Moon is even harsher than that of 
Mars, without the mitigating factors of an atmosphere to block radiation and an increased gravity 
environment. Assessment of lunar environmental effects on systems (human and physical) is an essential 
aspect of the development of innovative technologies, knowledge, capabilities, and infrastructures to 
support human and robotic lunar exploration.  Apollo astronauts accepted a high level of risk for their 
short (3-4 days) stays on the Moon that will not be acceptable for longer sortie missions.  Even more 
technical challenges must be overcome for longer-duration stays on the lunar surface; based on Apollo 
experiences, dust and radiation may be limiting issues that will determine the extent of capabilities and 
mission durations that can be supported.  Requirements related to the lunar environment include better 
characterization of the environment, better understanding of its interactions with humans and machinery, 
and demonstrations of technologies for monitoring and mitigating environmental impacts.  Environmental 
characterization should occur as early as possible in the robotic lunar architecture in order to provide 
significant risk mitigation and other benefits for the Constellation Program by informing technology 
development and the design of vehicles, suits, life support, and other systems.  
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Appendix G. In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) 
 
Even before the Apollo landing, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) was proposed as a means to reduce to 
cost of establishing a permanent presence on the Moon.  It has been extensively studied since that era and 
was a key element of the Space Exploration Initiative in the early 1990s.  The value of ISRU is in 
exploiting local resources to provide materials that would otherwise have to be “imported’ from Earth.  
Uses include consumables such as O2 for life support and propellant, construction materials such as 
metals and glass, and radiation protection from regolith. 
Overall, the elemental composition of the lunar soil (regolith) resembles that on earth: about 40% oxygen, 
with large amounts of silicon, aluminum, and iron, and lesser amounts of other metals such as titanium.  
While the mineralogical composition is also similar (complexes of metals and metal oxides), the exact 
form and concentrations can be somewhat different.  Nonetheless, many processes have been developed 
to extract both oxygen and metals from the lunar regolith – typically producing ceramic or glass 
construction materials as useful byproducts.  The merits of the individual processes are principally in their 
compatibility with lunar operations such as: sensitivity to size and composition of feedstock; consumption 
of material not readily available on the Moon such as carbon electrodes; energy consumption; and mass of 
a production plant and its ability to be shut down and re-started.  Regolith also contains dissolved gasses 
primarily deposited by the solar wind that are easily extracted by heating the soil to about 700°C, though 
they are quite scarce.  Hydrogen and helium are two of the more “abundant” gasses, but only exist in 
concentrations of about 50 ppm.  As such, large-scale hydrogen production from lunar soil to complement 
oxygen production is not practical.   
More recently, there has been indirect evidence of possible deposits of ancient cometary water that has 
survived in some isolated, permanently shadowed “cold traps” near the lunar poles, such as on the floor of 
the Shackleton crater.  The evidence is principally based on abnormally high concentrations of hydrogen 
– much higher than the background – measured by the Clementine spacecraft in 1994.  Subsequent radar 
data from the Arecebo observatory in Puerto Rico did not fully confirm the Clementine data, leaving the 
question open to further resolution.  If water exists in sufficient concentration and near enough to the 
surface to be easily “mined,” it represents a potential source of rocket fuel (e.g., H2/O2).  However, if it 
exists it is in a thermal environment of about 40K (-233°C), making mining operations potentially very 
difficult. In all cases, the potential value of ISRU is in the “economics”, not the “physics.”  This, in turn, 
depends on the scale of human lunar presence, the frequency of transits between Earth and the Moon (or 
other destinations), and the specific composition of the lunar soil near an outpost.   
The LRAS study assumed the eventual use of in-situ lunar resources to support lunar surface operations – 
and potentially, in the long-term, broader exploration goals – to be an integral part of the overall 
exploration program.  However, it was not considered required for lunar sorties mission or an initial 
outpost.   Further, the study considered two classes of ISRU: (1) a large facility nominally producing 50 
to 100 metric tons/yr of O2 from regolith, or possibly O2 and H2 from water existing in a permanently 
shadowed crater and alternately, and (2) a small-scale ISRU facility with a production capacity of about 
one to several metric tons/year.  As a reference, the ESAS study determined that about 8 metric tons of 
O2 would be needed to fuel two LSAM ascents per year and about 1 metric ton/year as a backup to 
closed-loop life support.   
For all large-scale operations, critical constraints include plant mass, power consumption and amount of 
feedstock per kilogram of product.  This tends to limit the range of processes and raw feedstock options 
that can practically be considered.  Typically, production facilities could weigh tens of metric tons, 
process thousands of metric tons of material and consume about 50 kW to 100 kW, likely requiring a 
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nuclear reactor power source.  Furthermore, if a reactor is required it will have to be shielded from the 
outpost at a distance of up to 2 km, either by natural features or a constructed shield (e.g., a regolith 
berm).  All of this limits site options and greatly increases the need for in-situ validation of critical 
mining/production/storage technology and engineering systems.  These requirements are carried over 
from the pre-landing robotic missions to the human sorties missions.  
Small-scale ISRU operations can be more “forgiving,” putting fewer constraints on feedstock, requiring 
only about 10 kW to 15kW, (which could likely be achieved with solar power), and weighing less than a 
metric ton.  This further relaxes constraints on where an outpost can be placed.  However, for an 
equatorial site nuclear power may still be required to prevent frequent, harmful start/stop cycles imposed 
by the long lunar night.  For both large and small-scale ISRU, mass and power requirements for water 
extraction from a 40°K environment may be much higher than for regolith. 
About midway through the study, the LRAS team concluded that constraints and requirements for large-
scale ISRU dominated the site location and subsequently the requirements on robotic precursor missions.  
As such, initial large-scale ISRU required an early commitment to build an outpost and focused most of 
the attention of robotic precursor mission requirements on supporting this decision.  This was not the case 
for small-scale ISRU.  As such, the LRAS study deferred the issue of large-scale ISRU and focused only 
on small-scale ISRU.   Small-scale ISRU could remain an open option for sortie missions as well an 
outpost for all likely lunar locations, and would not preclude eventual large-scale ISRU operations.   If an 
early decision was made to commit to large-scale ISRU, the scope of robotic precursor and sortie 
missions could be expanded and adjusted to accommodate this requirement.  
As such, the LRAS study considered resource mapping to be a primary near-term requirement.  While 
small-scale ISRU operations can be carried out in one form or another anywhere on the Moon, some 
regions are richer in different feedstock than others and may favor a different production process. For, 
example, Apollo found the lunar highlands to have much higher titanium content (e.g., ilmenite) than the 
lowlands.  Mapping is much more critical if the use of lunar water-ice is considered a viable option, since 
its existence, if any, is in very limited spots.  Lunar water restricts siting to the lunar pole regions, and 
more specifically requires a suitable human landing site be found near enough to a shadowed cold trap to 
make operations reasonable.  This raises the question if ISRU is economically or operationally reasonable 
if water is accessible and sufficiently abundant but requires placing a sortie/outpost in a thermally hostile 
location.  The question of lunar water can only be answered by direct in-situ survey. Remote sensing 
cannot provide the detail on depth of deposit or constituency in the soil (e.g., dispersed throughout or 
distributed as lunar “ice cubes”).  Studies by Paul Spudis of JHU/APL indicate up to twenty samplings up 
to a few hundred meters apart are needed.  Options for obtaining these data include a rugged, robust – and 
likely expensive – rover, possibly requiring an RTG power source; a rocket-powered hopper requiring 
development of a re-usable, deep-throttling engine; or a series of sophisticated surface-penetrating probes 
launched or dropped from orbit in the crater.  All of these would be “firsts,” including digging or drilling 
up to two meters into 40K, highly compacted regolith.  
For ISRU involving regolith, studies by the Johnson Space Center indicate small robotic demonstration 
plant could be developed in about 5 years.  It would weigh about 50-100 kg and require less than a 
kilowatt of power.  The same likely holds true for water-bearing material delivered from a crater.  A full-
scale plant could be developed in about 10 years.  Accepting the general opinion that a demonstration 
plant should be about 20% the capacity of a full-scale plant, a small-scale ISRU facility is about the right 
size to serve as a demonstration for a possible large-scale facility beyond 2025.  
A summary of lunar ISRU issues and conclusions considered by the LRAS is given below: 
•Focused on O2 from regolith or H2/O2 from water-ice in a lunar cold trap (crater) 
    121
• Two general classes of ISRU were considered: 
– Large-scale (several tens of metric tons of O2/year; principally for propulsion) 
• Processing method very dependent on site and feedstock 
• Drives outpost: extensive specialized infrastructure for mining, processing and storing 
weighing a few to several thousand metric tons requires nuclear power, about 50-100 KW 
• This option was deferred   
– Small-scale (up to several metric tons of O2/year for LSAM and life support; only about 1 
metric ton/year needed for life support) 
• Site-independent, multiple processing options for regolith 
• Does not drive outpost site or infrastructure: a few hundred kilogram plant and several  
KW of power will produce several metric tons/year 
• Solar power suitable (nuclear may be desirable to prevent harmful start/stop cycles if 
subject to lunar night) 
• Small demonstration plant on the order of 50 to 100 Kg, can be developed in about 5 
years 
• Full production capability requires about 10 years to develop 
The biggest issue is the question of water: how much (if at all), how deep, how far away how to extract 
and transfer, and how equipment will survive at 40K. 
•  An ISRU demonstration mission to the Moon can wait until 10 year prior to capability need date. 
 
Key questions include: 
•  Is H20 present and accessible for ISRU/ISPP? 
• Can O2 be extracted effectively from lunar regolith at the planned outpost site? 
• How is it best to validate these processes: rate, power, storage, and supply? 
• Can regolith be excavated, manipulated, transported, and processed effectively? 
• Is the assumed few-hundred-watts required for demonstration mission correct? 
• Is the best scale for an ISRU demonstration mission at least 20% of full scale? 
• How much is required to support environmental closed-loop life support?  
o A few-kilowatts for 8MT/y production rate of O2? 
• What are the tradeoffs and determining factors to consider in deciding between nuclear and solar 
power? 
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o Both electrical and thermal energy can be supplied by solar power if near constant 
illumination site. 
o Is nuclear required to maintain ISRU reactor temperature throughout day/night cycle? 
o 50-100 kWe is required for 50-100 MT/y in-situ propellant production of O2. 
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Appendix H. Nuclear Power 
 
The LRAS study team investigated the power requirements for lunar exploration in order to understand 
the potential robotic precursor requirements to support the development of lunar power systems.  Several-
kilowatt-class power will be required for small in-situ resource processing (less than 1 Mg/y O2 
production from regolith) and early nighttime operations at a human lunar outpost.  Full-up outpost 
operations, which may involve significant processing of lunar resources (8Mg/y O2 production from 
regolith), will require on the order of 15-70 kWe, depending on the process used.  This power could be 
supplied by solar energy, transformed into electricity using photovoltaics (PV), which is an attractive 
option below 50 kWe, especially if the solar arrays can be sited in a region of the lunar surface that 
receives near constant illumination.  An important requirement for a robotic precursor mission is the 
confirmation of the existence of these “peaks of eternal light,” and the mapping of their boundaries.  
Above about 50 kWe the physical area required for the solar arrays becomes an issue of feasibility.  
However, the stated objective for the lunar exploration architecture is to enable sorties and an eventual 
outpost anywhere on the surface of the Moon.  Away from the constant illumination region, the solar PV 
option is not mass-competitive with a nuclear reactor if energy storage is required to provide 50 kWe 
during the 14-day lunar night.   
A significant issue that will drive the decision between solar PV and nuclear power is the relative cost of 
the two systems.  Recent cost estimates for a Fission Surface Power System (FSPS) are in the $3B range, 
motivating the consideration of a foreign partnership to provide this capability.  The feasibility of this 
partnership, as well as the credible potential to significantly reduce the cost of a domestic fission surface 
power system development, is currently under study.  Alternatively, Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) 
are an option to provide a few kilowatts of power (up to about 5 kWe per unit).  These kilowatt-class RPS 
systems could be brought by each sortie mission and left at the outpost site, eventually accumulating 
enough power capability to enable a human stay through the lunar night with minimal operations.  
Ultimately, however, a fission surface power system will be required to enable robust operations (greater 
than 100 kWe) anywhere on the lunar surface. 
Recent advances in Stirling power conversion technology offer opportunities to provide significant, 
affordable nuclear power using radioisotope energy sources.  The only feasible radioisotope for use as a 
source of space power and heat is Plutonium-238 (Pu238) due to its long half-life (87 years), and 
relatively benign radioactivity (primarily alpha-particles which are easily shielded, and low-energy 
gamma rays).  Pu238 is very expensive and in limited supply both domestically and internationally.  The 
Advanced Stirling Convertor (ASC) project, run by the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), has recently 
demonstrated 38% heat-to-electricity conversion efficiency at the convertor level.  Highly efficient 
Stirling power conversion is a key to increase power output from plutonium General Purpose Heat Source 
(GPHS) modules, and extend the limited Plutonium supply.  Using ASC technology, about 1 kWe can be 
produced from 7.8-8.4 kg of Pu238 fuel contained in 13-14 GPHS modules (each GPHS contains .6 kg of 
Pu238 fuel, produces 250 Wth, and costs about $2M in FY06).  The Advanced Stirling Radioisotope 
Generator (ASRG ~ 160 We BOL) is in development in SMD using the ASC technology. 
Lunar surface validation of the ASRG flight system would be an important achievement.  Currently the 
ASRG is caught in the usual advanced capability trap, where no potential user will consider employing it 
before it is flight proven, and it cannot be flight proven until someone commits to using it.  By flying and 
ASRG on a lunar robotic mission as a primary or back-up power source, NASA would validate the 
advanced power system, making this new capability available for lunar robotic exploration, and  
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potentially for other planetary surface and deep space missions.  Furthermore, by validating advanced 
Stirling dynamic power conversion in space using a radioisotope power source, NASA would support the 
development of larger, kilowatt-class systems, and perhaps the development of Stirling convertors for a 
fission reactor system.   
Large-scale ISRU and outpost operations will require hundred-kilowatt class power, likely requiring a 
surface nuclear reactor.  During the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) a fission surface 
power system was studied and developed as a concept.  Several issues were identified for further study, 
including the potential need for precursor missions.  These were: the potential use of regolith for radiation 
shielding, the need to move the FSPS from the cargo lander and emplace it, and the end-of-life disposal of 
the FSPS.  If regolith can be used a shielding it could save up to 10,000 kg of shielding mass that would 
otherwise need to be transported from Earth.  Options for using regolith as shielding include: burying the 
reactor; “berming” regolith around the reactor; building a wall around the reactor using regolith in bags or 
in sintered bricks; and using natural terrain features between the reactor and the crew.  Precursor missions 
are required to answer feasibility questions for: digging holes, moving significant amounts of regolith, 
sintering regolith bricks, and mapping the terrain in sufficient detail around potential outpost sites to 
identify advantageous terrain features where a reactor could be emplaced.  The second issue identified 
during ESAS was the challenge of moving large, heavy masses on the lunar surface.  Specifically, 
precursor missions will need to determine what soil bearing and traction is possible in order to design a 
surface mobility system.  The final ESAS issue deals with disposal of the reactor at end-of-life, which 
likely requires burying the reactor, and has the same associated issues as burying the reactor for shielding 
purposes.  In the development of a surface nuclear power system, the effects of lunar dust on power 
systems and potential strategies to mitigate those effects would also require data from robotic precursors. 
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Appendix I. Opportunity Science  
 
The fundamental goal of the President’s Vision for Space Exploration is “to advance U.S. scientific, 
security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.”  NASA has clearly 
assigned the responsibilities and authorities to its Mission Directorates for achieving this.  These 
responsibilities apply for planning future exploration architectures, formulating and implementing 
missions, and analyzing mission results.  NASA makes architectural decisions concerning the 
implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration at the Agency level, and the Science Mission 
Directorate (SMD) has a vital role to represent the Space and Earth science interests of the United States’ 
scientific community.  NASA conducts missions at the Mission Directorate level.  SMD is responsible for 
formulating and implementing missions and for conducting scientific research and analysis that advance 
space and earth science interests.  The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is responsible 
for formulating and implementing missions and for conducting research and analysis that enable human 
exploration, including associated life and microgravity research.   
Planning Future Exploration Architectures   
The advancement of U.S. scientific interests is part of the fundamental goal for the Vision for Space 
Exploration.  Future exploration architectures all require choices across a zone of intersection between 
science and exploration.  Responsibility for planning future exploration architectures is held at the 
Agency level.   
ESMD is responsible for refining these exploration architectures and for developing the exploration 
systems that implement these architectures.  SMD is responsible for representing U.S. earth and space 
science interests in the development of these architectures and systems.  For example, SMD participated 
in the Agency-level Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) and the Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (PA&E) Lunar Robotics Architecture Study (LRAS).   
To expand and validate SMD’s capacity to represent U.S. earth and Space science interests, NASA is 
committed to setting the science priorities jointly with the community via the National Academies of 
Science and the NASA Advisory Council (NAC):  
1) SMD had tasked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study of lunar science priorities in 
the context of its recent decadal survey for solar system science and NASA’s emerging exploration plans.  
2) SMD and ESMD are jointly supporting the external Lunar Exploration Analysis Group (LEAG) under 
the NAC.  
3) SMD is assisting ESMD and the NAC on exploration-related workshops and requests for information.  
Understanding these science priorities is also essential for guiding the formulation and implementation of 
science missions.   
Formulating and Implementing Missions 
SMD and ESMD formulate and implement space missions to fulfill their respective responsibilities.  
SMD’s responsibility is to formulate and implement missions that advance U.S. space and earth science.  
These science-driven missions address science that enables human space exploration as well as science 
that is enabled by human space exploration.  SMD sets priorities for missions in the context of the 
Agency’s and the nation’s overall science priorities.  NASA is committed to setting priorities jointly with 
the science community.  It is absolutely vital that NASA draw upon the judgment of active members of 
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the research community in setting these priorities.  NASA is dependent on the continued support and 
assistance of the broader science and industrial communities to successfully implement the highest 
priority science in a cost-effective manner.   
SMD’s science program includes missions to the planned destinations for human explorers.  For the 
Moon, SMD competitively selected through the Discovery program the Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3) 
as a Mission of Opportunity.  M3 will fly on the Indian Space Research Organization's (ISRO) 
Chandraayan-1 Mission.  SMD will issue by the end of the year a request for studies of innovative 
“suitcase science” instruments and packages to accompany future lunar astronauts.  For Mars, the Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter recently entered Mars orbit.  This science mission will be followed by the 
launches of Phoenix in 2007, the Mars Science Laboratory in 2009, and the Mars Scout in 2011.  Mars 
missions beyond 2011 are outlined in a community “road mapping” activity now undergoing review by 
the National Academies of Science.  SMD’s science missions will produce new knowledge that will be 
useful to ESMD for future human exploration.  SMD works with the ESMD to seek the most effective 
approach to address the intersection of science and exploration priorities.   
ESMD’s responsibility is to formulate and implement missions that enable human exploration.  ESMD is 
implementing precursor missions to obtain the strategic knowledge necessary to design and implement 
human exploration systems.  ESMD’s Robotic Lunar Exploration Precursor (RLEP) missions, including 
the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) currently approaching mission confirmation, are focused on the 
essential knowledge needed to reduce risks and understand the design constraints for future lunar 
exploration systems operating on the Moon.  SMD is supporting ESMD in a role similar to traditional 
program science role, by providing scientific advice on instrument selection, development, and related 
matters.   
Analyzing Mission Results 
NASA will take a shared approach to analyzing science and exploration mission results.  SMD will 
support the analysis of scientifically valuable results from ESMD missions.  Science enabled by 
exploration activities will compete in the same prioritization process as the rest of the SMD science 
program.  For example, if confirmed and implemented, the results of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
will address priority science objectives identified by the NRC in the 2002 decadal survey.  As these data 
become available SMD will support their scientific analysis by funding proposals selected through openly 
competed solicitations for SMD’s science research programs.   
ESMD will support the analysis of results from SMD missions that address exploration system needs.  
Science lays vital foundation for exploration by providing the framework for the strategic knowledge that 
enables exploration.  For example, SMD’s Heliophysics research program is undertaking the scientific 
study of the radiation environments beyond the Earth’s magnetosphere where future space explorers will 
live and work.  It is vital to understand this environment in order to design missions and systems to 
mitigate its effects.  SMD’s Planetary Science research program will answer basic science questions about 
the Moon, Mars, and other solar system destinations, providing results that will inform the essential 
engineering decisions concerning the design and implementation of human exploration systems.   
The Vision for Space Exploration provides a fresh impetus for the science that enables exploration and for 
the science that is enabled by exploration.  Human exploration of space beyond low Earth orbit is a core 
element of NASA’s strategic plan.  SMD has a vital role in advancing the scientific interests of the United 
States as part of this national vision.   
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Appendix J. Space Radiation and Space Weather 
Introduction 
Space radiation and its effects on humans and on robotic systems are key drivers for the development of 
exploration systems, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.  Mitigating space radiation risks will 
almost certainly require a mixed strategy of structural, operational, and countermeasure solutions.  
Enabling structural and operational solutions will place requirements on both the lunar and non-lunar 
robotic architectures.  The LRAS team does not believe that the implementation of space radiation 
countermeasures will result in significant lunar robotic architecture requirements.  For the lunar robotic 
architecture, the LRAS team has determined that these requirements are not near-term drivers, but can be 
addressed as part of the initial human sorties.  However, the implications for the non-lunar robotic 
architecture were beyond the scope of the LRAS.  The LRAS team recommends that the NASA 
Exploration Systems, Space Operations, and Science Mission Directorates (ESMD, SOMD, and SMD) 
jointly study and understand the requirements for space weather robotic systems needed to safeguard 
human voyages to the Moon, Mars, and other destinations.   
Space Weather and the Space Radiation Environment 
The overall space radiation environment can be categorized by the steady state galactic cosmic ray 
radiation, the relatively steady state solar wind, and the infrequent and difficult to predict large-scale 
coronal mass ejections that result in an intense flood of high-energy (Mev) protons and electrons.  This 
last, time-variable aspect of the space radiation environment is referred to as “space weather.”  For 
operations on or near the Moon, another consideration is secondary: backscattered albedo radiation from 
the lunar surface.   
Galactic cosmic rays are ubiquitous, with very low particle fluences, but energies as high as several 
Gev/nucleon and a composition that spans the atomic spectrum.  Hydrogen is the most abundant element 
though iron is typically considered the most “dangerous” when its higher atomic weight is considered.  
Overall, cosmic rays are not acutely lethal but they are very difficult to stop and over the long-term 
represent a measurable health risk.  The steady state solar wind is far denser than cosmic rays but easier to 
stop.  The primary solar risk is from large-scale coronal mass ejections that result in an intense flood of 
high-energy (Mev) protons and electrons.  These events are infrequent, sometimes hard to predict and can 
be lethal, though they typically last only a few days.   
Mitigation of Space Radiation Risks 
Mitigation against cosmic rays and the steady state solar wind will almost certainly require a mix of 
structural shielding, operational procedures that limit time spent in less shielded environments, and 
possibly medical countermeasures to reduce or repair the damage caused by these particles.   
Mitigation against large-scale coronal mass ejections will also require a mix of structural shielding, 
operational procedures, and countermeasures.  Structurally, astronauts outside Earth’s protective magnetic 
field for extended periods must be provided with safe havens from these “storms.”  Operations during the 
entire flight of human lunar missions will have to provide the assured capability to detect or predict 
impending events in time to alert the astronauts and allow them to secure themselves within their safe 
havens.  This may place operational constraints on the astronaut activities such as EVAs and rover 
traverses.  Options for robotic systems that increase warning time or reduce the time required to shelter 
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and protect astronauts will enhance the operational flexibility of future human exploration missions, 
increasing their value in addressing the fundamental goal for the Visions for Space Exploration. 
Lunar Robotic Architecture Requirements 
Providing structural protection against the steady state solar and galactic radiation fluence and providing 
safe havens against solar “storms” may have implications for the lunar robotic architecture.  Future 
studies may indicate that the best way to provide this protection is to utilize in-situ materials for shielding.  
This will require considerable lunar robotic activity over an extended period to: measure and validate the 
shielding properties of the lunar regolith; test and demonstrate the capacity to adequately manipulate the 
regolith; and emplace and bury the sheltered structure.  It is the assessment of the LRAS team that NASA 
does not need to begin these efforts prior to the first human return to the Moon.  These efforts are not 
near-term drivers for the lunar robotic architecture.   
Providing the assured operational capability to detect or predict impending events in time to alert and 
secure the astronauts implies demands for both the lunar and non-lunar robotic architecture.  For the lunar 
robotic architecture, the primary implications are related to 1) providing timely alerts to astronauts 
regardless of their activity or location, and 2) safely conveying astronauts to a safe haven or robotically 
delivering safe havens to the astronauts.  The first implication is covered by the requirement to provide 
continuous two-way communication with the astronauts, regardless of their location or activity.  The 
second implication is closely coupled to the detailed design of the human systems; the LRAS team finds 
that the requirements for robotic companion systems to assist astronauts in sheltering from solar storms 
will have to be developed as part of the detailed lunar sortie and outpost design.   
Providing medical countermeasures to reduce or repair damage caused by space radiation are not 
expected to have significant robotic architecture implications.   
Non-Lunar Robotic Architecture Implications 
As stated in the Study Charter and Scope section of this report (section 2.2): “LRAS discussed but did not 
address other robotic missions such as space weather sentinels that orbit close to the Sun.”  As mentioned 
in the introduction of this appendix, the LRAS team recommends that the NASA Exploration Systems, 
Space Operations, and Science Mission Directorates (ESMD, SOMD, and SMD) jointly study and 
understand the requirements for space weather robotic systems needed to safeguard human voyages to the 
Moon, Mars, and other destinations.  As a start to defining the focus of this study, the LRAS team has 
identified an initial set of study questions: 
• What are NASA’s needs regarding operational space radiation and space weather for human and 
robotic missions as a function of time?  How well defined are these needs for the various stages 
of exploration, and what additional work is needed to develop clear space radiation requirements 
for future exploration systems? 
• What are the current and projected future limits on the predictability of large-scale coronal mass 
ejections?  What science measurement and modeling investments are needed to accelerate the 
advancement of knowledge based upon the needs of human exploration missions?  What 
technology investments are needed to implement these missions and advance this modeling 
capability?   
• Are there exploration-driven instruments that should be considered for future missions throughout 
the solar system that would help in gathering statistics or other data related to future human 
exploration operations?  To what extend is the ESMD-funded Radiation Assessment Detector 
(RAD) flying on SMD-funded Mars Science Lander (MSL) a precedent and model for how these 
instruments could be implemented?   
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• How quickly do large-scale coronal mass ejections move from the Sun to the Moon (and to other 
locations in the solar system where humans will be operating)?  What is the natural variability in 
the velocity of these ejections?  Is there such a thing as “space climate” or “seasons” on the sun, 
periods in which coronal mass ejections are certain to be slower or nonexistent, providing 
reduced operational constraints and greater flexibility for lunar EVAs and other operations? 
• How early can these ejections be detected, and what robotic systems enable early detection and 
warning?  What capabilities are within the scope of current and planned science missions?  What 
operational capabilities for assured detection and warning are beyond the scope of research 
missions? 
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Appendix K. Prior U.S. Missions to the Moon 
 
The Office of Space Science (OSS) managed the robotic data acquisition and used two previously funded 
independent programs to support the Office of Manned Spaceflight’s (OMSF) Project Apollo.  Fueled by 
the Cold War competition and the Soviet Luna program, Project Ranger began as a hard-lander 
exploration program led by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in 1959 to provide data on the lunar 
surface.  JPL also started the Surveyor program as a soft-lander and orbiter mission to validate landing 
technologies and increase lunar environmental knowledge by 1960.  Due to the initial failures in Project 
Ranger and development difficulties in the Surveyor program, OMSF requested OSS/JPL to prioritize 
Project Ranger and the Surveyor lander in late 1962.  OSS eliminated the Surveyor orbiter because the 
projected data gained by an orbiter mission would apply to Apollo mission planning rather than the 
spacecraft design.  In late 1963, the Lunar Orbiter program officially began at Langley Research Center 
(LaRC) in response to the high resolution photography necessary from the Requirements for Data in 
Support of Project Apollo (15 June 1962) and the August 1963 release of the request for proposals (RFP).  
The Boeing Company won the contract to build the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft that carried a flight 
photographic system with nominal 1-meter and 8-meter resolution from a 46-kilometer altitude.  While 
the Surveyor landers essentially superseded the data from Project Ranger, the Surveyor experiments 
provided significant lunar surface information about mechanical properties and physical characteristics 
that complemented the high-resolution Lunar Orbiter images.  
During the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) Explorations Program 
Office evaluated the combined Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter robotic missions as “adequate” for Project 
Apollo and “absolutely necessary” in providing landing site surface characteristics and topography data. 
The JSC report also concluded that the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter data did not affect Apollo component 
design, but played an important role by confirming the basic lunar surface model used for designing 
Apollo hardware and preparing topography models for landing site evaluation and crew training. 
Overall, the Apollo robotic precursors applied not to the initial vehicle design, but to mission operations 
planning and design confirmation. For imaging, the SEI team recommended 1-to-2 meter resolution as 
adequate, but noted that resolution of greater that 1 meter seemed unnecessary. 
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Mission Launch 
Date 
Type 
Ranger 3 01/62 Hard Lander (missed the moon) 
Ranger 4 04/62 Hard Lander (hit farside) 
Ranger 5 10/62 Hard Lander (missed the moon) 
Ranger 6 01/64 Hard Lander (TV failed) 
Ranger 7 07/64 Hard Lander 
Ranger 8 02/65 Hard Lander 
Ranger 9 03/65 Hard Lander 
Surveyor 1 05/66 Soft Lander 
Lunar Orbiter 1 08/66 Orbiter 
Surveyor 2 09/66 Lander (crashed) 
Lunar Orbiter 2 11/66 Orbiter 
Lunar Orbiter 3 02/67 Orbiter 
Surveyor 3 04/67 Soft Lander 
Lunar Orbiter 4 05/67 Orbiter 
Surveyor 4 07/67 Lander (crashed) 
Explorer 35 07/67 Orbiter 
Lunar Orbiter 5 08/67 Orbiter 
Surveyor 5 09/67 Soft Lander 
Surveyor 6 11/67 Soft Lander 
Surveyor 7 01/68 Soft Lander 
Apollo 8 12/68 Orbiter (1st Human to orbit the moon) 
Apollo 10 05/69 Orbiter  Test LM in lunar orbit 
Apollo 11 07/69 Mare Tranquillitatis (1st manned lunar landing) 
Apollo 12 11/69 Oceanus Procellarum (near Surveyor 3 spacecraft) 
Apollo 13 04/70 Flyby (aborted mission after onboard explosion) 
Apollo 14 01/71 Fra Mauro (1st highland mission) 
Apollo 15 07/71 Hadley-Apennines (1st use of rover, extended LM) 
Apollo 16 04/72 Descartes (Lunar highlands) 
Apollo 17 12/72 Taurus-Littrow (Last Apollo landing, 1st geologist 
lunar astronaut) 
Explorer 49 06/73 Lunar Orbit radio astronomy explorer (RAE B) 
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Clementine 01/94 Orbiter (BiStatic radar indications of polar water) 
Lunar 
Prospector 
01/98 Orbiter (Neutron Spectroscopy indications of polar 
“water’) 
Table L-1.  NASA Moon Landers  (Source: Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Project Office) 
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Appendix L – Acronyms 
APL   Applied Physics Laboratory 
ASC   Advanced Stirling Convertor  
ASRG   Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator 
ATP   Authority to Proceed 
BUR Bottoms-Up Review  
C3I Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence 
C&N communication and navigation 
CaLV   Cargo Launch Vehicle 
CARD   Cost Analysis Requirements Document 
CER   cost-estimating relationship 
CEV   Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CHF   critical heat flux 
CLV   Crew Launch Vehicle 
COSPAR  Committee on Space Research 
CRISM   Compact Reconnaissance Imaging Spectrometers for Mars 
DRM   design reference mission 
DSN   Deep Space Network 
DTE   direct-to-Earth 
ECANS  Exploration Communication Navigation Systems  
ECLSS   Environmental Control &  Life Support System 
EDS   Earth Departure Stage 
EELV   Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
ESAS   Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
ESMD   Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
EVA   extra-vehicular activity 
FOM   figure of merit 
FSPS   Fission Surface Power System  
GCR   galactic cosmic ray 
GNC   guidance, navigation, and control 
GRACE  Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment 
GRC   Glenn Research Center 
GSFC   Goddard Space Flight Center 
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HEND   High Energy Neutron Detector 
ICSAT    Integrated Cost and Schedule Analysis Tool 
IMU   Inertial Measurement Unit 
IPAO   Independent Program Assessment Office 
ISRO   Indian Space Research Organization 
ISRU   in-situ resource utilization 
ISS   International Space Station 
LCNS   Lunar Communication and Navigation Systems 
LEAG   Lunar Exploration Analysis Group 
LEO   low-Earth orbit 
LIDAR   Light Detection and Ranging 
LCROSS  Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite 
LLO   low lunar orbit 
LOI   Lunar Orbit Insertion 
LPRP   Lunar Precursor and Robotic Program 
LRAS   Lunar Robotic Architecture Study 
LRO   Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter  
LSAM   Lunar Surface Access Module 
M3   Moon Mineralogy Mapper 
MCO   Mars Climate Orbiter 
MER   Mars Exploration Rover 
MGS   Mars Global Surveyor 
MPL   Mars Polar Lander 
MRO   Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter 
MSL   Mars Science Laboratory 
MVACS  Mars Volatiles and Climate Surveyor 
NAC   NASA Advisory Council 
NAFCOM   NASA/Air Force Cost Model 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRC   National Research Council 
OMSF   Office of Manned Spaceflight 
PA&E   Program Analysis and Evaluation 
REDSTAR   Resource Data Storage and Retrieval 
RF   radio frequency 
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RLEP   Robotic Lunar Exploration Program 
RPS   Radioisotope Power Systems 
RTG   radio-isotope thermal generator 
SCAWG  Space Communication Architecture Working Group 
SEI   Space Exploration Initiative 
SMD   Science Mission Directorate 
SOMD   Space Operations Mission Directorate 
SRB   solid rocket booster 
TDRS   Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 
TOR   Terms of Reference 
UHF   ultra-high frequency 
VHF   very high frequency 
138 
 
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA’s Lunar Robotic Architecture Study
Final Report
July 2006
www.nasa.gov
N
A
S
A’s Lunar R
ob
otic A
rchitecture S
tud
y 
 
Final R
ep
ort  
 
July 2006
NASA-TM-2006-214067 Vol. 1
